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Civil Procedure. Ho-Rath v. R. I. Hospital, 115 A.3d 938 (R.I.
2015). The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the statute of
limitations for medical malpractice actions provides a minor
Plaintiff with an option of: (1) a parent or guardian filing on the
minor’s behalf within three years of the alleged malpractice or of
its reasonable discovery or (2) the minor filing on his or her own
behalf when the minor reaches the age of eighteen, at which time
a parent’s loss-of-consortium claim may be tolled alongside the
minor’s claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On July 16 2010, the Plaintiffs Jean and Bunsan Ho-Rath1
(“Jean” and “Bunsan”) sued Rhode Island Hospital and associated
medical professionals,2 (collectively “RIH”) and Woman and
Infants Hospital of Rhode Island and associated medical
professionals3 (collectively “WIH”)4, on behalf of their minor
daughter, Yendee Ho-Rath (“Yendee”), who was born on January
9, 1998.5 The Plaintiffs’ claims were founded on theories of
negligence, lack of informed consent, corporate liability, and
vicarious liability in connection with the diagnosis and treatment
of Yendee’s genetic blood disorder, alpha thalassemia.6 The

1. Ho-Rath v. R. I. Hosp., 115 A.3d 938, 940 (R.I. 2015). The Plaintiffs
will be referenced by their first names, just as the case did, in order to avoid
confusion.
2. Id. at 941, n.2. These medical professionals are: Lewis Glasser,
M.D., William Ferguson, M.D., Fred Schiffman, M.D., and B.E. Barker, Ph.D.
Id.
3. Id. at 941, n.3. These medical professionals are: Calvin E. Oyer,
M.D., Jami Star, M.D., and Marsha Sverdup, M.S. f/k/a Marsha Pagnotto,
M.S. Id.
4. Id. at 941. While the Plaintiffs named many other defendants in the
complaint and amended complaint, the defendants named here are the only
pertinent defendants discussed in this case. Id.
5. Id. at 941.
6. Id.

639
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640 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:639
Plaintiffs also asserted individual loss-of-consortium claims.7 The
Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants failed to diagnose and treat
Yendee despite Jean, Bunsan, and Yendee’s brother being tested
for the disorder as early as 1993.8
On February 8, 2011, RIH moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’
individual claims.9 On July 7, 2011, the trial justice granted the
Defendants’ motions to dismiss and held that the statute of
limitations barred both the Plaintiffs’ independent loss-ofconsortium claims and the claims brought on behalf of Yendee.10
The trial justice noted that since Yendee was a minor, the tolling
provision in section 9-1-14.1(1) would permit Yendee to sue on her
own behalf upon reaching the age of eighteen, the age the
disability is removed.11 Final judgments were subsequently
entered in favor of the Defendants.12 The Plaintiffs appealed, and
the Defendants cross-appealed.13 The Supreme Court issued its
final decision on May 19, 2015.14
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Medical Malpractice Claims Brought on Behalf of Minors
Justice Suttell wrote for the majority.15 Upon review,16 the
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. RIH argued that under § 9-1-14.1 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, the Plaintiff’s loss-of-consortium claims were not part of the tolling
portion of the statute and therefore were time-barred. Id. On February 28,
2011 WIH moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims on the same theory. Id.
The Plaintiffs argued against the Defendant’s motions to dismiss on the
grounds that §9-1-14.1(1) may be interpreted to permit the tolling of the
statute of limitations for a minor who sues on a medical malpractice theory,
until three years after the minor’s eighteenth birthday. Id. The Plaintiffs
further argued that since loss-of-consortium claims derive from the claims
brought on Yendee’s behalf, the loss-of-consortium claims are also tolled until
three years after Yendee’s eighteenth birthday. Id.
10. Id. at 942.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 938.
15. Id. at 951. Justice Goldberg did not participate in the decision.
16. Id. at 942. For the court to affirm a motion to dismiss it must be
“clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief from the defendant under any set of facts that could be proven in
support of the plaintiffs claim.” Id. (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994,
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court looked to sections 9-1-14.1 and 9-1-1917 of the Rhode Island
General Laws to address the dispute between the Plaintiffs18 and
the Defendants19 regarding the Plaintiffs’ medical malpractice
claims brought on behalf of Yendee. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Defendants’ motions to dismiss, as it found the language of
section 9-1-14.1 unequivocal; therefore, it found section 9-1-14.1
capable of only one rational interpretation.20 Nevertheless, the
court cited to its precedent cases of Bakalakis v. Women & Infants’
Hospital21 and Dowd v. Rayner22 to illustrate its decision.23 The
1000 (R.I. 2012)).
17. Id. at 944 (“§ 9-1-19 provides in pertinent part: ‘If any person at the
time any such cause of action shall accrue to him or her shall be under the
age of eighteen (18) years . . . the person may bring the cause of action, within
the time limited under this chapter, after the impediment is removed.’”)
(quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-19 (1956)).
18. Id. Plaintiffs’ argument was that § 9-1-14.1(1) contains only a
maximum time limit and does not use language explicitly requiring the minor
to wait until the disability of age is removed. Id. Thus, according to
Plaintiff’s, § 9-1-14.1(1) permits parents or guardians to bring medical
malpractice claims on behalf of minors at any time until the minor’s
eighteenth birthday, at which time he or she has three years to bring suit on
his or her own behalf. Id. Thus, Plaintiffs argued their suit was timely as it
was filed before Yendee’s twenty-first birthday. Id.
19. Id. WIH’s argument was that § 9-1-14.1(1) instead limits the tolling
provision of § 9-1-19, by requiring that when a suit is brought on a minor’s
behalf, it must be filed no later than three years after the alleged
malpractice. Id. WIH argued that Plaintiff’s interpretation of § 9-1-14.1(1)
leaves the statute interchangeable with § 9-1-19 since it would permit a
minor’s suit to be brought at any time before the minor’s twenty-first
birthday. Id. Additionally, WIH argued that since Plaintiffs brought a claim
on behalf of Yendee, more than three years after the alleged malpractice,
Yendee is no longer permitted to take advantage of the § 9-1-14.1(1) tolling
provision, and thus, Yendee may not bring a suit when she turns eighteen.
Id.
20. Id.
21. 619 A.2d 1105, 1106 (R.I. 1993). Parents filed a medical malpractice
suit within the three-year limit of the alleged malpractice on behalf of minorchild against doctors involved in the prenatal and delivery of the minor. Id.
The parents later sought to amend their complaint to add additional
defendants after the three-year limit past. Id. The court held that the
general tolling statute does not affect or supersede the requirement of the
medical malpractice statute of limitations that one who is under disability of
age, mental incompetence, or otherwise and on whose behalf no action is
brought within three years of occurrence must bring action within three
years of the removal of disability. Id. at 1107. The court noted that to permit
otherwise would bring about the unwelcomed situation where the action
brought within three years would merely be preliminary to the main event to
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642 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:639
court further acknowledged, “if the Legislature did not intend to
limit24 a minor’s ability to initiate medical malpractice actions . . .
section 9-1-14.1 would be unnecessary”25 as section 9-1-19 already
accomplishes the same result in a general manner for medical
malpractice cases.26 The court held that its decision provided the
most sensible result given the dual purposes of the statute to
promote certainty and finality and avoid stale claims, but also to
protect individual plaintiffs from those limitations where those
plaintiffs cannot exercise their legal rights while under certain
constraints.27
The parents had time to file, but did not;
accordingly, Yendee’s ability to bring suit is not jeopardized
because she may file suit when she turns eighteen.28
B. Loss of Consortium Claims of Parents
Upon review, the court interpreted sections 9-1-14.1(1)29 and
9-1-4130 of the Rhode Island General Laws to determine whether
when the disability is later removed. Id.
22. 655 A.2d 679, 681–82 (R.I. 1995). The Legislature enacted the
statute in 1976 in response to the medical malpractice “crisis” within the
state at which time the legislature had an interest in limiting the number of
medical malpractice suits, but also wanted provide minor victims a fair
opportunity to have their claims adjudicated. Id. The rule exists to ensure
that minors are not disadvantaged by their disability during minority to
ensure that, the rule serves to restrict the number of suits or amendments of
complaints when the suit is brought on behalf of the minor. Id. at 682.
23. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 945–46.
24. The Limitation of Actions Chapter of R.I. Gen Laws (2012) includes
§§ 9-1-14.1 and 9-1-19.
25. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 945 (citing Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1107).
26. Id. at 947.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 948.
29. While courts must not interpret statutes with myopic literalism,
“[u]nder no circumstances will this Court construe a statute to reach an
absurd result.” Id. at 943 (quoting National Refrigeration, Inc. v. Capital
Properties, Inc., 88 A.3d 1150,1156 (R.I. 2014)).
30. Id. at 948–49. The court provided:
Pursuant to § 9–1–41, parents are permitted to recover damages for
the loss-of-consortium of a minor child caused by tortious injury.
This statute provides in pertinent part: “(c) Parents are entitled to
recover damages for the loss of their unemancipated minor child’s
society and companionship caused by tortious injury to the minor (d)
Actions under this section shall be brought within the time limited
under §§ 9–1–14 or 9–1–14.1, whichever is applicable, for actions for
injuries to the person.”
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the claims between the Plaintiffs31 and the Defendants,32
derivative in nature, were time-barred. The court affirmed the
decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims.33 The
court declared that a parent’s loss-of-consortium claim in a
medical malpractice case should be tolled alongside the minor’s
claim to which it derived.34 Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ derivative
claim may be brought alongside Yendee’s when she reaches the
age of eighteen.35 The court ultimately found that consolidating
the cases into one suit would be in line with the various policy
interests regarding efficiency.36
C. Dissent
Justice Flaherty dissented,37 contending that section 9-1-14
(1) of the Rhode Island General Laws was capable of two
reasonable interpretations, that the statute: (1) prohibits a suit
Id. (quoting R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-41 (2012)) (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 948. The Plaintiffs argued that their loss-of-consortium claims
are derivative to those brought on behalf of Yendeee. Id. Accordingly, § 9-114.1(1) is the applicable statute of limitations. Id. This statute attaches to
the derivative claim and should be the same statute to which it derived,
Yendee’s. Id. Thus, the Plaintiffs argued that their individual claims should
benefit from §9-1-14.1(1) and not be dismissed. Id.
32. Id. RIH argued that while the Plaintiffs’ claims are governed by § 91-14.1(1), the Plaintiffs’ claims were, nevertheless, untimely, as they were
brought more than three years after the occurrence of the alleged
malpractice. Id. RIH further argued that while § 9-1-14.1 applies to both the
Plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims and to those brought on behalf of Yendee,
the statute’s application produces different results. Id. Since Yendee is
“disabled” due to her age, she may file when she turns eighteen, the age the
disability is removed. Id. But since the Plaintiffs’ were not “disabled,” they
may not attach the claim to Yendee’s. Id. Further, RIH argued that the
Plaintiffs’ loss-of-consortium claims were separate and distinct from the
underlying tort claims and should, therefore, be analyzed as such. Id. WIH’s
argument was consistent with RIH. Id. WIH further noted that since the
Plaintiffs’ were not disabled, they were not part of the statute’s protected
class of individuals and, thus, cannot be afforded the statute’s protections.
Id.
WIH further argued that permitting the attachment would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the provision since it would allow stale
claims to be brought when there is no real impediment to bring the claims
earlier. Id.
33. Id. at 951.
34. Id. at 950.
35. Id. at 951.
36. Id. at 950–51.
37. Id. at 951.
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644 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:639
until the minor’s eighteenth birthday, if a parent or guardian did
not bring a suit on his or her own behalf within three years of the
alleged malpractice and (2) as setting the outside limit to the
initiation of a suit brought by the minor.38 Justice Flaherty
believed that the majority’s interpretation did not address the
precise issue presented and effectively “[left the] complications for
another day,”39 Yendee’s eighteenth birthday.40 Justice Flaherty
instead interpreted section 9-1-14(1) to mean that the Plaintiffs
must lay all their cards on the table when the suit is brought,
rather than extend the litigation by adding new defendants every
three years until the minor becomes eighteen years old.41
According to Justice Flaherty, the Legislature intended to protect
the rights of those laboring “under a legal disability.”42 Justice
Flaherty contended his interpretation better addressed the
statute’s goals of eliminating drawn-out litigation while protecting
a minor’s right to relief.43 By allowing the minor to bring suit up
until three year’s after the disability is removed, there is less
potential that a claim will be broken down and litigated on a
“piecemeal” basis, as was the case here.44
COMMENTARY

A. Medical Malpractice Claims Brought on Behalf of Minors
The majority’s decision to prohibit the Plaintiffs to proceed
with their claim brought on behalf of Yendee is sound and in
accordance with the purpose of the statutes. While Justice
Flaherty makes a great argument, his distinction is without a
difference. The Legislature’s intent for enacting section 9-1-14.1
clearly shows its intent to limit the ability to litigate medical
malpractice cases.45 What is noteworthy is that the court does not
38. Id.
39. Id. at 955 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at 941.
41. Id. at 953 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
42. Id. “[W]here suit has not been brought on a minor’s behalf within
three years of the incident of professional malpractice, once the minor does
bring suit, she is expected to join all defendants to the action within a threeyear period, even if she may remain a minor for many years.” Id. at 955.
43. Id. at 956.
44. See id. at 952.
45. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-14.1 (1956) (“[A]n action for medical,
veterinarian, accounting, or insurance or real estate agent or broker
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direct attention to the specific language in the statutes. Section 91-14.1, titled Limitation on Malpractice Actions, provides that “an
action for medical . . . malpractice shall be commenced within
three years from the time of the occurrence of the incident which
gave rise to the claim.”46 The Legislature’s use of the word “shall”
strengthens the majority’s argument as it shows that the
Legislature intended that suits brought on behalf of a minor must
be done in that time period.47 Conversely, if the parent or
guardian fails to file suit in that time period, his or her
opportunity to file closes.
Justice Flaherty’s argument that section 9-1-14.1(1) provides
a window between the alleged malpractice and Yendee’s twentyfirst birthday, is sound, but given the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the case—the Legislature’s explicit language, the
legislative history surrounding the statutes enactment, and the
Plaintiff’s waiting to file until 2010, despite the alleged
malpractice dating back to 1993—his argument is outshined by
that of the majority. Further, this case is distinct from its
precedent, as this is not a case where the Plaintiffs filed timely,
and sought to amend their Complaint outside of the three years.48
This is also not a case in which Yendee’s potential recovery is
unknown.49 Thus, the Majority’s decision provides the best result
given the dual purposes of the statute.
B. Loss of Consortium Claims of Parents
The court’s decision permitting the Plaintiffs’ loss-ofconsortium claims to toll alongside Yendee’s was an attempt by
the court to afford the Plaintiffs relief. Today, the medical
malpractice litigation is under greater control50 than it was when
malpractice shall be commenced within three (3) years from the time of the
occurrence of the incident which gave rise to the action.”).
46. Id. (emphasis added).
47. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 950.
48. See Bakalakis, 619 A.2d at 1107.
49. See Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 955 (Flaherty, J. dissenting). Yendee is
disabled due to her age. See id. Her disability will be removed on her
eighteenth birthday. See id. Thus, the time she will be able to file on her
own behalf is certain. See id. However, had Yendee’s disability been mental
incompetence, when she would be able to file on her own behalf is unknown,
because we cannot be certain when her disability would be removed. See id.
50. See generally The Medical Liability Crisis: Talking Points, am. Med.
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the Legislature enacted the statutes, and thus, such stringent
application may not be needed.51 By holding that the Plaintiffs
may bring their derivative claims alongside Yendee’s, the court is
attempting to lessen the procedural safeguards, where it can
interpret the laws to do so.52
The court’s reasoning is not clear. In the court’s analysis, it
first established that the Plaintiffs’ claims are in-fact derived from
Yendee’s.53 The court then acknowledged that under section 9-141, the statute governing derivative suits, such cases “shall be
brought under the time limited under sections 9-1-14 or 9-114.1.”54 The court seemingly interpreted this statute to permit the
derivative suit.55 But, the court did not say how it came to this
interpretation. Notwithstanding the majority’s decision, the
Legislature’s intent for section 9-1-41 is clear. The Legislature’s
use of the word “shall” and “limited” evince its intention that this
statute is meant to curb the flow of claims, like the Legislature’s
intent in section 9-1-14.1.56 Additionally, nothing in sections 9-141 or 9-1-14.1 permit the inference that derivative claim are
permitted to toll until the minor’s eighteenth birthday.57 Had the
Legislature intended derivative claims to benefit from the
disability statute, it likely would have expressly provided so.
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs were not within the class of persons
section 9-1-14.1 sought to protect. Section 9-1-14.1 tolling
provision serves to protect the disabled, in order to ensure that he

Ass’n, Jan, 2003 (on file with author) (The American Medical Association has
cited twelve states as suffering a medical malpractice crisis; the state of
Rhode Island is not included in that list).
51. Id. at 946. Faced with a medical malpractice crisis, the Legislature
sought to limit the number of medical malpractice suits. Id. (quoting Dowd v.
Rayner, 655 A.2d 679, 681–82 (R.I. 1995)).
52. See Press Release, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Medical Malpractice
Liability: A Case for Real Reform, (July 2003), http://www.abanet.org/media/
jul03/july_oped.html (last visited October 31, 2015) (The ABA calls for the
legal and medical malpractice communities to work together to find a
solution to the medical malpractice problem. It further states that “the
problem with medical malpractice is not the tort system; the problem with
medical malpractice is medical malpractice”).
53. Id. at 949.
54. R.I. GEN LAWS § 9-1-41(d) (1956).
55. Ho-Rath, 115 A.3d at 951.
56. Id. at 946.
57. Id. at 951.
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or she has a fair chance to litigate their claim.58 By that same
token, part of having a fair chance to litigate is having a case
litigated properly. The Plaintiff’s failure to timely file on behalf of
Yendee should not be rewarded by the benefits of section 9-1-14.1,
when its only window of access to the statute’s protections is
through the back door of section 9-1-41.
CONCLUSION

As a matter of first impression, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the statute of limitations for medical malpractice
actions provides a minor plaintiff with an option: have his or her
parent or guardian file on his or her own behalf or wait until he or
she turns eighteen, at which point he or she has three years to file
on his or her own behalf. If the minor choses to file on his or her
own behalf, a parents’ loss-of-consortium claim will be tolled along
with it until his or her twenty-first birthday.
Clare M. Harmon

58.

Id. at 946 (quoting Dowd, 655 A.2d at 681–82).
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Constitutional Law. State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390 (R.I.
2015). The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed whether a
criminal defendant’s free speech rights were violated when he was
charged under the “fighting words” provision of the disorderly
conduct statute. In holding that the defendant’s speech was not
constitutionally protected, the court reaffirmed its test for
determining what speech constitutes fighting words, highlighting
the necessity that the focus of these cases must be the context in
which the words were spoken.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In the early morning hours of January 31, 2012, two Rhode
Island State Police troopers, Anthony Washington and Edward
Viera, observed what appeared to be a physical altercation
between an African-American man and woman at the corner of
Smith Street and West Main Road in Middletown, Rhode Island.1
The man was later identified as Thomas H. Matthews
(“Defendant”).2
To assess the situation, the troopers pulled over.3 As the
troopers got out of the police cruiser and approached the couple,
the Defendant abruptly said, “take me now, take me now, I don’t
care.”4
Trooper Washington asked the Defendant for his
identification.5
The Defendant aggressively responded by
physically moving toward the troopers calling them both
“motherfuckers,” “queers,” “fags,” “niggers,” and threatening to
kill them and “kick [their] asses.”6 Based on his training and
1. State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d 390, 391–94, 403 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id. at 392.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 392–95. The court acknowledged that these words are likely to
offend some readers, but explains that it has chosen to print them in its
opinion without redaction because “what the defendant is alleged to have

648
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experience, Trooper Viera believed that the Defendant’s agitated
state posed a safety threat; he restrained the Defendant by
placing him in an “arm bar”7 across the hood of the cruiser.8 The
troopers attempted to calm the Defendant and “loosened” the arm
bar, but the Defendant seemed like he might try to escape.9 For
safety, the troopers handcuffed the Defendant and arrested him
for disorderly conduct.10 The Defendant continued to yell, swear,
and threaten the troopers throughout the ride to the Wickford
Rhode Island State Police Barracks.11
The Defendant’s trial began on June 18, 2012, in Newport
County Superior Court.12 The State’s case against the Defendant
consisted solely of the troopers’ testimony.13 After the State
rested, the Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant
to Rule 29, which the trial justice denied.14 The trial justice
instructed the jury in accordance with the Defendant’s jury
instructions, and the jury returned a guilty verdict.15 Pursuant to
Rule 33, the Defendant moved for a new trial, which was also
actually said is so central to the issues on appeal.” Id. at 392, n.3.
7. “Arm bar” is a restraint technique used by law enforcement to exert
control over an individual and prevent injuries to others. Id. at 393, n.5.
8. Id. at 394.
9. Id. at 393.
10. Id. The Defendant was charged pursuant to R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-451(a)(3) (2015), the “fighting words” provision of the disorderly conduct
statute, which states: “[a] person commits disorderly conduct if he or she
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly . . . [d]irects at another person in a
public place offensive words which are likely to provoke a violent reaction on
the part of the average person so addressed.” Id. at 391.
11. Id. The Defendant was transferred to the Wickford Rhode Island
State Police Barracks for processing. Id. Trooper Washington testified that
the Defendant said to him once they were in the police cruiser “you’re nothing
but a bitch-ass nigger,” “I don’t know why you’re doing this,” “you’re going
against me,” “you’re going against your own kind.” Id. at 393 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 391–92.
13. Id. at 392.
14. Id. at 395–96. The relevant section of Rule 29 of the Rhode Island
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion shall order
the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in
the indictment, information, or complaint, after the evidence on
either side is closed, if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction of such offense or offenses.
R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
15. Id. at 396.
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denied.16 On July 5, 2012, the Defendant was sentenced to six
months, thirty days to serve, balance suspended, with probation.17
The Defendant filed a timely appeal contending that the trial
justice improperly denied his motions for judgment of acquittal
and a new trial because the weight of the evidence did not support
the jury’s verdict, his speech to the troopers was constitutionally
protected, and the criminal complaint did not provide sufficient
notice of the charges against him as a matter of law.18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court first reviewed the
Defendant’s motion for a new trial.19 The Defendant argued that
the evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to support the
jury’s verdict.20 The court concluded, however, that the trial
justice’s assessment of the evidence was proper.21 The trial justice
16. Id. at 391, 397. The relevant section of Rule 33 of the Rhode Island
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads, “[o]n motion of the
defendant the court may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the
interest of justice.” R.I. SUPER CT. R. CRIM. P. 33.
17. Id. at 391.
18. Id. at 391, 399, 406.
19. Id. at 398. The court started its review with the Rule 33 motion for a
new trial because the burden of proof is less than a Rule 29 motion for
judgment of acquittal. Id. at 397–98. The court explained that if the
Defendant cannot meet his burden under Rule 33, then he necessarily cannot
under Rule 29. Id. at 398.
20. Id. at 397.
21. Id. at 402. The applicable standard of review is as follows: “[w]hen
addressing a motion for a new trial, the trial justice places himself or herself
in the role of a ‘thirteenth juror’ and then exercises his or her independent
judgment as to the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the
evidence.” Id. at 398 (citing State v. Stansell, 909 A.2d 505, 511 (R.I. 2006)).
The court set out the following approach in State v. Hie for trial justices
acting as the “thirteenth juror”:
In fulfilling his or her role as the thirteenth juror . . . the trial justice
must (1) consider the evidence in light of the jury charge, (2)
independently assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight
of the evidence, and then (3) determine whether he or she would
have reached a result different from that reached by the jury . . . . If,
after carrying out this three-step analytical process, the trial justice
agrees with the jury’s verdict or determines that reasonable minds
could differ, then the analysis is complete and the verdict should be
affirmed. . . . However, if the trial justice does not agree with the
verdict or does not agree that reasonable minds could differ, then the
trial justice must determine whether the verdict is against the fair
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considered the evidence in light of the jury charge by reviewing
his own instructions to the jury in detail and then summarizing
the testimony given at trial.”22 Additionally, the trial justice
independently reviewed the evidence and found that the troopers’
testimony was not only credible, but supported each element of
the “fighting words” violation under section 11-45-1(a)(3).23
Further, the trial justice agreed with the jury’s verdict.24 Finding
no clear error by the trial justice, the court affirmed his decision.25
Next, the court addressed the Defendant’s contention that his
conviction violated his free speech rights.26 The Defendant argued
that under Rhode Island and United States Supreme Court
precedent, his speech to the troopers was constitutionally
protected.27 While “fighting words” are not protected speech, the
Defendant argued that his speech did not rise to the level of
“fighting words” because there was no evidence that “the troopers
were, or likely would have been, provoked to imminent violent
retaliation.”28
The Defendant argued words, such as
preponderance of the evidence and fails to do substantial justice.
Id. at 398 (quoting State v. Hie, 93 A.3d 963, 974–75 (R.I. 2014)).
22. Id. at 402.
23. Id. at 402–03.
24. Id. at 403.
25. Id. at 399, 403, 406.
26. Id. at 399.
27. Id. at 399–401. See Clift v. Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d
805, 810 (R.I. 1996) (recognizing that “there are limitations on what types of
speech may be proscribed” and that “specifically defined areas” including
“obscenity, fighting words, defamatory invasions of privacy, and words likely
to produce imminent lawless action” may be controlled by the state); State v.
McKenna, 415 A.2d 729, 731 (R.I. 1980) (holding that a young female
defendant’s abusive language to a group of five male police officers did not
constitute fighting words because her speech did not create “an imminent
likelihood of provoking an imminent retaliation.”); Johnson v. Palange, 406
A.2d 360, 365 (R.I. 1979) (stating that fighting words are “ those personally
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a
matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”);
State v. Authelet, 385 A.2d 642, 648 (R.I. 1978) (quoting Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972)) (acknowledging that for speech to constitute
constitutionally unprotected fighting words it must “have a direct tendency to
cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed.”). In Authelet, a defendant’s speech to police officers “[h]ere come
the motherfucking pigs again” did not constitute fighting words because it
was not directed at the arresting police officer. Id. at 400.
28. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant at 17, State v. Matthews, 111 A.3d
390 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-299-C.A.), 2014 WL 10295554.
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“motherfucker” and “queer” would not provoke the average person
to violence, and argued further that such words were even less
likely to provoke a police officer.29 Further, the Defendant argued
that his speech was “unspecific,” “idle,” and “conditional.”30 The
Defendant contended that his response was akin to an “emotional
outburst” and that he was not capable of following through on any
of his threats.31
The court provided an in-depth review of the First
Amendment principles underpinning the “fighting words” doctrine
and Rhode Island precedent on the issue.32 Fighting words are
“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace.”33 To be considered fighting
words, speech must be directed at a specific person and be likely to
provoke an average person to an imminent violent reaction.34 The
context of the speech must be the focus of the analysis; there are
no per se fighting words.35 Fighting words, “even when addressed
to a police officer, do not lose their character as fighting words,
if . . . they would cause an average person to fight.”36
The Defendant claimed that based on the court’s prior
reasoning in State v. McKenna, his conviction should be
reversed.37 In McKenna, the court held that the young female
29. Id.
30. Matthews, 111 A.3d at 397.
31. Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, supra note 29, at 19.
32. Matthews, 111 A.3d at 399.
33. Id. (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72
(1942)). Chaplinsky is the seminal United States Supreme Court case on
fighting words. Id.
34. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1(a)(3) (2015); Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400
(emphasis added). In Authelet, the court put forth the following test for
determining whether speech constituted “fighting words”:
The test to be applied when the prosecution relies on the fighting words
theory is an objective one: Are the defendant’s expressions words which,
when directed to the average person, would cause the addressee to fight? . . .
It is not necessary that the person who is personally insulted react violently.
As long as the language is inherently likely to cause an average person to
retaliate in a violent way, the defendant’s words may be punished as fighting
words. Thus, . . . even though a police officer may be expected not to react to
abusive language, words directed to an officer which would cause an average
person to fight may be proscribed.
Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400 (citing Authelet, 385 A.2d at 649–50).
35. Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400, 404.
36. Id. at 401 (quoting Johnson, 406 A.2d at 365).
37. Id. at 403; see also Mckenna, 415 A.2d at 731.
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defendant’s words did not rise to the level of “fighting words”
when from a “nearby parking lot” she called a group of police
officers “cocksuckers” and told them she would “blow [their]
fucking heads off.”38 The defendant was eventually arrested after
ignoring the officers’ requests to quiet down.39 In finding that the
defendant’s speech was constitutionally protected, the court
considered the defendant’s distance from the police officers, that
she addressed the officers as a group and not individually, and
that the officers were not threatened or provoked by her words
because she was a “young girl” unable to “effectuate [her]
threat[s].”40
Additionally, the State acknowledged that the
defendant’s words were not “fighting words.”41
Here, however, the court found that the Defendant was more
than a bystander; he was “personally involved” in the incident as
the actual subject of the troopers’ inquiry.42 Moreover, the
Defendant’s physical proximity to the troopers was closer than
that of the defendant in McKenna, and the Defendant here
directed his speech specifically at the two troopers as
individuals.43
Additionally, the court considered that both
troopers testified that the Defendant’s speech provoked and
threatened them, whereas the defendant in McKenna was more of
an “annoyance” to the officers.44 Furthermore, the State, in this
case, did not concede at any point that the Defendant’s words were
not fighting words.45 Based on these differences, the court ruled
that the Defendant’s speech did rise to the level of fighting words
and, therefore, was not constitutionally protected.46
Lastly, the court examined whether the criminal complaint
against the Defendant provided him with sufficient notice as a
matter of law.47
The Defendant argued that the criminal
complaint was insufficient because it referenced conflicting
sections of the disorderly conduct statute and, thus, did not give
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 401.
McKenna, 415 A.2d at 729, 730.
Matthews, 111 A.3d at 396.
Id. at 402.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 405–06.
Id. at 406.

CONSTITUTIONAL-CRIMINAL LAW_PICKERING.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/2016 6:55 PM

654 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:648
adequate notice of the charges against him.48 To effectively
preserve an issue for appellate review the issue must be raised
before the trial court.49 The court held that because the Defendant
did not raise the notice issue at trial he could not raise it on
appeal.50 Despite this holding, the court examined the issue and
found the notice sufficient because the Defendant provided the
trial court with the correct jury instructions for the applicable
law.51
COMMENTARY

The United States Supreme Court has never again upheld a
conviction for fighting words since its 1942 decision in
Chaplinsky.52 Yet, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, as well as
many other state courts across the country, continue to uphold
these convictions, many of which involve police officers.53 Given
the current state of law enforcement relations with communities
nationwide, especially racial minorities, it is worth exploring why
Rhode Island continues to apply this doctrine and if it is
appropriate in situations involving police officers.
It is well established that free speech protection is not
absolute.54 Thus, the context of the speech in question matters.
The court in Matthews focused heavily on this point.55 In the
instant case, the Defendant’s words to the troopers were
personally abusive, provocative, and offensive. The question is
whether the standard for determining what constitutes fighting
words should be the same for officers of the law as it is for average
citizens.
48. Id. at 396 n.9, 406.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1053–54 (5th ed. 2015). Since 1942, the United States Supreme Court has
overturned fighting words convictions by ruling it only applies to speech
directed at another person likely to cause a violent response and by finding
laws overly broad, vague, or impermissible content-based restrictions of
speech. Id. at 1054.
53. Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire Is A Threat To First Amendment Values And Should Be
Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 445 (2004).
54. CHEMERINKSY at 1053.
55. Matthews, 111 A.3d at 400.
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In a footnote, the court briefly touched on the following
principle embraced in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Lewis
v. City of New Orleans: “[A] properly trained [police] officer may
reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint
than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond
belligerently to fight words.”56 In Lewis, a woman called the
police who were arresting her son, “god-damn-mother-fuckerpolice.”57 Under a city ordinance this speech was prohibited and
Lewis was arrested.58 Justice Powell explains that this type of
speech restriction:
[C]onfers on police a virtually unrestrained power to
arrest and charge persons with a violation. Many arrests
are made in “one-on-one” situations where the only
witnesses are the arresting officer and the person
charged. All that is required for a conviction is that the
court accept the testimony of the police officer.59
The application of this standard in cases involving law
enforcement is problematic because we expect police officers to be
objectively restrained in situations where we might not expect the
average person. In Matthews, if the standard for fighting words
was whether an average police officer would be provoked to violent
reaction, the Defendant may never have been convicted.
Encounters with police are ripe for emotional outbursts, including
the use of profane and offensive language. This increased
tendency for the use of profane and offensive language in dealing
with the police, coupled with the higher standard of restraint
expected of police officers, supports the implementation of a
different standard in fighting words cases involving law
enforcement. Rhode Island should reexamine this doctrine and
why the United States Supreme Court has not upheld a conviction
for fighting words since 1942.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court’s
56. Matthews, 111 A.3d. at 401; Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130, 136 (1974).
57. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 131.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 136.
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denial of the Defendant’s motion for a new trial and motion for
judgment of acquittal.60 The Court reaffirmed its precedent that
the determination of whether speech constitutes “fighting words”
must be made on a case by case basis depending on the context in
which the words were spoken.61
Laura Pickering

60.
61.

Id. at 406.
Id. at 400, 406.
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Contract Law. Emond Plumbing & Heating v. BankNewport,
105 A.3d 85 (R.I. 2014). Mortgagee was not unjustly enriched
despite subcontractors, hired by property owner, remaining
unpaid for materials and labor furnished to improve property.
After property owner defaulted on mortgage, mortgagee set-off
funds dispersed from a construction loan to pay for improvements
to the mortgaged premise contracted by the property owner. The
court held that nonpayment by the mortgagee for the
improvements made to the property was not inequitable because
the mortgagee exercised its contractual right by setting off the
property owner’s accounts and foreclosing on the property.
Moreover, because the mortgagee had not acted in bad faith or
made any fraudulent misrepresentations to the unpaid contractor,
with whom the mortgagee had no contractual relationship, the
mortgagee had no legal obligation to pay the subcontractors.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In May 2010, Anjan Dutta-Gupta, manager of AIDG
Properties, LLC (“AIDG”), purchased an industrial office building
in Middletown (“the property”).1
Advanced Solutions For
Tomorrow, Inc. (“ASFT”),2 a defense contracting company,
planned to occupy the property.3 In order to acquire and prepare
the property for ASFT’s occupancy, AIDG and ASFT obtained a
construction loan from BankNewport (“the Defendant”).4 AIDG
and ASFT executed a first and second mortgage on the property to
secure the purchase and construction loans from the Defendant.5
In August, 2010, ABC Building Corporation (“ABC”) was
hired by AIDG as general contractor to replace the property’s roof
1. Emond Plumbing & Heating, Inc., et al. v. BankNewport, 105 A.3d
85, 86 (R.I. 2014).
2. Dutta-Gupta was also the principal of ASFT. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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and HVAC systems.6 Emond Plumbing and Heating (“Emond”),
and Tecta America New England, LLC (“Tecta”)7 were awarded
bids to perform the work and subsequently entered into
subcontractor agreements with ABC.8
The subcontractor
agreement provided that the subcontractor submit detailed
payment applications to ABC.9 ABC would compile the payment
applications submitted by the subcontractors and remit a
consolidated payment application to AIDG.10 AIDG would then
forward the consolidated payment application to the Defendant to
draw funds from the construction loan from the Defendant.11
Prior to disbursement, the Defendant would conduct an inspection
of the property to ensure that the work on the payment
application was properly completed.12
The Plaintiffs began work at the property in September 2010
and October 2010.13 The Plaintiffs, pursuant to the subcontractor
agreement, submitted detailed payment applications to ABC.14 It
was undisputed that the Plaintiffs had received partial payment
for the work.15 In January 2011, the Plaintiffs had substantially
completed the renovations to the property and, on February 3,
2011, the Defendant’s inspector inspected the completed work and
disbursed loan proceeds into AIDG’s account the following day.16
Prior to paying ABC for the work performed on the property,
Dutta-Gupta was accused of bribing a government official to
obtain AFST’s defense contract.17 In the wake of Dutta-Gupta’s
arrest, AFST laid off all of its employees and ceased operations.18
The Defendant “then declared Dutta–Gupta’s arrest to be an event
of default because it constituted a material adverse change in the
circumstances of AIDG and its guarantors.”19 “Therefore, under
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 87.
Emond and Tecta will be referred to collectively as the Plaintiffs.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the terms of the loan documents, [the Defendant] accelerated the
loans, making the full amount immediately due and payable.”20
Additionally, the Defendant “set off the February 4, 2011 [deposit]
that had been made into AIDG’s account by ‘reversing’ it.”21
Unable to access construction loan proceeds, AIDG was unable to
pay ABC, and “as a result, there [was] no dispute that Emond
[and] Tecta” were each owed for materials and labor.22
To protect its interest in the property, the Defendant
petitioned the Newport County Superior Court for injunctive relief
to enjoin any parties from entering the property.23 The Defendant
then commenced foreclosure proceedings against AIDG; however,
the Defendant discontinued its foreclosure proceedings after AIDG
filed for bankruptcy protection.24 The Defendant, citing the
Superior Court’s injunction, denied the Plaintiffs from accessing
the property to remove materials.25 Subsequently, ABC and the
Plaintiffs began mechanic’s lien proceedings in Superior Court.26
On July 18, 2011, the Defendant obtained permission from
the United States Bankruptcy Court to foreclose on the
property.27 The following day, the Defendant petitioned the
Superior Court for permission to foreclose the property in the
pending mechanic’s lien cases, and without objection from
Plaintiffs, the Defendant was granted permission by the Superior
Court to foreclose on the property.28
On September 16, 2011, a day after Emond notified the
Defendant of its equitable lien on the proceeds of the foreclosure
sale, the Defendant conducted a foreclosure sale.29 At the sale, it
was announced that the second mortgage was being foreclosed on
and any potential bidder would be responsible for the first
mortgage on record.30 No bidders at the foreclosure sale bid
against the Defendant’s opening credit bid of $1,000,000 and, on
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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October 27, 2011, the Defendant recorded a foreclosure deed in the
Middletown Land Evidence Records.31 Ultimately, the Defendant
decided to use the property as its own corporate headquarters.32
The Plaintiffs filed suit in Newport County Superior Court on
November 15, 2011, “seeking to recover compensation for their
work under the theory of unjust enrichment.”33 On May 29, 2013,
the court granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
holding that, as a matter of law, the Defendant “was not unjustly
enriched by any improvements [the Plaintiffs] made to the
premises when it purchased the property at foreclosure.”34 The
Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal.35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island conducted a de novo
review of the case.36 Writing for the court, Justice Flaherty stated
that “it is well established that ‘recovery for unjust enrichment is
predicated upon the equitable principal that one shall not be
permitted to enrich himself at the expense of another by receiving
property or benefits without making compensation for them.’”37
The court assumed that the Plaintiffs had met the first two prongs
of the unjust enrichment analysis and focused on whether it was
inequitable for the Defendant to retain the benefit without
compensating the Plaintiffs because the court considered the third
prong of the unjust enrichment analysis dispositive to the claim of
unjust enrichment.38
“The [P]laintiffs argue[d] that it would be inequitable for [the
Defendant] to retain disbursed portions of the construction loan,
which it reversed and remitted to itself, as well as the improved
collateral, because it is contrary to the purpose underlying the
construction loan and the expectations of the parties.”39 The
Plaintiffs cited Providence Steel & Iron Co. v. Flammand for
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 90 (quoting Narragansett Electric Co. v. Carbone, 898 A.2d 87,
99 (R.I. 2006)).
38. Id. at 90–91.
39. Id. at 91.
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support; in Flammond a subcontractor made a claim against a
general contractor and landowner after not being paid for
materials furnished to a property.40 Rejecting the Plaintiffs
argument, the court distinguished Flammand because there, the
general contractor had both informed the land owner that the
subcontractor had not been paid and “the landowner used the
construction loan proceeds that had been earmarked for the
subcontractor to pay other subcontractors on unrelated projects.”41
The Plaintiffs also cited Metric Constructors, Inc. v. Bank of
Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., another unjust enrichment case involving
a lender and a contractor.42 The court differentiated Metric as
well, highlighting that “[u]nder the terms of the construction
contract, payments were made directly to the plaintiff by the
lender, as opposed to the scenario here, where the lender released
funds to the landowner who, in turn, was to pay plaintiffs.”43
Furthermore, although the lender in Metric knew of the
impending default of the landowner’s mortgage, the lender
“induced the [subcontractor] to continue working,” ceased funding
the project, foreclosed on the property, and refused to pay the
subcontractor.44
Lastly, the Plaintiffs looked to J.G. Plumbing Service, Inc. v.
Coastal Mortgage Co., where the court held that a construction
lender “may be held liable if it affirmatively misleads
‘subcontractors and materialmen so as to induce them to continue
to work upon and supply materials to the job to their
detriment.’”45
Here, the court stated that it was undisputed that there was
no contractual relationship between the Plaintiffs and Defendant,
and that the record did not show that the Plaintiff claimed that
the Defendant had misled or acted fraudulently or in bad faith.46
Furthermore, the court reviewed the terms in which the ABC was
paid as being through AIDG and not directly from the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. (citing 413 A.2d 487, 487–88 (R.I. 1980)).
Id. (quoting 413 A.2d 487, 488 (R.I. 1980)).
Id. (citing 72 Fed.Appx. 916 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Id. (quoting 72 Fed.Appx. 916, 918–19 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Id. (quoting 72 Fed.Appx. 916, 919–20 (4th Cir. 2003)).
Id. (quoting 329 So.2d 393, 396 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
Id. at 91–92.
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Defendant.47
The court held that Dutta-Gupta’s arrest constituted a
“material adverse change that was an event of default as defined
in the loan documents,” causing the Defendant to have the
contractual right to reverse the February 4, 2011 disbursement of
construction loan proceeds to AIDG.48 Moreover, the court found
that the most important fact was the absence of a contractual
relationship between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant and “lack of
any allegation that the defendant engaged in any type of
misconduct or fraud” when it held that the Defendant’s “retention
of the property, including the improvements thereon, was not
inequitable under our jurisprudence on unjust enrichment.”49
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court clearly established that the
third prong to the unjust enrichment analysis is dispositive to the
claim of unjust enrichment.50 Although the Plaintiffs claim that
the Defendant had “appreciated” the benefit of the Plaintiffs
improvements to the property where the Plaintiffs increased the
value of the mortgaged collateral real estate, it was still essential
to the claim of unjust enrichment that the Defendant have some
sort of relationship with the Plaintiffs, whether by contract or
misdealing.51
Although the holding of the court may appear to be
fundamentally unfair or even inequitable, specifically because the
Defendant’s new corporate headquarters’ roof and HVAC system
was improved at the expense of the Plaintiffs, the court had little
sympathy for the Plaintiffs as it found that the Defendant was
exercising its contractual rights under the terms and conditions of
the mortgage. It is not the fact that the Defendant came into
ownership of the property that makes this case unique, but rather
that the Defendant occupied the property subsequent to the
foreclosure sale. The Plaintiffs had the opportunity to object to
the mortgagee’s foreclosure proceedings at the hearing on July 29,
2011, however, the Plaintiffs did not object to the Defendant’s
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 92.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 90.
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petition to foreclose the property, nor did the Plaintiffs anticipate
the
Defendant’s
future
occupancy
of the
property.52
Notwithstanding, there would have been very little likelihood of
success objecting to the Defendant’s petition to foreclose due to
both the Defendant’s superior title claims to the first and second
mortgage and the lack of any inequity as described by the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.
Had the court held for the Plaintiffs, the result on subsequent
cases could have been absurd if applied to more probable
circumstances.
For example, if the property here was a
residential home that had been improved at the expense of unpaid
contractors, the holding would open the door for creditors with
inferior title status to lay superior claim to a first position
mortgage on the premise that the collateral property was
improved. In that light, the only restriction of the contractor’s
claim would be the value of improvements made to the property by
contractors. Thus, in theory, a disgruntled homeowner could
contract for improvements on real estate for the homeowners own
preference, such as a pool or a sauna, and the lender would be
responsible to compensate the unpaid contractors regardless of the
effect that the improvements have on the value of the underlying
collateral, if any.
Unfortunately for the Plaintiffs, pursuit of AIDG on the basis
of breach of contract may be the only viable avenue of relief,
although that claim would be difficult to collect on considering
that AIDG’s principal is in federal prison.53
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the third prong to
the unjust enrichment analysis is dispositive. Additionally, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in order for it to be
inequitable for a lender to retain a benefit to collateral property
without making payment for the value of that benefit, the lender
must have had a contractual relationship with the contractor on
behalf of the landowner, paid the contractor directly, otherwise
52. Id. at 89.
53. Michael P. McKinney, Dutta-Gupta sentenced to 3 years in Navy
kickback scheme, PROVIDENCE J. (Dec. 4, 2013, 9:42 PM), http://www.prov
idencejournal.com/article/20131204/NEWS/312049995.
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acted in bad faith, or made fraudulent misrepresentations to the
claimant. The Plaintiffs were not paid directly, had no contractual
relationship with Defendant, and did not claim that the Defendant
acted fraudulently, thus the Defendant was not unjustly enriched
by the Plaintiffs improvements to the property and was not
required to compensate the Plaintiffs as a matter of law.
Michael Riley
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Criminal Law. D’Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270 (R.I. 2014). The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island found it necessary to find that
testimony of an expert witness was not sufficient or material
enough to overturn a man’s conviction because the testimony of
the expert witness did not meet the two prong test showing that
the evidence should be entered in. In order to receive postconviction relief, the Defendant needed to meet this two prong
test, which here the court determined the Defendant failed to do.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In May of 2007, Rocco D’Alessio, the Defendant, filed for an
application for post-conviction relief in the Providence County
Superior Court.1 The Defendant had previously been convicted of
second-degree murder of his infant daughter.2 On the night of
January 13, 2000, the Defendant was left alone with his infant
daughter when the infant’s mother had to leave for work.3 A little
while earlier, the Defendant and Ms. Greenhalgh, the infant’s
mother, got into a heated argument about the location of cocaine,
which was hidden from the Defendant by Ms. Greenhalgh.4 After
obtaining the location of the cocaine, the Defendant was left alone
with the infant, but only after Ms. Greenhalgh had made sure the
Defendant had calmed down.5 After about an hour alone with the
child, Lieutenant Alan Fortes of the Providence Fire Department
Rescue Company responded to a call at the Defendant’s neighbor’s
house where he was met by the Defendant holding the infant.6
There, the child was examined and just appeared to be “simply
colicky, or constipated.”7 The Defendant was asked if he wanted
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

D’Alessio v. State, 101 A.3d 1270, 1272 (R.I. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to bring the child to the hospital, but he declined to do so.8
Around 8 p.m., Lt. Fortes received another call, however this time
it was from the Defendant’s actual residence.9
The first
responders to the site were met by the Defendant who came out of
the house holding the infant who was clearly not breathing as
noticed by Lt. Fortes.10 The infant was pronounced dead upon
arriving at the hospital.11
On May 19, 2000, the Defendant was indicted for first-degree
murder.12 At the trial, occurring two years later, Dr. Elizabeth
Laposata, testified that the infant had died from Shaken Baby
Syndrome.13 Dr. Laposata stated that the infant died from
“violent trauma” via shaking and that death occurred within a
matter of moments after the injuries were inflicted.14 The doctor
came to this conclusion immediately upon seeing the dead
infant.15 Before the trial, Dr. Laposata confirmed her findings
with Dr. Selina Cortez, a neuropathologist.16 At the end of the
trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict for second-degree murder
and the Defendant was sentenced to serve a sixty year sentence.17
A few years later, the Defendant filed for post-conviction relief
hoping that the testimony of Dr. Richard Callery, the chief
medical examiner for the state of Delaware, would alleviate his
sentence.18 Dr. Callery was accredited to be an expert witness in
forensic sciences.19 Dr. Callery’s testimony revealed that he was
tasked by Dr. Laposata in reviewing and finalizing incomplete
autopsy reports.20 Among one of the autopsy reports was the file
of the deceased infant.21 Dr. Callery testified that upon reviewing
the file, he was unable to come to a conclusion as to whether the

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1272–73.
Id. at 1273.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. However, forty years were to be served as probation. Id.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
Id.
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infant had died of Shaken Baby Syndrome or by other means.22
However, Dr. Callery’s testimony revealed that he viewed the file
in its preliminary stages and before Dr. Cortez reviewed the file
and issued her opinion on it.23 Dr. Callery also stated that he did
not remember what was in the file and continued to repeat that he
was unable to make a conclusion based off what he saw when he
received the file.24 At the end of his testimony, Dr. Callery
conceded that the manner of death could have ranged anywhere
between “homicide and undetermined.”25 At the conclusion of Dr.
Callery’s testimony, the hearing justice ruled that the testimony
was “valueless” and would not have changed the jury’s verdict.26
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, the Defendant raised three arguments that the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island heard.27 The court focused its
attention on the Defendant’s argument that the hearing justice
erred when he issued his ruling that the testimony of Dr. Callery
would not change the verdict of the jury and was immaterial.28
The court stated that when hearing new evidence for
postconviction relief, the evidence presented must have material
value, it cannot simply be used as cumulative or impeaching
evidence.29 The court defined material as evidence which tends to
create a reasonable likelihood of a different result.30
Furthermore, the court reasoned there needs to be a “nexus

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. Dr. Callery also mentioned that it would have been possible to
improve the file to such a degree that it would have been possible to
determine that the infant’s cause of death was indeed homicide. Id.
25. Id. at 1273–74. Dr. Callery listed the possible forms of death that
medical examiners usually include in their reports such as suicide, accident,
undetermined, natural, and homicide. Id. at 1274.
26. Id. at 1275. The hearing justice also went on to say that the
credibility of Dr. Callery was in doubt as he seemed to be motivated by
personal gain. Id.
27. Id. at 1276. However, the court threw out the second and third
argument, since they were not raised in the postconviction relief proceedings.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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between the new evidence and the outcome of the trial.”31 The
court found that the testimony of Dr. Callery was immaterial in
the sense that it would not have shifted the jury’s verdict in a
more favorable result to the Defendant. 32 The court believed the
testimony of Dr. Callery was trying to undermine the testimony of
Dr. Laposata and did not add any material value to the evidence
of the trial.33 It also found that Dr. Callery’s testimony was so
vague and inconclusive that even if the testimony were allowed to
be entered as evidence, it would not have shifted the jury’s
verdict.34 The court also stated that Dr. Laposata’s testimony was
credible and was complemented by receiving the outside opinion of
Dr. Cortez before the start of the trial.35
The court used a two-prong test in order to determine
whether new evidence should be entered.36 The first prong of the
test is a threshold prong where the new evidence must meet
certain criteria in order to be considered for the second prong.37
The second prong determines whether or not the evidence is of a
credible nature to allow relief.38 Although, the court reached the
same conclusion as hearing justice, it did so on different
grounds.39 The hearing justice determined the evidence passed
the first prong of the test, but it was not credible to warrant
relief.40 The Rhode Island Supreme Court, however, determined
that the testimony of Dr. Callery did not even pass the first prong
of the test since it was being offered to undermine the testimony of
Dr. Laposata and further determined the testimony would not
have changed the jury’s verdict.41
The Defendant claimed next that he had ineffective assistance
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1276–77.
33. Id. at 1277.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1275.
37. Id. In order to satisfy the first prong, the evidence must be (1) newly
discoverable and not available at the time of the trial; (2) it must not have
been discoverable by due diligence; (3) it must be material, not simply
cumulative or impeaching; and (4) it must be of the type that would likely
change the verdict at trial. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1277.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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of counsel.42 However, the court ruled that since this issue was
not raised by the Defendant or the state, it was not preserved for
appeal and therefore the court did not address the claim.43 Even
though the hearing justice ruled that there was no claim for
ineffective counsel, the court said that the hearing justice should
not have ruled on the matter as it was not at issue before him.44
The Defendant’s final argument and again one that the court
dismissed, was that the prosecution tried to suppress material
that was favorable to the Defendant thereby violating his due
process rights.45 However, the court again ruled it was not
preserved for appeal and therefore not reviewable by the court.46
COMMENTARY

Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court properly determined
that the testimony of Dr. Callery was not sufficient for the
Defendant to succeed on a claim for post-conviction relief. The
two-prong test that the court applied to determine the viability of
the Defendant’s new evidence may have been a difficult standard
to pass, but it is nonetheless a fair and just standard created by
the courts. Here, the two-prong test was fairly applied to the
Defendant’s new evidence of Dr. Callery’s testimony. This test
creates narrow guidelines in order for a Defendant to succeed to
get post-conviction relief. However, the narrow test is necessary
in the sense that it helps to weed out senseless new evidence from
those convicted trying to get out of their sentence.
The Defendant in this case tried to introduce evidence that
was in no way beneficial to his case. The testimony he was trying
to provide did not help his case, but sought to poke holes in the
State’s case, a clear violation of the first prong of the test because
it attempted to impeach the credibility of Dr. Laposata’s testimony
and not actually add any value to the Defendant’s testimony. It
seems here as though the Defendant was simply trying to
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1278.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The court also rejected the Defendant’s argument that he did
make this claim in court, but the Defendant simply points to “vague and
scattered references” none of which the court deemed worthy of constituting
this claim. Id. at 1278–79.
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introduce any kind of evidence that he could muster in order to
alleviate his sentence to some degree. He was simply trying to
find an “out” in order to relieve himself of his sentence. The
sentence that also seemed fair, considering forty of the sixty years
the Defendant was going to be allowed on probation.
The other two claims brought forward by the Defendant, just
seem to be him scraping the bottom of the barrel, trying to come
up with any and all claims that may help him win the
postconviction relief. However, the court correctly mentioned that
in order for him to bring these claims, he should have brought
them at trial. This makes procedural and common sense, as
allowing people to make any claims they can muster when on
appeal, backs up the court system, and allows people to bring in
claims that were never argued in the first place.
The test for post-conviction relief helps to weed out claims
that people bring in order to alleviate their sentences, but do not
actually have viable claims that will benefit them.
The
Defendant’s claim was one like that: it had no basis to be brought
in front of the court. This prevents bogging down the court system
with immaterial claims or claims that Defendants such as
D’Alessio try and bring simply for the sake of trying to get out of
their sentence, not because they believe they were actually
wronged.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the hearing
justice in the Defendant’s post-conviction hearing did not err when
he ruled that the evidence of Dr. Callery was not material and
therefore would not have influenced the jury to arrive at a
different verdict. The court also determined that the Defendant’s
other two claims had no merit before the court as they were never
argued at trial, therefore making them non issues with this court.
Jamison Jedziniak
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Criminal Law. State v. Armour, 110 A.3d 1195 (R.I. 2015). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction
of second-degree child molestation, holding that a defendant’s
confession is voluntary when he is made aware of his rights,
completely understands those rights, and subsequently provides
an incriminating statement to law enforcement. The court also
held that a witness’s medical testimony was not beyond the scope
of proper expert testimony or unfairly prejudicial, even if the
testimony suggested an inference that a defendant committed a
more serious crime.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In the early morning hours of January 29, 2011, six-year-old
Sarah awoke to a man inside her bedroom, touching her vagina.1
The perpetrator, Defendant Joseph Armour, rented an upstairs
unit of a multi-family home belonging to Sarah’s mother, who
resided in the first floor unit with Sarah.2 The Defendant fled
from Sarah’s room, where her mother found her covered under her
blanket, with her jeans and underwear pulled down below her
waist.3 After confirming to her mother that the Defendant
touched her inappropriately, Sarah was taken to the local hospital
for an examination performed by Dr. Goldberg.4 At trial, Dr.
Goldberg testified that the victim’s examination appeared to be
normal other than a few disclosures made by Sarah.5 Dr.
Goldberg further testified that a normal examination does not
necessarily mean the absence of child abuse, which raised several
objections from defense counsel.6 Notably, the one answer to
which defense counsel neither objected to nor moved to strike was
1. State v. Armour, 110 A.3d 1195, 1197 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 1197–98.
4. Id. at 1198. The victim’s mother asked her daughter if he touched
her “cookie,” to which the victim said “yes.” Id.
5. Id. at 1202. The victim told the doctor she “felt wet,” prompting the
doctor to examine for sexual assault. Id.
6. Id.
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Dr. Goldberg’s statement that “[Sarah’s] normal examination does
not exclude the possibility of sexual abuse, or even
penetration . . .”7
One of the witnesses called at trial was Detective Mark Jones,
the officer who initially spoke to the Defendant following his
arrest.8 He testified that the Defendant agreed to speak to the
two investigating detectives and was therefore moved to an
interview room after being brought to the police station.9
Detective Jones provided the Defendant a standard rights form,
advised the Defendant of his constitutional rights that were
included in the form, and that following his advisement, the
Defendant initialed every item and signed the document around
9:40 a.m.10 The Defendant then provided a full confession, which
was typed, handed to him to confirm there were no inconsistencies
or omissions, and then was signed by the Defendant.11 The
Defendant never indicated the statement was incorrect, and never
asked to speak to an attorney or make a phone call.12 The second
detective testified that he was present when the Defendant read
the rights form, signed and initialed the form, and provided the
confession.13
The second detective also testified that the
Defendant never asked for a lawyer, and that neither detective
was advised that a lawyer attempted to contact them on the
Defendant’s behalf.14
The Defendant’s trial testimony of his arrest and
interrogation was substantially different than that of the
detectives.15 The Defendant testified that, after being arrested,
he was subjected to intimidation tactics including threats of
violence from a large group of law enforcement officers and
potential future prison inmates.16 Once he was brought to the
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1198.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1198–1200.
11. Id. at 1199.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id. The defendant testified that the officers said they were “really in
the mood to mess him up,” while touching their guns. He testified that the
officers asked him “about what he could expect from other inmates at prison.”
Id.
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police station, he was permitted to make a phone call from his cell
phone, which he used to call his mother to secure an attorney for
representation.17 The Defendant stated that before he was
provided the rights form, he asked multiple times for his lawyer,
but his requests were ignored by the officers who continued
questioning him.18 He signed the form out of fear and exhaustion
and admitted to giving a statement and signing it because he “was
afraid not to”; although he admitted during cross-examination
that he knew he was not required to continue answering the
detective’s questions, but did so anyway.19 Finally, the Defendant
testified that while being questioned, another officer entered the
room and mentioned an outside phone call to the investigating
detectives.20
The Defendant’s mother also testified at trial.21 She stated
that after receiving a phone call from her son requesting an
attorney, she contacted the Defendant’s cousin to find him one.22
The Defendant’s cousin then testified that he contacted and
secured a lawyer to represent the Defendant.23 Next, the
Defendant’s attorney testified that she contacted the police station
around 9:45 a.m., but was denied the opportunity to speak to the
Defendant.24 The attorney left a message for her client and
advised him of her representation of him and that he should not
give a statement.25
During trial, the Defendant moved to suppress his
incriminating statement, which was subsequently denied.26 The
jury found the Defendant guilty of second-degree child
molestation.27 The trial justice denied the Defendant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal and sentenced him to thirty years at the

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1199–1200. The defendant also claimed he signed the form
because he thought the judge would assume he was guilty if he didn’t sign it.
Id. at 1199.
20. Id. at 1199.
21. Id. at 1200.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1197.
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Adult Corrections Institution (ACI).28 The Defendant timely
appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress the confession he gave to law enforcement, in
permitting Dr. Goldberg to testify regarding the explanation of a
normal examination over defense counsel’s objection, and in
denying the Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A. The Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
On appeal, the Defendant asserted that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law
enforcement, arguing the incriminating statement was made
involuntarily.30 The trial justice, concluding the Defendant’s
statement was made voluntarily, found the Defendant’s testimony
“implausible, unbelievable, and farfetched,” and determined the
Defendant’s statement was not coerced, but rather that the
Defendant “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
rights.”31 In its opinion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
discussed three things: (1) the State’s burden of proof for
establishing the voluntariness of the Defendant’s confession; (2)
the trial justice’s standard for ruling on the motion to suppress the
Defendant’s confession; and (3) the two-step test that this
appellate court must apply when reviewing the lower court’s
ruling on this motion.32
28. Id. at 1198, 1203.
29. Id. at 1197.
30. Id. at 1120.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1200–01. First, “[i]n order for the trial justice to admit a
defendant’s statement at trial, ‘the state must establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waved
his or her right against self-incrimination and that the statement was
voluntary.’” Id. at 1200 (quoting State v Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I.
2007). “This inquiry ‘requires an analysis of the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation.’” Id. (quoting State v Jimenez, 33 A.3d 724,
734 (R.I. 2011). Then, the court “applies the following two-step review of a
trial justice’s finding of voluntariness:
‘First, we review the trial justice’s findings of historical fact with
deference and we will not overturn those findings unless they are
clearly erroneous. Second . . . we accept the historical facts and
credibility determinations, and we then conduct de novo review of
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First, in ruling that the Defendant’s confession was voluntary,
the court focused on the evidence presented at trial regarding the
Defendant’s condition and understanding of his rights at the time
of interrogation.33 The court reasoned that because the detectives
advised the Defendant of his rights, both in written and oral form,
and because the Defendant initialed and signed next to each right
on the form, the Defendant was therefore capable at the time of
the interrogation of providing a voluntary statement to the
officers.34 The court also relied on the Defendant’s condition at
the time of questioning, as he appeared alert and acknowledged
that he understood his right to silence and to counsel.35 Finally,
the court determined that the Defendant’s trial testimony was
relevant to finding that his confession was voluntary, because the
Defendant admitted at trial that he knew he was not required to
speak to the officers during the interrogation but that he chose to
do so anyway.36
In asserting that the trial justice erred by denying his motion
to suppress, the Defendant argued that he was denied his right to
counsel when the officers refused his request to make a
confidential phone call prior to questioning.37
The court
acknowledged that any “person who is arrested ‘shall be afforded,
as soon after being detained as practicable . . . the opportunity to
make use of a telephone for the purpose of securing an
attorney.’”38 However, the court noted that the officers allowed
the Defendant to call his mother in an attempt to obtain counsel,
and therefore the officers did not deny the Defendant his right to
counsel.39
B. Dr. Goldberg’s Medical Testimony
The Defendant’s second assertion was that the trial justice
erred in allowing Dr. Goldberg to testify about examination

the trial justice’s conclusion that the confession was voluntary.’”
Id. (quoting Monteiro, 924 A.2d at 790).
33. Armour, 110 A.3d at 1201.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1202.
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information involving first-degree sexual molestation, because the
Defendant was charged with the lesser offense of second-degree
sexual molestation.40 The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld
the trial justice’s admission of Dr. Goldberg’s testimony, finding
that the testimony was relevant, within “the scope of proper
expert testimony,” and not “substantially prejudicial.”41
In
reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit Dr. Goldberg’s
testimonial evidence, the court applied the “abuse of discretion”
standard.42 Because defense counsel expressly agreed to allow the
doctor to testify regarding the absence of injuries and the results
of the examination, the court ruled that there had been no abuse
of discretion and thus no error.43
Additionally, the court
concluded that defense counsel failed to properly preserve this
evidentiary issue for appeal under the “raise or waive” doctrine by
failing to object to this specific line of questioning or moving to
strike the doctor’s answer during trial.44 Moreover, the court
ruled the doctor’s testimony was not unfairly prejudicial had the
issue been properly preserved for appeal because of the specific
jury instructions provided by the trial justice and the State’s
burden to prove every element of the crime.45 Thus, the court
found no error in admitting Dr. Goldberg’s testimony.46
C. The Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
The Defendant’s third and final assertion was that the trial
justice erred in denying the Defendant’s motion for judgment of

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id “It is well settled that this Court will ‘review a trial justice’s
decision admitting or excluding evidence under an abuse of discretion
standard.’” Id. (quoting State v Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012).
43. Armour, 110 A.3d at 1202.
44. Id. at 1202–03. The raise or waive doctrine explains that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court should “not review issues that were not presented to
the trial court in such a posture as to alert the trial justice to the question
being raised[.]” See Bernard v HCP, Inc., 64 A.3d 1215, 1219 n.2 (R.I. 2013)
(quoting State v Kluth, 46 A.3d 867, 876 (R.I. 2012)).
45. Armour, 110 A.3d at 1203. “In addition, ‘because the state bears the
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt, it
has the right to present evidence establishing those elements in its case in
chief.’” Id. at 1203 (quoting State v Marmolejos, 990 A.2d 848, 852 (R.I.
2010).
46. Armour, 110 A.3d at 1202.
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acquittal.47 The Rhode Island Supreme Court noted that when
ruling on a trial court’s denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal, the same standard applies as when the trial justice is
initially ruling on a defendant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.48 The fact that the young victim testified at trial about
the Defendant’s actions, combined with the corroborating
testimony from the victim’s mother, Dr. Goldberg, and the
Defendant’s own statement to police following his arrest, all led
the Rhode Island Supreme Court to conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to prove the Defendant committed one count of
second-degree child molestation.49 Thus, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held there was enough evidence to support the
Defendant’s conviction and withstand his motion for judgement of
acquittal.50
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed two issues
regarding the constitutionality of the Defendant’s confession to
law enforcement: First, whether the Defendant’s confession was
voluntary; second, whether Defendant was denied his right to a
confidential phone call.51 As to the first issue, the court focused
its factual determination exclusively on the events that occurred
during the Defendant’s interrogation.52 By doing so, the court
ignored the Defendant’s assertions that law enforcement officers
threatened and harassed him after being arrested.53 By failing to
address these contentions in the opinion, it could be argued the
court purposefully limited its factual analysis to the interrogation
and the Defendant’s understanding of his rights, excluding from
47. Id. at 1203.
48. Id. “‘A motion for a judgment of acquittal should be granted only if
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is
insufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.
(quoting State v Heredia, 10 A.3d 443, 446 (R.I. 2010). “‘If, however, a
reasonable juror could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
the motion should be denied.’” Armour, 110 A.3d at 1203 (quoting Heredia¸
10 A.3d at 446).
49. Armour, 110 A.3d at 1203–04.
50. Id. at 1204.
51. Id. at 1198.
52. See id.
53. Id. at 1199.
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their inquiry any factual assertions made by the Defendant
regarding events prior to the interrogation.
The second issue raised by the Defendant was his right to a
confidential phone call pursuant to Rhode Island law.54 The court
made clear that by calling his mother and requesting her
assistance in finding an attorney, the Defendant was afforded the
opportunity to use the telephone in order to secure an attorney,
and therefore was not denied his right to invoke counsel.55
It could be argued that the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s
conclusion on the evidentiary issue raised by the Defendant
provides extensive latitude for prosecutors when questioning a
medical examiner.56 The court dismissed the Defendant’s two
arguments that the doctor’s testimony was beyond the scope of
proper expert testimony and that it was extremely prejudicial.57
Although the court applied the “raise or waive” doctrine as one of
the reasons for denying the Defendant’s motion, the court also
pointed to the State’s burden of proof in criminal cases as a
justification for allowing the doctor’s testimony.58 In doing so, the
court indicated that had this issue been properly preserved for
appeal, the testimony would still be admissible even though the
doctor was clearly describing facts consistent with a more severe
criminal charge. Also, the court acknowledged that defense
counsel previously agreed to allow the doctor to testify as to the
results of her examination.59 Even though the results of the
examination eluded to facts outside the relevant criminal charges,
with the possibility of a prejudicial effect on the jury, the
testimony should still be admissible to allow the State the
opportunity to prove every element of the crime.
However, had Dr. Goldberg’s testimony directly accused the
Defendant of conduct consistent with first-degree child
molestation, as opposed to mere speculation on the issue, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court might have ruled in favor of the
Defendant. A direct implication of sexual penetration would likely
mislead the jury, focusing their attention on the possibility of first54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id. at 1202.
See id. at 1202–03.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1202.
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degree child molestation, as opposed to the charged crime of
second-degree child molestation. A trial justice would likely
decide that the doctor’s testimony in this instance would have an
unfairly prejudicial effect on the Defendant’s case, and conclude
that this prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value of the
testimony. In this case, however, Dr. Goldberg’s testimony only
suggested an inference of potential sexual penetration, which
likely had a very minimal effect on the jury’s determination of
guilt.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the
Defendant’s confession was voluntary because the Defendant was
advised of his rights, signed a form acknowledging his
understanding of his rights, and eventually testified at trial that
he knew he was not required to continue speaking to detectives.60
Further, the court ruled that because defense counsel failed to
properly object at trial, the doctor’s testimony was properly
admitted even though it went outside the scope of the Defendant’s
second-degree child molestation charge.61
Brett Hargaden

60.
61.

Id. at 1201.
Id. at 1202–03.
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Criminal Law. State v. Tucker, 111 A.3d 376 (R.I. 2015). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that evidence of a prior
criminal act is properly admitted to establish motive if the
evidence is powerful, relevant, extraordinarily significant, and the
probative value of the prior criminal act does not outweigh the
potential prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury. A witness’s
testimony of committing prior crimes with a defendant does not
create grounds for mistrial when defense counsel is on notice of
the prior crimes and chooses to push the subject anyway. A
prosecutor’s closing statements are permissible where they
pertain only to evidence presented and are not of such a nature as
to inflame the passions of the jury.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In September 2006, Defendant Deaven Tucker (“Tucker”),
Victoria Berardinelli (Berardinelli), and Tucker’s friends Zachery
Brown (“Brown”), John Soares (“Soares”), Ronald Spearin
(“Spearin”), and Eugenia Gomes (“Gomes”) went to Florida.1
Everyone drove to Florida from Rhode Island, besides
Berardinelli, who flew.2 When Berardinelli arrived in Florida, she
was surprised to discover that Jennifer Durate (Jennifer) was
with the group.3 On the group’s last night in Florida everyone
except Brown went out to a club.4 When the group returned to the
room where Brown was staying, Tucker declared that Spearin
“had to be taken care of.”5 Brown testified that at that time,
Tucker told Brown the plan he came up with to kill Spearin.6
After the group executed the plan, Tucker, Jennifer, Brown, and
Berardinelli packed their things and headed back to Rhode
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

State v. Tucker, 111 A.3d 376, 379 (R.I. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Island.7
When the group returned to Rhode Island, Berardinelli
warned Tucker that Jennifer “was going to tell on him.”8
Thereafter, Tucker maintained a low profile, hiding out in various
hotels throughout Rhode Island and Massachusetts, often
accompanied by Jennifer.9
Soon, a detective from Florida
contacted Berardinelli, at which time she told the detective
nicknames of those involved in the Florida incident.10 Tucker
learned that Florida detectives had heard everything and believed
it would only be a matter of time before they would identify the
remaining accomplices, including Jennifer.11 While Tucker was
sure that Jennifer would not implicate him because she loved him,
he was worried Jennifer might implicate Berardinelli.12
Ultimately, Tucker declared that he did not “trust Jennifer, and
that she had to go.”13
On November 20, 2006, Tucker, Ruiz and Jennifer, robbed a
bank on the East Side of Providence.14 Ruiz testified that Tucker
had informed him before the robbery that “there’s going to be a
good, good lick.”15 Ruiz further explained that Tucker said that
they would rob the bank and that Jennifer would drive the
getaway car.16 Tucker and Ruiz wore all black clothing and
bandanas over their faces to rob the bank, however only Tucker
wore gloves.17 The group surveyed the area for a bank to rob and
eventually decided on one.18 According to testimony, Ruiz entered
the bank first and ordered the tellers to put the money in his
bag.19 The tellers complied, but Ruiz became impatient and
7. Id. at 379–80. Tucker ordered that “[e]verybody keep their mouth
shut.” Id. at 380.
8. Id. at 380.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 377
15. Id. at 381.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Jennifer cased the bank they chose and determined that it had
neither security officers nor bulletproof glass, which made it a good target.
Id.
19. Id.
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reached into the drawers.20 During the robbery, Tucker stayed
near the entrance to maintain order by displaying his gun and
threatening to fire.21 After about forty seconds, Tucker and Ruiz
left the bank and fled to Jennifer’s car.22 Followiong the robbery,
Tucker stated to the others that “he had used Jenny as much as
he could. He didn’t trust her anymore and she had to go.”23
In effort to prevent being connected to the Florida crime,
Tucker decided that that Jennifer had to die.24 On November 21,
2006, Tucker, Jennifer and two others25 parked a vehicle on the
side of the road in Pawtucket.26 Tucker lured Jennifer from the
car, took out a semiautomatic handgun and fired one shot at
point-blank range into Jennifer’s back.27 Tucker then stood over
Jennifer and fired eight more shots into her body, including three
shots in her back, one in her upper right arm, and four in her
head.28 Tucker left Jennifer’s body where she fell.29
By early December 2006, the Providence Police Department
had made significant progress in their investigation into the bank
robbery.30 Detectives had obtained a latent fingerprint from the
teller’s cash drawer which was determined to be Ruiz’s.31 On
December 12, 2006, Ruiz turned himself into the police and was
arrested on the spot.32 Tucker was arrested later that day.33
Berardinelli visited Tucker numerous times while he was
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Tucker asked Wilson to kill Jennifer for her share of the money
from the bank robbery and Wilson declined. Id. Testimony stated that
Tucker then made the same offer to Ruiz and Ruiz responded affirmatively,
“F—- it. I’ll kill her. I don’t care.” Id. Shortly after, Ruiz changed his mind
and told Tucker he would not kill Jennifer and Tucker responded that he
would take care of it. Id. at 382.
24. Id. at 378.
25. The two other passengers were Jason Ruiz and Dana Wilson. Id. at
n.2.
26. Id. at 378.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 382.
31. Id. Ruiz was contacted by his mother after the police had been to
her home and told her they wanted Ruiz to turn himself in for questioning.
Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.

CRIMINAL LAW_CHEVALIER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

SURVEY SECTION

5/16/2016 7:03 PM

683

incarcerated and testified about many of their conversations.34
Ruiz also testified at trial regarding Tucker’s plan to rob the bank,
as well as his desire to kill Jennifer.35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Tucker was charged with the murder of Jennifer and eleven
other offenses.36 The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.37
Tucker was sentenced to three consecutive life sentences plus an
additional thirty-five consecutive, non-parolable years.38 Three
issues were raised on appeal. First, Tucker argued that the trial
justice abused his discretion when he admitted certain Rule 404(b)
evidence39 concerning the Florida incident, the Spearin murder,
and the subsequent investigation spearheaded by one of the
detectives.40 Next, Tucker argued that the trial justice erred
when he denied his motion for a mistrial after Ruiz revealed,
during cross examination by the defense, that he knew that the
term “good lick” meant a robbery because he had previously done
such an act with Tucker.41 Finally, Tucker claimed that the trial
justice committed reversible error when he failed to grant a
mistrial because of the prosecutor’s inappropriate and
inflammatory comments during closing arguments.42

34. Id.
35. Id. at 381. Tucker first had a plan that consisted of Ruiz hiding near
Jennifer’s house until he lured her outside, at which point Ruiz was to shoot
and kill her, but that plan did not work because they were unable to get
Jennifer out of her apartment. Id. at 380–81.
36. Id. at 378 (the murder of Jennifer was in violation of R.I. GEN. LAWS
1956 §§ 11-23-1 and 11-23-2).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence states:
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, or to prove
that defendant feared imminent bodily harm and that the fear was
reasonable.”
R.I. R. Evid. Art. IV, Rule 404.
40. Tucker, 111 A.3d at 383.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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A. Admission of the Florida Evidence was Proper
Prior to the start of trial, the state filed a motion in limine
seeking the court’s guidance with respect to the admissibility of
certain Rule 404(b) evidence.43 The state argued that the
evidence regarding the Florida incident was necessary to
demonstrate Tucker’s motive for killing Jennifer and to provide
the jury with a full description of the events leading up to
Jennifer’s murder.44 Tucker argued that the Florida evidence
should be excluded because its admission would violate Rule
404(b), and because it was unfairly prejudicial, and therefore in
violation of Rule 403.45 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion regarding the Rule
404(b) analysis when he determined that the Florida evidence was
relevant and probative as it established Tucker’s motive to kill
Jennifer.46 Additionally, the court reasoned that Tucker had a
motive to kill Jennifer because she might have implicated him or
Berardinelli for the murder in Florida, and Tucker was firm on
not letting that happen.47
After the 404(b) analysis was complete, the trial judge
balanced the relevance and probative value of the Florida evidence
against its potential prejudice, as required by Rule 403.48 The
court agreed with the trial judge that the probative value of the
evidence outweighed the potential for prejudice, especially since
the state chose to refrain from referring to the Florida incident as
a murder.49 Moreover, the various limiting instructions the judge
gave to the jury, including those he gave right after the Florida
events were brought up and before closing arguments, further
supported that the judge did not abuse his discretion when he
admitted the Florida evidence.50

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 383–84.
Id at 386.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386–87.
Id. at 387.
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B. “Good lick” Testimony did not Warrant a Mistrial
The court next addressed Tucker’s argument regarding Ruiz’s
“good lick” testimony.51 Tucker asserted that Ruiz’s testimony
“easily could have distracted the jurors from the issues at hand
and allowed them to convict [him] based on evidence that he and
Ruiz were seasoned robbers.”52 Prior to Ruiz testifying, the trial
judge conducted an extensive interview of Ruiz.53 The judge
learned that Ruiz was testifying because he was afraid Tucker
would “snitch” on him about other “robberies and a shooting,” and
then warned Tucker’s counsel about the dangers of certain
questioning that could open a door to expose Tucker to other
shootings and robberies.54 However, Tucker’s counsel elected to
proceed.55 After the judge interviewed Ruiz, Tucker’s counsel
continued his cross-examination where Ruiz responded to a
question stating that he knew Tucker was talking about a robbery
because he had done things like that with Tucker before.56
Immediately after Ruiz revealed the past criminal acts he
committed with Tucker, the trial judge granted Tucker’s motion to
strike the statement from the record.57
Tucker moved to pass the case at the beginning of the next
day of trial.58 In his ruling, the trial judge explained that
Tucker’s counsel had been forewarned that Ruiz had participated
in uncharged robberies with Tucker however Tucker’s attorney
continued to repeatedly question Ruiz about how he knew what
the phrase “good lick” meant.59 The decision to pass a case and
51. Id. “Good lick” refers to Ruiz’s statements that he and Tucker had
previously done similar criminal acts, so he knew the context of the phrase
“good lick” when Tucker used it. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 388. The record revealed the following line of questioning:
[Defense Counsel]: . . . that the defendant indicated that he was
going to— there’s going to be a good lick?
[Ruiz]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Is that right? That’s a chance to get some money?
[Ruiz]: Yes. A lick is robbery. It’s a slang term for, like, robbery.
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declare a mistrial belongs to the trial justice, and this Court gave
great weight to that decision in coming to a conclusion here.60
Ultimately, the court ruled that the trial justice did not err
when he denied Tucker’s motion to pass because Tucker’s counsel
had been forewarned about Ruiz’s prior criminal experience with
Tucker, and Tucker’s counsel still proceeded to ask Ruiz how he
knew a “good lick” was a robbery.61 Additionally, directly after
Ruiz stated that he had done things like that with Tucker
previously, the trial judge ordered that statement to be stricken
from the record.62
C. The Prosecution’s Closing Statements Were Appropriate
Tucker’s final argument on appeal was that the prosecutor
made inappropriate and inflammatory comments during his
closing argument which warranted a new trial.63 However, in
order for a prosecutor’s comments to be deemed inappropriate the
statements must be totally extraneous to the issues in the case
and tend to inflame and arouse the passions of the jury.64 The
court concluded that the prosecutor’s statement did not exceed the
considerable latitude he was allowed because it related only to
evidence presented at trial.65 Tucker also argued that the
prosecutor acted improperly when he referred to victim impact
evidence that was not introduced into evidence before closing
arguments.66
The prosecution discussed Jennifer’s son and

[Defense Counsel]: So, when you say that the defendant mentioned
that, then you knew he was talking about a robbery?
[Ruiz]: Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: Not something else?
[Ruiz]: But I knew—but—knew it was a robbery, but I didn’t know
what kind of robbery, because I had before done things like that with
[defendant].
Id. at 387.
60. Id. at 388.
61. Id. “[W]hen counsel goes fishing on cross-examination, he cannot
assume that in playing with fire, he will not get burned.” Id. (citing State v.
Edwards, 478 A.2d 972, 975 (R.I. 1984)).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 389.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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mother and the tragedy they were facing because of her murder,
which Tucker believed to be impermissible “victim impact
evidence.”67 However, the court disagreed with Tucker because
his own counsel had probed a number of the state’s witnesses
about the nature of Jennifer’s relationship with her son and how
much time she spent with him.68 The court affirmed all of the
trial courts findings.69
COMMENTARY
The court properly affirmed the trial justice’s ruling on the
Rule 404(b) argument. The trial justice did a thorough Rule
404(b) analysis regarding Tucker’s motive and how the evidence of
the Florida crimes would go directly to that motive. Rule 404(b)
expressly states that evidence of past crimes may be admitted for
various purposes, such as to prove motive. It is clear from Ruiz’s
testimony that Tucker expressly stated his motive through verbal
communication. Next, the trial judge correctly moved on to a Rule
403 analysis. While the evidence could have potentially been
prejudicial to Tucker, such prejudice does not outweigh the
probative value of establishing a clear and convincing motive. The
level of prejudice was also greatly reduced by the trial judge’s
multiple limiting instructions to the jury regarding the Florida
evidence both before and after closing arguments. The judge
made a diligent effort in trying to avoid prejudice.
As to Ruiz’s “good lick” testimony, the court seemed to be
more passionate about emphasizing Tucker’s counsel’s clear error
of judgment in probing the witness on the meaning of “good lick”,
as well as in establishing that Tucker’s attorney essentially
deserved what was coming to him than it was in evaluating
whether the trial judge’s ruling was appropriate based on the rule.
However, as there is a very high standard for reversing the
decision of a trial judge70 on a mistrial ruling, this court’s
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 390.
70. The standard for overruling a judge in the lower court on the
mistrial ruling states, “a mistrial shall be declared when an “inappropriate
remark [or action] has so inflamed the jurors that they no longer would be
able to decide the case based on a calm and dispassionate evaluation of the
evidence.” Id. at 388 (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1033 (R.I.
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affirmation of that ruling was proper. A jury probably would not
have been aroused to such a point, especially considering the vast
array of testimony and evidence presented at trial.
Lastly, Tucker’s claim that the prosecution made
inappropriate statements seems unwarranted.
The exact
language of the prosecution’s closing statement would probably
better reflect the degree to which Tucker’s claim was frivolous;
however, the brief recap the court discusses makes it quite clear
that Tucker’s own counsel opened the doors to the subject matter
of comments from the prosecution to which he claimed warranted
a new trial.71 Moreover, other evidence in the trial was certainly
more outrageous than the prosecution’s closing statements about
Jennifer’s family’s sorrow and mourning after her death. It would
be a great stretch to say that such comments could inflame the
passions of the jury so much as to impact their decision or to
warrant the granting of a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that evidence of a prior
crime is admissible to establish motive when the probative value
is not outweighed by prejudice. The court determined that
testimony by a witness of prior criminal acts committed by the
defendant will not create grounds for mistrial when defense
counsel was on notice that such events could come to light, and
continues to push an issue likely to bring those facts to light.
Finally, the Court established that prosecution’s closing
statements will not be considered inappropriate so long as they
are not totally extraneous to the evidence presented at trial and
do not inflame the passions of the jury.
Brianne M. Chevalier

2004)).
71. The only specific example the court discusses in the opinion is when
Tucker’s counsel asked Jennifer’s sister, Susan, about how much time
Jennifer spent with her son. Id. at 389.
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Criminal Law. State v. Rosenbaum, 114 A.3d 76 (R.I. 2015). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a person who wants a
restitution order reduced has the burden of proof to show that he
or she has made a good faith effort to procure the additional funds
that are purportedly missing. The court will not accept evasive
and vague answers as evidence.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In 2010, Defendant, Judith Rosenbaum (“Rosenbaum”), pled
nolo contendere before the Rhode Island superior court to one
count of uttering or delivering checks in an amount exceeding
$1,500 with intent to defraud, one count of misappropriating
property, and one count of obtaining goods valued at more than
$500 by false pretenses with intent to cheat or defraud.1
Rosenbaum was put on probation and ordered to pay $95,000 in
restitution.2 Rosenbaum’s restitution payments were set at $500
a month.3 On January 17, 2013, Rosenbaum appeared before a
Superior Court magistrate in order to have her monthly payments
reduced.4
At the hearing before the magistrate, Rosenbaum testified
that her husband had lost his job as a physician and that her
financial situation had changed since she was originally ordered to
pay $500 a month in restitution.5 Rosenbaum argued that her
monthly payments should be reduced to $237, the amount she
received every month from a pension benefit.6 The hearing
focused on various (although outdated) financial documents
Rosenbaum submitted into evidence.7 The evidence revealed that

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Rosenbaum, 114 A.3d 76, 77 (R.I. 2015).
Id.
Id
Id.
Id. at 78
Id. at 77
Id. at 78
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Rosenbaum and her husband resided in a house valued at
$950,000, which they had incurred negative equity in the amount
of $350,000.8 The Rosenbaum’s had had a monthly mortgage
payment on the property for $8,850 and a property tax obligation
of $1,542.9 At the time of the hearing, Rosenbaum and her
husband were in the midst of foreclosure proceedings after falling
more than a year behind on their mortgage and tax payments.10
Rosenbaum’s financial statements showed that she and her
husband owned two cars, making monthly payments of $856 on
the 2007 Toyota Highlander and $680 on the 2008 Toyota Prius.11
Rosenbaum and her husband spent $175 a month on car
insurance and $256 a month on gas.12 Rosenbaum’s other
monthly expenses included $804 on homeowners insurance, $745
on life insurance, $200 on clothing and shoes, $150 on cable and
internet and $100 on charitable donations.13 Rosenbaum and her
husband also owed $11,000 on a line of credit with Harris Furs14,
which the couple had been making $600 monthly payments on
prior to Rosenbaum’s husband losing his job.15 When asked at the
hearing if she had thought about selling any of the furs or jewelry,
Rosenbaum made no indication that she had considered reducing
any of her monthly expenditures.16 The magistrate denied
Rosenbaum’s petition to have her monthly payments reduced,
finding that Rosenbaum had failed to present evidence that she
was financially unable to make the restitution payments without
accessing her social security funds.17
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Rosenbaum explained that her husband drove the Prius and she
was previously driving the Highlander but now had “incredible difficulty
driving” due to an injury. Because the car went essentially unused, the court
reasoned that Rosenbaum could sell it as a means to repay her restitution.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. William Harris Furs is a luxury and couture full service fur retailer.
See www.williamhharrisfurs.com.
15. Rosenbaum, 114 A.3d at 78.
16. Id. at 79
17. Id. Defendant’s cannot, by law, be forced to use their social security
funds towards restitution payments. The magistrate made note of the fact
that Rosenbaum had several expenditures (including monthly car payments
on a car she hardly used) that could be allocated toward her restitution
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Rosenbaum argued that it was an error to conclude she had
sufficient funds to pay the $500 per month restitution and
reminded the court that her husband was not obligated to pay
restitution and therefore his assets could not be considered toward
her ability to pay.18 The state argued that Rosenbaum had access
to numerous assets that could be liquidated and could easily
relocate funds that she was spending on unnecessary expenses in
order to pay her restitution.19 In a hearing held in superior court,
the hearing justice explained that the standard of review was very
deferential to the decision of the magistrate and that under this
standard, factual findings would only be overturned if clearly
erroneous and issues of law would be reviewed de novo.20
The hearing justice issued a bench decision denying
Rosenbaum’s appeal, holdingthat Rosenbaum had “willfully failed
to meet”21 the burden of proof in order show that she was unable
to make her restitution amount.22 The hearing justice noted
several unnecessary expenditures that Rosenbaum could
eliminate from her budget that could provide her with additional
income sufficient to make her restitution payments.23 The justice
also vacated a previously imposed stay on the magistrate’s order
and ordered the defendant to pay an additional $1,000.24
Rosenbaum appealed this decision to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court.25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In reviewing the decision of the Superior Court, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court explained that it would review the
questions of law de novo, but that it would “not disturb the factual
determinations of the Superior Court justice unless he or she
made clearly erroneous findings or misconceived or overlooked
obligation. Id. The magistrate also noted that Rosenbaum had not presented
any evidence regarding the value of her assets in personal property. Id.
18. Id. There was an issue determining exact financial statements as
Rosenbaum did not provide any tax returns for after the year 2007. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 80.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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material evidence.”26
Rosenbaum argued that the “findings of the magistrate and
hearing justice were ‘‘clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.’”27
Rosenbaum argued that the financial informative she submitted
into evidence showed that her only source of income was from her
social security and pension benefits.28 Rosenbaum contended that
most of the monthly expenses the lower courts found to be
relevant in their decision were being paid for by her husband.29
The court rejected this argument as Rosenbaum did not produce
any new evidence to her argument that her husband was paying
her expenses after previously claiming, as the State noted, that
Rosenbaum was “continually [worried] about having money to feed
herself and her husband.”30 Much like the lower courts, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court found that Rosenbaum bore the
burden of proving that she was unable to comply with the
restitution order and showing that she had made sufficient efforts
to try and acquire the necessary funds to comply with the order.31
The court noted from Rosenbaum’s testimony that she had
numerous assets that she could potentially liquidate.32 This,
along with the lack of evidence to support her “vague claim that
her husband is paying her monthly expenses,”33 and the tax
return documents that she failed to submit after being instructed
to do so, was noted as the reasoning for why the court was
affirming the Superior Court’s judgement.34
COMMENTARY
In keeping with the decisions of the lower courts, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court disregarded the admittedly ridiculous
argument of being unable to pay a $500 payment by a person who
lives in a million-dollar home, pays a line of credit on furs, and has
26. Id. (citing Wilby v. Savoie, 86 A.3d 362, 372 (R.I. 2014) (supporting
deference to the hearing justices)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 81
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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a monthly clothing and shoe budget nearly half the amount she is
being ordered to pay in restitution. While it is easy to want to
agree with the court’s ruling in this instant, there are several
factors that were overlooked in making this determination.
Rosenbaum’s argument on appeal that it was her, and not her
husband who owed restitution, was an argument that should have
received more thought and attention. If Rosenbaum could have
shown that her finances were completely separate from her
husband’s, and that because she only personally made $237 a
month, far less than the restitution ordered, she might have been
more successful.35
However, because Rosenbaum did not produce any concrete
evidence to the fact that her husband’s finances were separate
from her own, or that he was paying for the expenses noted on
their financial statements, the court did not find this argument
very compelling. This argument would have been much more
persuasive had it been introduced at the very first appearance in
front of the magistrate instead of only being introduced to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court in order to argue a position such as
this, with no evidentiary backing.
Furthermore, though the court requested Rosenbaum’s tax
returns, she continually failed to provide any returns after the
year 2007. The court also questioned why none of the financial
statements Rosenbaum did supply indicated how she, who claims
she only has an income of around $1,100 a month and a husband
who lost his job, pays for any of the expenses listed.36 The court
did not find Rosenbaum’s evidence satisfactory as it did not
answer any of the basic questions the court had, meet the burden
of proof or back up any of Rosenbaum’s arguments.
In addition to the complete lack of evidence, Rosenbaum’s list
of extravagant expenses juxtaposed with her apparent worry
about having enough money to feed herself and her husband did
not help help the court to sympathize with her. In considering the
lack of evidentiary support behind Rosenbaum’s claims as
compared to the extravagant life style she and her husband led,

35. Id. at 77. She also collected $907 in Social security benefits. Id.
However, it would be a violation of federal security law to require her to use
money from her social security to fulfill her restitution obligation. Id.
36. Id. at 81
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the court made an appropriate decision in affirming Rosenbaum’s
restitution order.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the magistrate’s
order for the Defendant to continue to pay her previously set
restitution payments. The Defendant bore the burden of proof to
show that she was unable to comply with the restitution order.
The Superior Court found the Defendant did not meet this burden
and the Supreme Court affirmed.
Cayman Calabro
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Criminal Law. State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87 (R.I. 2015). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court adjudicated a second-degree sexual
assault case regarding the admissibility of a complainant’s out-ofcourt identification procedure of the Defendant. When evaluating
the reliability of testimony regarding identification of an
assailant, the trial justice uses a five-factor test. On appeal, the
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, a motion to suppress
evidence of the faulty identification procedure used, and a motion
to use the Defendant’s proposed jury instructions. In denying the
motion to suppress evidence and for a new trial, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reasoned that the procedure was not “unduly
suggestive” and that the trial justice conceded with the jury’s
verdict. Furthermore, the court denied the motion to use the
Defendant’s proposed jury instructions because the instructions
given adequately covered the law concerning eyewitness
identifications. Thus, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s
conviction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In the early afternoon on November 29, 2010, the complaining
witness, Laura,1 boarded the Rhode Island Public Transit
Authority (RIPTA) at Kennedy Plaza in Providence, Rhode Island
(R.I).2 Upon entering the bus, Laura elected to sit near the back;
shortly thereafter, a man carrying a black duffel bag sat down in
the seat right next to her.3 The man tried to start a conversation
with Laura, which proved unsuccessful.4
Subsequently, as the bus approached a church5 in Barrington,
1. The name “Laura” is used is used in this case to refer to the
complainant in order to protect her privacy.
2. State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87 (R.I. 2015) 87, 89–90. The bus was
scheduled to depart along Route 114 towards Newport, Rhode Island. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Barrington Congregational Church, commonly known as “the

695
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the man sitting next to Laura plunged his hand between her legs
and latched onto her vaginal area.6 Laura ordered the man to
“stop,” but he persisted despite Laura’s numerous attempts to
push his hand away.7 At this time, no passengers came to Laura’s
aid.8 Laura then told the man that she needed to get off the bus
because it was her stop, although this was not true.9 The man
acknowledged her request and moved his duffel bag out of the
way, allowing Laura to reach the aisle.10 After Laura moved to
the front of the bus—where she remained—she notified the bus
driver about what had just occurred; however, the bus driver
ignored Laura’s complaint.11 Laura then noted details of the
incident.12 Shortly after, the bus came to another stop in
Barrington where the man vacated the bus, being sure to hide his
face behind his jacket as he passed Laura.13
Soon thereafter, Laura departed the bus in Bristol and went
directly to the Bristol police station to report the incident.14 The
Bristol police then transported Laura to the Barrington police
station where she met with Detective Ferreira.15 Laura stated
that her perpetrator was a white male over six feet tall, weighing
around 230 pounds, and was between the ages 30 and 50.16
Laura also asserted that her assailant was clean-shaven with
short grayish-brown hair and had been wearing a gray sweat suit
with a purple and yellow sports jacket,17 and was carrying a black
duffel bag.18 After Detective Ferreira received this information,

white church.” Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Laura then began noting details of the incident; she took note of:
the bus and route number, the time of day that the incident occurred, and a
description of her perpetrator. Id.
12. Id. Laura took note of: the bus and route number, the time of day
that the incident occurred, and a description of her perpetrator. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Detective Ferreira concluded that Laura was likely describing the
logo for the Minnesota Vikings, whose team colors are purple and yellow. Id.
18. Id.
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he sent out a department-wide BOLO19 with a description of the
perpetrator Laura described.20
The following day, as a result of the BOLO, Patrolman Mark
Haddigan (“Haddigan”) detained a man—clad in a purple and
yellow Minnesota Vikings jacket—in Barrington.21 Haddigan
informed the man, referred to as “McGill,” of the sexual assault
that occurred the day before.22 McGill then voluntarily proceeded
to the police station where he produced his RIPTA bus pass and
was photographed.23 McGill was released shortly thereafter.24
On
December
1,
Patrolman
Michael
Gregorezek
(“Gregorezek”) noticed a man fitting Laura’s description waiting
for a RIPTA bus.25 The man, identified as Robert Austin (“the
Defendant”), was wearing a gray sweat suit, a purple and yellow
Vikings jacket, and was lugging around a black duffel bag.26
Patrolman Gregorezek approached the Defendant and asked him
if he would be willing to go to the police station to answer a few
questions.27
While at the station, Detective Ferreria asked the Defendant
whether he had traveled through Barrington on a RIPTA bus on
November 29, 2010, and the Defendant replied that he had not.28
The Defendant also informed the police that he was the only
person in possession of his bus pass.29 After this statement, the
officers asked the Defendant for his bus pass, and after complying,
permitted the Defendant to leave the station.30
Detective Ferreira then proceeded to transfer the serial
numbers from the Defendant’s and McGill’s bus passes to the

19. A BOLO notice alerts officers to “be on the lookout.” See State v.
Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242 n.4 (R.I. 2008).
20. Austin, 114 A.3d at 89–90.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 90–91.
26. Id. at 91.
27. Id. Austin complied with the patrolman’s request and went to the
station. Id.
28. Id. Although Austin did admit to Detective Ferreira that he had
traveled on a bus that day, which was headed towards Warwick. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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RIPTA Assistant General Manager, James Dean.31 The scan of
the serial numbers disclosed no activity on McGill’s bus pass on
the date in question; however, on the contrary, a scan of the serial
numbers on the Defendant’s bus pass revealed that it was used on
November 29, 2010, at 1:06 p.m. to board a bus to Newport.32 The
bus running to Newport was number 0545, which matched the
number Laura recorded in her notes.33
On December 1, 2010, Detective Ferreira contacted Laura and
arranged for her to view an array of photographs at the Bristol
Police Station.34
After Laura read the Barrington police
department procedure on how to correctly view a photo array, she
was shown seven photographs in sequential order; the
instructions stated that the array “‘may or may not contain a
picture of the person who committed the crime.’”35 The first
photograph was of McGill, the third was of the Defendant, and the
remaining five photographs were taken from the Adult
Correctional Institutions WINFACTS computer database.36
Detective Ferreira excluded photographs of any bald, mustached,
and non-Caucasian men, and all of the men in the array were
between the 30 and 42 years old, while McGill and the Defendant
were both 51 years old.37
After analyzing all seven photographs, Laura asked to see the
photographs identified as numbes one and three in the lineup
again.38 After viewing the side-view of these photographs, Laura
immediately identified the Defendant, as depicted in the third
photograph, as her assailant.39
Laura later testified that the side-view profile photograph of
the Defendant helped assure her that “‘[r]ight away [she] knew
which one it was.’”40 Detective Ferreira then presented Laura a
photograph of the black duffel bag and a photograph of the
Defendant, with his face concealed, wearing a purple and yellow
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CRIMINAL LAW_COOPER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

SURVEY SECTION

5/16/2016 7:05 PM

699

Vikings jacket and holding a black duffel bag.41 Laura identified
the purple and yellow Vikings jacket and black duffel bag as
articles worn and carried by her assailant.42 Lastly, Detective
Ferreira showed Laura a photograph of the Defendant wearing
gray sweatpants and a Vikings Jacket.43 At that time, Laura
declared that she was “‘one hundred percent certain’” that this
was the individual who assaulted her on the RIPTA bus.44
On January 27, 2011, the Defendant was charged with one
count of second-degree sexual assault in violation of Rhode Island
General Law 1956 §§ 11-37-4 and 11-37-5.45 Thereafter, the
Defendant filed a motion to suppress Laura’s out-of-court
identification.46 At the hearing on the motion, the Defendant
argued that Laura’s out-of-court identification should be
suppressed because of dissimilarities between the individuals in
the photo array, the complainant’s disputable accuracy, and
because the photo identification procedure was unduly suggestive,
which created a high risk of misidentification.47
The Defendant’s motion to suppress was ultimately denied
because the trial court concluded that the identification procedure
was not unduly suggestive.48 The state argued in response to the
Defendant’s motion that the photo array contained photographs of
Caucasian men that were all of similar builds, weights, and were
all similarly cleanly shaven like the Defendant.49 The state also
noted that Laura had four opportunities to identify her assailant
in different photographs, and concluded after viewing these
varying images that that the Defendant was her assailant.50
Lastly, the trial justice considered the five-factor test for assessing
the appropriateness of an eyewitness identification,51 and also
41. Id. at 91–92.
42. Id. at 92.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The hearings were held on the motion to suppress issue on June
28, 2012 and July 2, 2012. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The five factors for assessing an eyewitness identification are:
the opportunity to observe, the degree of attention given to hose observations;
the accuracy of the prior description of the perpetrator; the level of certainty
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found that the identification procedure was not unduly
suggestive.52
The Defendant’s trial began on July 2, 2012, and four days
later, the trial justice gave instructions to the jury.53 The
Defendant objected to the instructions given to the jury because
none of the instructions given were the Defendant had
proposed.54 Moreover, the Defendant objected because the trial
justice did not include language concerning “‘accuracy versus
demonstrated by the witness at the identification procedure; and the time
between the crime and confrontation. See State v. Austin, 731 A.2d 678, 682
(R.I. 1999) (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)).
52. Austin, 114 A.3d at 92.
53. Id. The trial court charged the jury as follows:
“The burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt not
only that the crime was committed but that the Defendant was the
person who committed the crime. While this concept may seem
rather fundamental you may consider one or more of the following as
you determine whether the State has proven the identity of the
Defendant as the person who committed the crime alleged in the
complaint.
“(One) The witness’s opportunity to observe the criminal acts and
the person committing them, including the length of the encounter,
the distance between the various parties, the lighting conditions at
the time, the witness’s state of mind at the time of the offense, and
other circumstances affecting the witness’s opportunity to observe
the person committing the offense that you deem relevant.
“(Two) Any subsequent identification, failure to identify or
misidentification by the witness. Also the certainty or lack of
certainty expressed by the witness at the time of the identification,
the state of mind of the witness at the time of the subsequent
procedure, the length of time that elapsed between the crime and the
subsequent identification and any other circumstances bearing on
the reliability of the witness’s identification that you as the jury
deem relevant.
“(Three) Any other direct or circumstantial evidence which may
identify the person who committed the offense charged which
corroborates or fails to corroborate the identification by the witness.
“You as the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the
accuracy of the identification of the Defendant before you convict
him. If the circumstances of the identification of the Defendant are
not convincing beyond a reasonable doubt then you must find the
Defendant not guilty.”
Id. at 92–93.
54. Id. at 93. One set of proposed instructions was based on instructions
pursuant to State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011), while the other
proposed instructions were from the decision in State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d
1283, 1290–91 (R.I. 2011). Id.

CRIMINAL LAW_COOPER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

SURVEY SECTION

5/16/2016 7:05 PM

701

certainty’” in his charge.55 The state’s response was that this
issue is normally relevant in the context of a defendant’s proffered
eyewitness expert testimony, “but that [the] Court has
consistently rejected these experts on the ground that
‘trustworthiness of eyewitnesses is not beyond the ken of the
jurors.’”56 Thus, the trial justice declined to give the Defendant’s
proposed jury instructions and held that the jury instructions
given sufficiently covered the law concerning eyewitness
identifications.57 On July 6, 2012, the jury returned a guilty
verdict on one count of sexual assault.58
The Defendant filed a motion for a new trial.59 At the hearing
on that motion, the Defendant argued that the evidence presented
at his trial should have generated a not guilty verdict because the
Defendant contended that the evidence showed that Laura
“demonstrated a level of uncertainty” upon first observing the
photo array.60 The Defendant argued that Laura’s uncertainty
resulted in a high likelihood of misidentification, which could have
led a reasonable juror to find in favor of the Defendant.61 In
response, the state asserted that Laura identified the Defendant
as her assailant before she was shown the photograph of the
Defendant wearing the purple and yellow jacket.62 When the trial
justice denied the motion, he disclosed that the identification
procedure was completed to his satisfaction and the complainant
had testified credibly.63
On November 13, 2012, the Defendant was sentenced to 15
years in prison.64 Soon after, the Defendant filed a notice of
appeal of his conviction, arguing that the trial justice erred in
denying his motion to suppress, his motion for a new trial, and his

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Moreover, the procedure became overly suggestive and “sloppy”
when she was only shown a photograph of Austin in the jacket with the bag.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. The trial justice also expressed that if this had been a bench
trial, he also would have found the Defendant guilty. Id.
64. Id.
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request for jury instructions.65
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Motion to Suppress
On appeal to the the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the
Defendant asserted that it was error to deny his motion to
suppress Laura’s out-of-court identification because the
arrangement of the photos was unfair, as it was unduly
suggestive.66 When courts evaluate the appropriateness of an
eyewitness identification, the trial justice undertakes a two-step
analysis.67 The first step is determining “‘whether the procedure
used in the identification was unnecessarily suggestive.’”68 Next,
if it is found that the identification procedure was unnecessarily
suggestive, “‘the trial justice must “determin[e] whether in the
totality of the circumstances the identification was nonetheless
reliable.’”69
In his appeal, the Defendant contended that the layout of the
photos was unfair, and that the trial justice was incorrect to
conclude that the physical characteristics of the men in the array
were similar to Laura’s description of her assailant.70 The trial
justice rejected the Defendant’s contentions, determining that all
seven photographs in the photo array portrayed men, fitting the
general description of Laura’s assailant.71 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court noted that is well-established that “the images
constituting a photographic array need not be ‘look-alikes,’ but
rather need only possess similar general characteristics.”72 Thus,
65. Id. at 93–94.
66. Id. at 94.
67. See State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795, 801 (R.I. 2014) (quoting State v.
Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012).
68. See State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012) (quoting State v.
Texter, 923 A.2d 568, 574 (R.I. 2007)).
69. Austin, 114 A.3d at 94 (quoting Brown, 42 A.3d at 1242-43).
70. Id. This was demonstrated by the fact that the photographs of the
fiver younger men were instantly ruled out by Laura, and of the two
remaining photographs, only the Defendant matched the weight of the
described perpetrator. Id.
71. Id. All of the photographs depicted men between the ages of thirty
and forty, with short hair, and no facial hair; furthermore, despite all of the
men not matching the Defendant’s weight of 230 pounds, five of the six men
in the photo array weighed close to 230 pounds. Id.
72. State v. Imbruglia, 913 A.2d 1022, 1029 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v.
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the court held that because the photographs in the array all
shared roughly the same basic characteristics described by the
complainant, the photo array was not unduly suggestive.73
Furthermore, prior to the viewing of the photo array,
Detective Ferreira informed Laura that the photo array “‘may or
may not contain a picture of the person who committed the
crime.’”74 This court reasoned that this instruction “‘mitigated the
risk’” that Laura would select a photograph “‘simply because she
believed she was expected to do so.’”75
The court rejected the the Defendant’s argument that the
display of the Defendant’s photographs after Laura’s initial
selection was “‘impermissibly suggestive confirmation’” of Laura’s
original selection of the Defendant from the lineup array.76 The
court concluded that this argument failed because it was evident
that these individual photographs of the Defendant were shown to
Laura only after she had already identified the Defendant as her
assailant.77 Having concluded that the photo array was in fact
not unduly suggestive, the court found unnecessary to engage in
step two of the analysis.78 Therefore, the court determined that
the trial justice did not err in denying the Defendant’s motion to
suppress the identification.79
B. Motion for a New Trial
The Defendant asserted that it was error for the trial justice
to deny the motion for a new trial because the only reasonable
response to the evidence presented was that the identification was
erroneous.80 The Defendant also contested the probative value of

Gatone, 698 A.2d 230, 236 (R.I. 1997)).
73. Id. at 95.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Gallop, 89 A.3d at 802 (citing Imbruglia, 913 A.2d at 1029–30).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. Step two being, if it is found that the identification procedure
was unnecessarily suggestive, the trial justice must determine in the totality
of the circumstances whether the identification was nonetheless reliable. See
Gallop, 89 A.3d at 803; see also Brown, 42 A.3d at 1242-43 (determining that
a court should analyze a victim’s identification of a defendant under the
totality of the circumstances to assess its reliability).
79. Austin, 114 A.3d at 95.
80. Id. at 96.
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the testimony relating to the bus pass because he argued it was
just as likely that the Defendant was on a Warwick-bound bus.81
The court rejected the Defendant’s argument that the only
reasonable response was that the identification was incorrect; in
doing so, the trial justice assessed the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence and determined that the
complainant credibly testified so that a reasonable jury could, and
did, find that the Defendant was her assailant.82 In regard to the
probative weight of the bus pass, the trial justice indicated that
the data contained in the bus pass weighed heavily in the state’s
favor.83
It is well established that because a trial justice “‘is in an
especially good position to evaluate the facts and to judge the
credibility of witnesses on appeal, [the Rhode Island Supreme]
Court’s review is deferential.’”84 The court indicated that it was
apparent the trial justice followed the appropriate procedure for
assessing a challenge to the weight of evidence presented at
trial.85 For those reasons, the court concluded that the trial
justice’s denial of the Defendant’s motion for a new trial was not
clearly erroneous.86
C. Request for Jury Instructions
The Defendant’s lastly asserted that the trial justice erred in
not using the Defendant’s proposed jury instructions.87 The court
reasoned that “[w]hile [a] defendant may request that the trial
justice include particular language in the jury instructions, the
trial justice is not required to use any specific words or phrases
when instructing the jury—so long as the instructions actually
given adequately cover the law.”88
Notwithstanding the
Defendant’s argument, the court found that it was evident that
the instructions given to the jury presented “the jury with the
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. State v. Watkins, 92 A.3d 172, 191 (quoting State v. Clay, 79 A.3d
832, 842) (quoting State v. LaPierre, 57 A.3d 305, 310).
85. Austin, 114 A.3d 87 at 96–97.
86. Id. at 97.
87. Id.
88. Figuereo, 31 A.3d at 1290 (quoting State v. Adefusika, 989 A.2d 467,
477).
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essence of [the] defendant’s requested instruction.”89 Thus, after
review of the jury instructions given, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court concluded that the instructions adequately covered the law
regarding eyewitness identification.90
COMMENTARY

In this case, The Rhode Island Supreme Court addressed an
evidentiary appeal concerning the admissibility of a complaining
witness’s out-of-court identification.91 When Rhode Island courts
rule on the admissibility of such evidence, it often turns to a fivefactor test to assess the propriety of eyewitness identifications.92
The five factors used to assess an eyewitness identification are: (1)
the opportunity to observe; (2) the degree of attention given to
those observations; (3) the accuracy of the prior description of the
perpetrator; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification procedure; and (5) the time between the crime
and confrontation.93 Here, it cannot be said that the photo array
presented to Laura just days after94 the assault occurred,
constituted an identification procedure that was unduly
suggestive.95
For an identification procedure to be inadmissible in court,
the procedure must have been “‘so impermissibly suggestive as to
give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.’”96 The standard of review this court adhered to
was the clearly erroneous standard, which is a hard standard to
overcome.97 Under a clearly erroneous standard, when a trial
justice determines whether or not to grant a defendant’s motion to
suppress identification evidence, the trial justice evaluates the
available evidence in the light most favorable to the state.98 It is
89. Id.
90. Austin, 114 A.3d at 98.
91. Id. at 94
92. Austin, 731 A.2d at 682 (quoting Manson, 432 U.S. at 114).
93. Id.
94. Austin, 114 A.3d at 91. There was a mere 48-hour lapse between the
assault and the identification procedure. Id.
95. Id. at 95.
96. Gallop, 89 A.3d at 801 (quoting Gatone, 698 A.2d at 235).
97. Austin, 114 A.3d at 96. See also State v. Luciano, 739 A.2d 222, 226
(R.I. 1999); State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710, 716 (R.I. 1994).
98. See, e.g., Gardiner, 636 A.2d at 716.
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apparent that this court came to the correct conclusion in denying
the Defendant’s motion to suppress.
It is evident that Laura had numerous occasions to observe
her assailant on the bus and during the course of the incident.99
While in most situations, the identification of an assailant may be
more controversial, it cannot be said that this case is one of them.
In an incident that occurs at night, the identification of a suspect
becomes more susceptible to inaccuracy, given the less suitable
lighting. Moreover, where an accusation involves a more rapid
turn of events, such as a sudden robbery, it is more likely that
that a complainant’s description of their assailant is less reliable.
We have none of those situations here. The man was not masked,
the incident occurred during the day, and the man sat right next
to her for some time on the bus before assaulting her.100
Furthermore, when considering the description of the
assailant that Laura initially gave to the police, it is evident that
she had a fairly accurate perception of him; the first description
she gave to the police was “a white male over six feet tall and
weighing approximately 230 pounds . . . he was clean shaven, had
short grayish-brown hair, carried a black duffel bag, and wore a
gray sweatsuit as well as a purple and yellow sports jacket.”101 It
follows that the Defendant’s assertion that the complaining
witness had questionable accuracy during the out-of-court
identification procedure is mere puffery.
Moreover, Laura stated she was “one hundred percent
certain”102 that the Defendant was her assailant, and this
confidence in her identification of the assailant may have
impermissibly persuaded the jury. This is problematic because
studies have shown that there is minimal, if any, correlation
between one’s confidence and the accuracy of their identification of
a suspect.103 In fact, although there is little correlation between
the two, some courts have noted that an eyewitness’s confidence
“is the most powerful single determinant of whether . . . observers

99. Id. at 90.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 92.
103. G.
Wells
et
al.,
Eyewitness
Identification
Procedure:
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW J. HUM. BEHAV.
603, 620 (1998).
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. . . will believe that the eyewitness made an accurate
identification.”104 Thus, the best chance a defendant may gave
had at being found not guilty would have been having an expert
testify as to the weakness of an eyewitness identification.105
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed on appeal a
motion to suppress evidence of an identification procedure, a
motion for a new trial, and motion to set aside the trial justice’s
jury instructions.106 After careful review of the motion to
suppress, the court concluded that the photo array was not
unnecessarily suggestive, thereby denying the Defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence.107 Moreover, on the Defendant’s appeal for
a motion for a new trial, the trial justice’s denial of the
Defendant’s motion for a new trial was not clearly erroneous.108
Lastly, the trial justice also denied the Defendant’s request that
his proposed jury instructions be used. For the following reasons,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the Defendant’s
conviction of second-degree sexual assault.109
Rebecca Cooper

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1110 (Utah 2009).
Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 97.
State v. Austin, 114 A.3d 87, 98 (R.I. 2015).
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Criminal Law. State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956 (R.I. 2015). A
statute amending the threshold amount for felony larceny during
the pendency of a defendant’s trial is not to be applied
retroactively under the general savings clause. In deciding
whether to apply a statutory change retroactively, courts consider
the issue on a case by case basis and ask whether the application
of the general savings clause would be clearly repugnant to the
express provisions of the prevailing statute. Considerations
include the language of the repealing statute, the nature of the
amendment, the equitable considerations of the legislature, and
the potential for inequitable application of the law.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On November 22, 2011, prosecutors charged John Whiting
with felony larceny for stealing over $500 and criminal solicitation
for soliciting another to receive stolen goods.1 On June 8, 2012,
prior to the start of Whiting’s trial, the state amended its larceny
penalty statute, increasing the threshold requirement from $500
to $1,500.2
The case went to a bench trial in Providence County Superior
Court on June 18, 2012.3 During the majority of the trial, neither
the parties nor the trial justice were aware of the amendment to
the statute.4 However, after the close of both parties’ cases-inchief and before the trial justice rendered his decision, defense
counsel informed the trial justice of the amendment to the statute
and sought to have the charges amended to reflect the new
statute.5 The trial justice chose to proceed with the counts as

1. State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 957 (R.I. 2015); see also R.I. GEN
LAWS 1956 § 11-1-9 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 §11-41-1 (1938); R.I. GEN.
LAWS 1956 § 11-41-5 (2012).
2. Whiting, 115 A.3d at 957; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-41-5.
3. Whiting, 115 A.3d at 957.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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charged, agreeing with the state’s argument that changes in the
law are only to be applied prospectively, and that since Whiting
had been charged prior to the amendment, he should not receive
its benefits.6 The trial justice rendered his decision from the
bench on July 2, 2012, and found that Whiting had stolen $714,
thus rendering him guilty of committing larceny over $500.7 The
trial justice also found Whiting guilty of soliciting another to
commit a felony.8 After denying a motion to reconsider his
decision regarding Whiting’s request to amend the charges, the
trial justice sentenced Whiting on September 14, 2012, to two
concurrent sentences of five years imprisonment with six months
to serve with the remaining time suspended with probation.9
After a final judgment of conviction was entered, Whiting
appealed and argued that the legislative intent of the amendment
increasing the threshold for felony larceny was to reclassify
offenses under $1,500 from felonies to misdemeanors.10 Whiting
further argued that
the amendment was intended to be
ameliorative in nature, and thus should inure to the benefit of
defendants.11 The state countered, invoking Rhode Island’s
general savings clause, which permits prosecution and sentencing
of defendants in pending cases in accordance with statutes
existing at the time defendants are charged.12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Upon review of the trial court’s decision, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court traced the history of Rhode Island’s general
savings clause, beginning with its common law predecessor of
abatement.13 Under the abatement rule, when statutes were
repealed or amended, courts discharged all pending proceedings
under the repealed statute in the absence of a savings clause in
the new statute.14 In response to the abatement rule, the General
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 958
Id.
Id.& n.3 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 43-3-23 (1938)).
Id. at 958.
Id.
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Assembly enacted a general savings clause, in part “to save the
necessity of the burdensome formality of attaching an identical
saving[s] clause to all repealing legislation.”15 The court then
summarized the first application of the general savings clause in
State v. Lewis, where the court authorized maintenance of the
prosecution of a driving under the influence charge under the preamended form of the statute.16 There the court stated that the
purpose of the savings clause was to abrogate the common law
rule and to “authorize the continuance of prosecutions that were
pending at the time of the repeal of the prior act.”17 The court
noted that although ameliorative statutes may be applied
retroactively, they should only do so if applying the savings clause
“would be clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the
repealing statute.”18 The court explained that in making such a
determination, courts are to review the statute on a case by case
basis, considering the language of the repealing statute and the
nature of the amendment.19
In comparing the offense at bar to other cases applying the
general savings clause, the court first noted the general
presumption that “statutes will be given prospective application
unless otherwise provided.”20 Next, it distinguished Whiting’s
case from two situations in which charges were dismissed because
the amendments to the statutes rendered the defendants’ conduct
legal, noting that under either statute, Whiting’s conduct
remained illegal, the only difference being that of degree.21 The
court also rejected Whiting’s attempt to analogize his case to State
v. Macarelli, where the defendant was convicted of conspiring to
corrupt horse trainers under a statutory scheme which allowed for
a much larger sentence for the common law offense of conspiracy
than the underlying statutory crime of corruption of a sports
15. Id. at 958–59 (quoting State v. Lewis, 161 A.2d 209, 212 (R.I. 1960)).
16. Id. at 958.
17. Id. at 959 (quoting Lewis, 161 A.2d at 212).
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d 783, 786 (R.I. 1999)).
20. Id. (quoting State v. Briggs, 58 A.3d 164, 168 (R.I. 2013)).
21. Id.; see also Mullen, 740 A.2d at 786 (applying statute retroactively
where the amendment effectively decriminalized sodomy); State v. Babbitt,
457 A.2d 1049, 1055 (R.I. 1983) (vacating convictions where amended statute
added a pecuniary gain requirement to transporting another for indecent
purposes offense).
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participant or official.22 While the appeal was pending, the
General Assembly codified conspiracy offenses to match the crimes
defendants conspired to commit.23 As a result, the court in
Macarelli amended the charges, reasoning that “it is apparent
that the legislature thought it inequitable to punish a conspiracy
to commit a crime more harshly than the underlying substantive
offense itself.”24 Here, the court determined that no such equitable
considerations existed, where the amendment contained only an
increase in the monetary threshold.25 Unlike in Macarelli, where
the enactment fundamentally changed the sentencing scheme
based on equitable considerations, there was no such large shift
here, nor an equitable principle embodied in the amendment
which would render the old statute “clearly repugnant to the
express provisions of the repealing statute.”26
The court also drew guidance from the Connecticut Supreme
Court decision of State v. Kalil, which addressed a nearly identical
issue to Whiting’s and rejected the defendant’s argument that the
amended statute should have applied.27 There the court reasoned
that the amended law contained no language indicating
retroactive application, and it expressed concern that inequities
could result if defendants committed crimes on the same day but
had trials on different days and thus were subject to different
laws.28 In light of the Kalil decision and Rhode Island precedent,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the general savings
clause was applicable to Whiting’s charge, and thus the amended
statute should not be applied retroactively.29
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision attempts to give
the general savings clause its full effect, while still providing for
situations in which amended laws should be applied retroactively
in order to comport with the legislature’s intent. In distinguishing
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 960; see also State v. Macarelli, 375 A.2d 944, 944–46 (1977).
Whiting, 115 A.3d at 960.
Id. (quoting Macarelli, 375 A.2d at 947).
Id.
Id. (quoting Lewis, 161 A.2d at 212).
Id. at 961; see also State v. Kalil, 107 A.3d 343, 361 (Conn. 2014).
Whiting, 115 A.3d at 961; see also Kalil, 107 A.3d at 361.
Whiting, 115 A.3d at 961.
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the mere changing of a threshold amount for felony larceny from
those cases in which there is a clear attempt by legislature to
ameliorate a legislative deficiency or accommodate for a clear
societal change, the court maintained the integrity of the savings
clause while leaving the door open for those rare circumstances
where retroactive application is necessary. The court’s case by
case analysis allows for the fair result of extreme scenarios, while
fending off attempts to swallow the rule with its exceptions.
The court’s formulation also bears in mind the difficulty in
deducing legislative intent from statutory construction and
accordingly maintains a high bar for applying statutory changes
retroactively with its clearly repugnant test. While here it might
be argued that the statutory change was made in response to the
reality of inflation and a change in government policy on criminal
punishment, the application of the old statute to the crime does
not so clearly undermine the new statute as to render it clearly
repugnant. Indeed, the legislature’s decision to amend a statute
must necessarily stem from some consideration of the statute’s
deficiency or inapplicability in its modern context. However, a
defendant’s ability to point to that vague intent alone cannot be
enough to trigger application of the new law, else nearly every
defendant could find some justification for receiving the benefit of
a new statute. The clearly repugnant test, while likely considered
too high a bar by some, is a necessary means to prevent the
erosion of the general savings clause, which is by its very nature
designed to be expansive.
Further, while not explicitly mentioned in the court’s decision
here, applying a broad amelioration doctrine despite a lack of clear
intent to do so in the new statute might be considered an
overreach of judicial power.30 As addressed in Kalil, broad
amelioration in a general savings jurisdiction flies in the face of
the legislature, undermining the legislative process by judicial
fiat.31 While the intent of the legislature is important in
considering the amended statutes in cases such as this, the intent
of the legislature in enacting the general savings clause must be
given equal weight. Thus, when judicial attempts to discern the
intent of one statute are likely to offend another statute, it is
30.
31.

See Kalil, 107 A.3d at 358–59.
Id.
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likely best left to the legislature to make the appropriate changes
to the law.32
Another important consideration that the court adds to its
analysis is the concern for inconsistency of application.33 There
can be no adequate explanation as to why two people who commit
the same crime on the same day should be punished differently
according to the dates of their trials. This is a problem that not
only could arise by mere coincidence under a different ruling, but
one that might encourage parties to delay the conclusion of
litigation in the face of pending litigation. The ruling here helps
to allay those concerns and ensures that decisions on these types
of issues are rendered consistently.
Overall, the court’s thorough analysis of this issue’s history
leads it to the case’s logical conclusion, drawing a line as to the
reach of the exception to the general savings clause, thus
preserving that statute’s intent and avoiding inconsistent
application of the law.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that applying the
general savings clause and prosecuting Whiting under the pre
amendment version of R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 § 11-41-5 was not
clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the new statute. In
considering whether there was clear intent to apply the law
retroactively in its language, and whether there were equitable
concerns meriting retroactive application, the court found that no
such evidence existed.
Andrew J. Piombino

32.
33.

See id.
See Whiting, 115 A.3d at 961.
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Criminal Law. State v. Virola, 115 A.3d 980 (R.I. 2015). The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Superior Court’s
judgment of conviction and its denial of Defendant’s motion for a
new trial. On appeal, the Defendant claimed that the trial justice
erred in denying his motion for a new trial and in admitting
certain witness testimony. The court held that the standard for
reversal does not depend on whether the court agrees with the
trial justice’s determination, but rather whether the trial justice
has overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was
otherwise clearly wrong in denying a motion for a new trial.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 16, 2004, Christopher Nelson, a graduate of
Johnson & Wales University, was shot in his second floor
apartment in Providence, Rhode Island.1 Nelson died as a result
of the shooting.2 Following an investigation, four men were taken
into custody—David Mercado, Lazaro “Casper” Martinez, Martin
“Malik” White, and Wayman “Kevin” Turner.3 At that time, the
police also issued an arrest warrant for Defendant, Ramon
Virola.4 Mr. Mercado subsequently entered into a cooperation
agreement with the state, and he pled nolo contendere to one
count of conspiracy to commit robbery.5
1. State v. Virola, 115 A.3d 980, 983 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The relevant section of Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Superior
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant
refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of

714
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On December 10, 2004, the Defendant, Martinez, White and
Turner were indicted by a grand jury for the murder of
Christopher Nelson, assault with intent to commit robbery,
conspiracy to commit robbery, and discharge of a firearm during a
crime of violence.6
Defendant was not apprehended until
approximately seven years later, on November 16, 2011, in
Glendale, Arizona, where he was then known by the name “Benny
Delgado.”7
At trial, Mercado and White testified that the day of Nelson’s
murder, Martinez had discussed with the two men a plan to rob
Mercado’s former drug dealer, who lived with Nelson.8 At the
same time, Turner told White that the men needed a gun for the
robbery, and Turner volunteered to attempt to acquire a gun by
contacting the Defendant.9 Before the robbery, Mercado drove
himself and Martinez to meet the other three men (White, Turner
and the Defendant) who would be involved in the robbery, yet,
Mercado had never met before.10
On the night of the murder, Christopher Nelson had been
watching the Olympics and playing video games with three of his
friends in the comfort of his second floor apartment in
Providence.11
After hearing a knock at the door, Nelson
answered, but then appeared to be “trying to close the door” as he
“struggle[d]” with someone.12 An intruder wearing a mask then
stepped into the room, pointed a gun at Nelson and repeatedly
asked: “Where is the money?”13 After Nelson replied that he did
not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual
basis for the plea.
RI SUPER. R. CRIM. P. Rule 11.
6. Virola, 115 A.3d at 983. On November 14, 2005, Martinez plead nolo
contender to second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit robbery.
Turner plea of guilty to second-degree murder and conspiracy to commit the
crime of robbery was filed and he had the remaining charges against him
dropped. Id.
7. Id. at 984.
8. Id. at 985. It is undisputed by both parties that Nelson was not
involved in any drug activity. Id.
9. Id. at 987.
10. Id. at 985. Mercado, Martinez, White and Turner drove to the site of
the murder in one car, while the Defendant drove separately in another car.
11. Id. at 984.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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not have any money, “the gun went off” and the intruder
continued to brandish the gun in the direction of the other
occupants of the apartment.14 After realizing that the other
occupants did not know where the money was, the intruder left
the apartment.15 It was then that the other occupants realized
that Nelson had been shot and called rescue services.16 Nelson
was later pronounced dead.17
After the men left the apartment, Turner, White, and the
Defendant ran back to White’s car and fled the scene, while
Martinez called to ask Mercado to pick him up near the
apartment.18 When Martinez picked up Mercado, he learned that
the Defendant had shot someone.19 The next day, when Mercado
learned from a news broadcast that Nelson had died, he drove
Martinez and himself to meet with Turner so they could dispose of
the weapon.20 In an attempt to potentially dispose of the gun,
Mercado was driving with Martinez while the gun was in a
shoebox on the floor of the front passenger seat.21 While he and
Martinez were en route to dispose of the weapon, the police pulled
his car over, arrested them, and seized the weapon.22 While in
custody, Mercado eventually gave a statement implicating
Defendant, Martinez, White, Turner, and himself in the murder of
Nelson.23 After learning that he had been implicated in the
attempted robbery and the murder of Nelson, White turned
himself in and entered into a cooperation agreement “in order to
get the best deal.”24
At trial, Patricia “Vicky” Gallardo testified that in 2008 she
met Defendant, who went by the name “Benny Delgado,” in
Arizona through an online dating service and the two eventually
began a romantic relationship.25 The couple continued their

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 985, 987.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987.
Id.
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relationship until 2011, with a short break in 2009, when Gallardo
complained that the Defendant had “[become] controlling and
wanted to know everything that she was doing].”26 Gallardo
discovered that she was pregnant with their child and moved in
with the Defendant where she began to overhear the Defendant
identify himself as “Ray” during phone calls.27 Prior to the end of
their relationship, Gallardo learned that the Defendant’s first
name was “Ramon” and that he was “wanted” by law enforcement
authorities in Rhode Island.28 In June of 2011, Gallardo and the
Defendant ended their relationship.29 In November 2011, she
came to believe that Defendant knew where she was living when
she received a message from him stating that he “knew where she
was” and that “he was coming.”30 Fearing for her life, Gallardo
contacted the Chino Valley Police Department and told the police
that the Defendant was wanted by law enforcement in Rhode
Island.31 Subsequently, Defendant was apprehended in Phoenix,
Arizona.32
On March 13, 2013, a jury found the Defendant guilty of all
four counts of the indictment, including the first-degree felony
murder of Christopher Nelson.33 Consequently, the Defendant
moved for a new trial, arguing that Mercado, White, and Gallardo
were, in his view, “all compromised witnesses,” and that,
therefore, the court should refuse to credit their testimony. The
Defendant thus requested that “the [c]ourt grant the motion for a
new trial in the interest of justice.34 On April 23, 2013, the trial
justice denied the motion and the Defendant filed a timely appeal
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court contending (1) that, in
denying his motion for a new trial, the trial justice inappropriately
credited the testimony of Mercado, White, and Gallardo; and (2)
26. Id.
During trial, Gallardo testified that the Defendant “was
preventing her from being independent and enjoying her own life. Gallardo
stated that after the Defendant got physically abusive with her, she moved
out. Id.
27. Id. at 988.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 989.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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that the trial justice erred in permitting Gallardo to testify as to
the Defendant’s purportedly “controlling” behavior during their
romantic relationship.35
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A. Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial
In his appeal, the Defendant first argued that in denying his
motion for a new trial, the trial justice inappropriately credited
the testimony of Mercado, White, and Gallardo because they were
all biased witnesses with motivation to lie and were unworthy of
belief.36 The Defendant argued that with respect to Gallardo, “it
was clearly in her interest to do anything to make sure that the
[D]efendant never again saw the light of day, as he was the one
impediment to her enjoying the rest of her life with her new
family.37 The Defendant averred that Mercado’s testimony was
not credible for the fact that Mercado entered into a cooperative
agreement with the State in exchange for a lenient sentence, and
that Mercado admitted to repeatedly using marijuana on the day
of the robbery.38 Lastly, when addressing White’s testimony, the
Defendant claimed that it too was unworthy of credence because
White entered into a cooperative agreement with the State.39
In reviewing the appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
placed great weight on the trial justice’s analysis and reasoning
for the denial of the Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial.40 The
court reasoned that the trial justice sits in the role of the
metaphorical “thirteenth juror;” and, in that role, the trial justice
must exercise independent judgment on the credibility of
witnesses and on the weight of the evidence.”41 The court
acknowledged that it affords a great deal of respect to the factual
determinations and credibility assessments made by each judicial
officer and will not overturn that decision unless the trial justice
has overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 989, 991.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
State v. Barrior, 88 A.3d 1123, 1128 (R.I. 2014).
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otherwise clearly wrong.42 The court noted that while the
Defendant was asking the court to second guess the credibility
determinations of the trial justice, all the facts that would make
those witnesses biased, were known to the jury.43
The court took into consideration that jury knew that while
Gallardo testified that the Defendant was a bad guy, she also said
that he loved their child and that while he was possessive, she did
not seek help from the police or family.44 Likewise, while Mercado
agreed to cooperate, the jury knew that he only did so ultimately
to save [his] own neck and “minimize the harm” that would befall
him.45 Lastly, while the jury knew that White was testifying in
exchange for a more lenient sentence, he agreed to make a
statement in order to get the best deal.46 Thus, the jury was
aware of all the information which the Defendant argued
demonstrated the lack of credibility of the witnesses.47 The court
stated that the trial justice found all three witnesses to be credible
and agreed with the jury’s verdict, and further stated that “the
mere fact that a defendant disagrees with the trial justice’s
conclusions about credibility is not a sufficient basis to warrant
the granting of a motion for a new trial.48
B. The Admissibility of Gallardo’s Testimony
The Defendant next argued that the trial justice erred in
permitting Gallardo to testify as to the Defendant’s purportedly
“controlling” behavior during their romantic relationship.49 The
Defendant argued that Gallardo’s testimony, with respect to
Defendant’s behavior during their relationship, was admitted in
error because “the unfair prejudice of [the] testimony greatly
outweighed its slight probative value.”50 The Defendant argued
42. See State v. Paola, 59 A.3d 99, 106 (R.I. 2013); State v. Clay, 79 A.3d
832, 842 (R.I. 2013).
43. Virola, 115 A.3d at 993.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.; see also State v. Ferreira, 21 A.3d 355, 367 (R.I. 2011).
49. Virola, 115 A.3d at 989.
50. Id. at 994. Defendant provided the Court with a list of statements
which he contends Gallardo inappropriately testified to his “controlling
behavior;” specifically that she testified that Defendant “wanted to know
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that the evidence was not relevant under Rule 401 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence, and even if the testimony were relevant,
its admission should have been barred by the provisions of Rule
403.51 The Defendant claimed that the only purpose served by the
statement at issue was “to depict him as a violent individual who
engaged in a pattern of domestic abuse during his relationship
with Gallardo.”52
1.

Rule 401

The Defendant first contended that the specific statements of
Gallardo regarding his controlling behavior and refusal to be
photographer were not relevant under Rule 401.53 The court
recognized that “inherent in Rule 401 are two basic facets of
relevant evidence-materiality and probativeness and if the
evidence is offered to help prove a proposition that is not a matter
in issue, the evidence is immaterial and should be excluded.”54
The court was unable to detect any abuse of discretion in the trial
justice’s decision to admit Gallardo’s testimony.55 The court
reasoned that because that Defendant told Gallardo that his
behavior was a result of being “wanted by the State of Rhode
Island, this helped illustrate the [D]efendant’s consciousness of
guilt.56
2.

Rule 403
The Defendant next contended that, even if Gallardo’s

everything she was doing and who she was talking to,” was “possessive,” and
never let her take his photograph. Id.
51. Id. at 995.
“Relevant evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
RI R. Evid. Art. IV, Rule 401:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
RI R. Evid. Art. IV, Rule 403.
52. Virola, 115 A.3d at 995.
53. Id. at 996.
54. State v. Thomas, 936 A.2d 1278, 1282 (R.I. 2007).
55. Virola, 115 A.3d at 996.
56. Id.
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statements were relevant, the trial justice erred in failing to
exclude them pursuant to Rule 403.57 The court, however, has
applied a standard which “asks whether [the evidence] will
inflame the jurors and therefore prejudice them beyond the
ordinary prejudice that is always sustained by the introduction of
relevant evidence intended to prove guilt.”58 The trial justice
stated on the record that some of the issues surrounding
Gallardo’s testimony about the Defendants purportedly controlling
behavior had been “aired” in chambers.59 The justice determined,
however, that Gallardo’s testimony, including statements properly
at issue on appeal, were admissible the statements were evidence
of the Defendant’s risk of flight.”60
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held on numerous
occasions that it “will not reverse a trial justice’s ruling admitting
evidence over a Rule 403 objection unless it constitutes a clear
abuse of discretion,” and here, the court was satisfied that the
trial justice soundly exercised his discretion and properly
articulated the grounds on which he was permitting the
testimony.61 The court agreed with the trial judge when he said:
“This is all evidence of guilty knowledge and is very, very relevant.
And to the extent that there’s any prejudice involved, it is
minimal, indeed, compared to the high relevance, and I will
certainly permit this kind of evidence to be adduced.”62
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court was presented with two
issues in State v. Virola, and the court’s opinion reaffirmed the
importance of the role of the trial justice. Here, the court deferred
to the trial justice’s findings “because a trial justice, being present
during all phases of the trial, is in an especially good position to
evaluate the facts and to judge the credibility of the witnesses.63
In this case, the Defendant tried to diminish the credibility of
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
at 997.
62.
63.

Id.
State v. O’Brien, 774 A.2d 89, 107 (R.I. 2001).
Id.
Virola, 115 A.3d at 997.
State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1242 (R.I. 2012); See Virola, 115 A.3d
Virola, 115 A.3d at 997.
State v. Mendez, 116 A.3d 228, 247 (R.I. 2015).
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the witnesses by arguing that each witness had motivation to
lie.64 The Defendant contended that the trial justice erred in
denying his motion for a new trial because Gallardo, Mercado, and
White were all biased witnesses with motivation to lie about the
murder of Nelson.65 With respect to Gallardo, the Defendant
argued that it was clearly in Gallardo’s interest to do anything to
make sure the Defendant never again saw the light of day, as he
was the one impediment keeping her enjoying the rest of her
life.66 As for Mercado, the Defendant avers that his testimony
was not credible for two reasons: (1) the fact that Mercado entered
into a cooperative agreement with the State in exchange for a
particularly light sentence; and (2) the fact that Mercado admitted
to repeatedly using marijuana on the day of the robbery and,
according to Defendant, was “stoned at the time of the commission
of the crime.”67 Lastly, the Defendant contends that White’s
testimony was unworthy of credence because White entered into a
cooperative agreement with the State and had access to all the
discovery in the case, including Mercado’s statement, before
making his statement to police.68 While this argument may have
proven that these witnesses demonstrated bias, the trial judge
discussed the fact that the State had called twelve witnesses and
had never set out to prove that the Defendant had personally shot
Nelson.69 The trial justice observed that the state intended to
prove that the Defendant was vicariously responsible for the
offenses as either a co-conspirator or as an aider and abettor.70
Further, the trial justice found that there was overwhelming
evidence that the Defendant was the one who orchestrated
obtaining the pistol that ultimately caused Nelson’s death and
that the jury came to the same conclusion.
Additionally, the Defendant contended that Gallardo’s
testimony with respect to Defendant’s behavior during their
relationship was admitted in error because the unfair prejudice of
the testimony greatly outweighs its slight probative value.71
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Virola, 115 A.3d at 992.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Virola, 115 A.3d at 992.
Id. at 994.
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However, the danger of unfair prejudice is one that all evidence at
trials presents.72 While the defendant agued that there was no
relevance, the trial justice found that there was. The testimony
given by Gallardo time and time again proved the guiltiness of the
Defendant. His possessive behavior, and fear of being
photographed, noted by the trial justice, helped illustrate
Defendant’s consciousness of guilt.. While the holding of this case
reaffirmed that the Rhode Island Supreme Court will defer to the
discretion of the trial justice absent a showing of clear error or
that he or she overlooked or misconceived material and relevant
evidence, it remains unclear at what point a higher court will
overturn a trial justice who has abused his discretion.
Historically, courts have defined the meaning of judicial discretion
to be the exercise of judgment by a judge or court based on what is
fair under the circumstances and guided by the rules and
principles of law.73 Therefore, only when the judge has failed to
exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making skills has
he abused his discretion. This is a very broad standard because,
as the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated, the trial justice is
in the best position to judge the facts of the case in relation to the
law as the trial justice is sitting in the front row of the audience in
the courtroom.74
In the past decades, there have only been a limited number of
occasions that the Rhode Island Supreme Court has reversed a
judgment due to an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
justice. One prominent example occurred in Beaton v. Malouin, in
which the Court found that the trial justice failed to make any
finding that the evidence was prejudicial, confusing, misleading,
or would result in undue delay and that the evidence was highly
probative and its exclusion was an abuse of discretion.75 There,
the plaintiff was traveling west on Route 195 near the northbound
and southbound split, when her automobile skidded on the wet
surface of the road and ended up perpendicular in the left high-

72. United States v. LeCompte, 131 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1997).
73. See Stephen C. Aldrich & Michael Cass, Judicial Discretion: Melding
Messy Facts and Pristine Law, BENCH AND BAR OF MINNESOTA (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://mnbenchbar.com/2013/11/judicial-discretion.
74. See State v. Mendez, 116 A.3d 228, 247 (R.I. 2015).
75. 845 A.2d 298, 302 (R.I. 2004).
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speed lane and middle lane of traffic.76 Although several drivers
managed to successfully avoid colliding with plaintiff’s
automobile, the defendant came upon plaintiff and struck the rear
quarter of her vehicle and plaintiff’s vehicle spun 180 degrees
from its original position.77 During trial, in which the plaintiff
filed a negligence action against the defendant, the trial court
limited the testimony of plaintiff’s expert engineer to his own
personal observations of the accident scene based on a finding that
his opinion of the sight-line distance defendant had before the
accident had not been verified by actual measurements and
refused to permit counsel to introduce into evidence two answers
to interrogatories provided by defendant.78 The court noted that
the exclusion of this evidence was made in clear error, and its
probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.79
Therefore, it seems that only when the trial justice has clearly
acted unreasonably in the judicial making process and has
ordered an erroneous judgment, that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court will overturn his judgment.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice
correctly executed the correct analytical approach to a motion for a
new trial and that his ultimate agreement with the jury’s verdict
did not overlook or misconceive material evidence and that he was
not otherwise clearly wrong in denying Defendant’s motion for a
new trial. In addition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
because the Defendant’s contention that the witnesses statements
were not relevant was not persuasive and that the trial justice did
not abuse his discretion under Rule 403 when he admitted the
witnesses statements over defendants objections.
Caroline Dias

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 299.
Id.
Id. at 299, 302.
See id. at 302.
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Evidence. State v. Arciliares, 108 A.3d 1040 (R.I. 2015). Where a
defendant in a criminal matter is not permitted to sufficiently
cross-examine a material witness as to statements made by that
witness to the defendant, reversible error has occurred, and the
verdict must be vacated and remanded for a new trial. The court’s
decision in State v. Harnois,1 which limits the admissibility of
statements made to police by a defendant that elects not to testify,
applies only to statements made by a defendant, not to statements
made to a defendant, and mirrors longstanding rules barring
hearsay.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

At about 3:00 a.m. on October 30, 2010, Alfredo Barros was
shot and killed in his vehicle while stopped at an intersection in
Pawtucket, Rhode Island.2
After an eight-month long
investigation, an inmate at the Rhode Island Adult Correctional
Institute (ACI), Raymond Baccaire, came forward and provided
testimony of an alleged jailhouse confession from defendant Victor
Arciliares.3 Baccaire informed the lead investigator, Detective
Richard LaForest, of an alleged conversation between Baccaire
and Arciliares.4 Baccaire claimed Arciliares offered details of
Barros’s murder, including admitting Arciliares’s involvement.5
As a result of the information provided by Baccaire, a grand jury
indicted Arciliares for, inter alia, first degree murder.6
1. See State v. Harnois, 638 A.2d 532 (R.I. 1994).
2. State v. Arciliares, 108 A.3d 1040, 1041–42 (R.I. 2015).
3. Id. at 1042–43.
4. Id. at 1043.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1042. The court explained:
The six counts against defendant were counts: (1) murder in the first
degree of Alfredo Barros, in violation of § 11–23–1; (2) discharging a
firearm while committing a violent crime, the murder of Alfredo
Barros, in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–47–3.2; (3) discharging a
firearm from a motor vehicle in a manner that created a substantial
risk of death to [passenger of Barros’s vehicle], in violation of § 11–

725
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At trial, the State called an Assistant Medical Examiner to
testify to the nature of the injuries that caused Barros’s death.7
The State introduced a number of autopsy photos into evidence to
demonstrate that the trajectory of the bullets that hit Barros
suggested that there was only one shooter.8 Arciliares objected to
the admission of the photos, arguing that they were too gruesome
and would unfairly prejudice the jury.9 The trial judge overruled
the objection and admitted the photographs into evidence.10
Following the Assistant Medical Examiner’s testimony, Det.
LaForest testified regarding his June 7, 2011 meeting with
Baccaire, where Baccaire alleged that Arciliares had confessed to
shooting Barros.11 Det. LaForest testified that he did not offer
any details of the shooting to the ACI investigator who initially
contacted LaForest about Baccaire’s information.12 On crossexamination, Arciliares inquired about a May 17, 2011 meeting
between Arciliares and Det. LaForest.13 Det. LaForest testified
that he remembered the meeting, but when asked about the
content of the discussion the State objected.14 Arciliares argued
that this conversation could provide the jury with an alternative
narrative for how Baccaire learned the details of the shooting.15
Arciliares may have “vented” to his cell mate about Det.
LaForest’s accusation.16 Seeing an opportunity to negotiate an
early release, Baccaire could have used that information to
fabricate Arciliares’s confession.17 The State argued that Det.
LaForest could not testify about this conversation because it

Id.

47–51.1; (4) assault with intent to murder [passenger of Barros’s
vehicle], in violation of G.L.1956 § 11–5–1; (5) use of a firearm in the
attempted commission of a violent crime resulting in an injury to
[passenger of Barros’s vehicle], in violation of § 11–47–3.2; and (6)
conspiracy to do an unlawful act, to wit, murder, in violation of
G.L.1956 § 11–1–6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042–43.
Id. at 1043.
Id.
Id. at 1043–44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1050–51.
See id. at 1044 n.7.
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would lead to an inquiry of Arciliares’s statements at the
meeting.18 Criminal defendants are not permitted to introduce
testimony of the defendant’s past favorable statements through a
third party as the prosecutor does not have the ability to crossexamine the declarant as to the content of those statements.19
Arciliares argued that he intended to only inquire as to what Det.
LaForest told Arciliares and not what Arciliares said to Det.
LaForest.20 Despite the limited scope requested by Arciliares, the
trial judge sustained the State’s objection and did not permit
cross-examination regarding the meeting.21
Arciliares later
attempted to recall Det. LaForest to inquire about the May 17,
2011 meeting, but the trial judge again sustained the State’s
objection.22 Det. LaForest never retook the stand.23 During
closing arguments, the State focused on Baccaire’s inability to
have learned details of the shooting in any way other than from
Arciliares’s confession.24
During jury deliberations, the foreperson sent a note to the
trial judge indicating that the jury believed it was deadlocked.25
The note stated that the issue troubling the jury was how Baccaire
received the information to which he testified.26 Despite an
objection from Arciliares, the judge “encourage[d the] jurors to
listen to the opinions of other jurors to resolve [the] deadlock.”27
The jury returned a guilty verdict later that afternoon.28
Arciliares moved for a new trial because he was not allowed to
properly cross-examine Det. LaForest, but the motion was

18. Id. at 1044 n.8.
19. Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36.
20. Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1044.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1045.
23. Id. at 1046.
24. Id. at 1046–47.
25. Id. at 1047.
26. Id. The note read:
We are at a point when we cannot arrive at a unanimous verdict.
We are currently at an 11–1 impasse. The issue is the information
given to Mr. Baccaire and if he was given all of this by the defendant
or if some or all was from another source.
Id. at 1047 n.15.
27. Id. at 1047.
28. Id.
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denied.29 Arciliares was subsequently sentenced and filed a
timely appeal.30
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Arciliares’s appeal was based on four perceived errors of
though, only two issues were discussed at length by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court:32 (1) the trial judge’s refusal to
allow Arciliares to cross-examine Det. LaForest as to the May 17,
2011 conversation;33 and (2) the admission of the gruesome
autopsy photos.34 The court held that the trial judge’s only error
was refusing to allow sufficient cross-examination of Det.
LaForest.35 As a result of this error, the court vacated the
conviction and remanded the case to the Superior Court for a new
trial.36
The conversation Det. LaForest had with Arciliares on May
17, 2011 was relevant as to the source of Baccaire’s information.37
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.”38 All relevant evidence is assumed admissible, though
it can be excluded based on the applicability of several
exceptions.39 The State argued that the evidentiary bar set forth
in State v. Harnois was one such exception, which would bar the
law;31

29. Id. at 1047–48.
30. Id. at 1048. (“The defendant was subsequently sentenced to two
consecutive life sentences, . . . two concurrent sentences of twenty years . . . to
be served consecutively to the two life sentences, and an additional twenty
years . . . to be served consecutively to the entire sentence.”).
31. Id. at 1048–49.
32. The court did not discuss the trial judge’s instruction to the jury but
stated simply that it was not an error. See id. at 1049.
33. Id. at 1049–51.
34. Id. at 1051–52.
35. Id. at 1049.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting State v. Brown, 42 A.3d 1239, 1244 (R.I. 2012)).
39. Id. at 1049; id. at 1049 n.19 (“Rule 402 of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence provides: ‘All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by the constitution of
Rhode Island, by act of congress, by the general laws of Rhode Island, by
these rules, or by other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence
which is not relevant is not admissible.’”).
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line of questioning suggested by Arciliares.40 In Harnois, the
court determined that while a defendant has a constitutional right
to not testify at their trial, they could not avoid cross-examination
by admitting evidence of the defendant’s previous statements.41
In essence, a defendant is not permitted to “testify through”
another person.42 The State would be unable to cross examine
Arciliares on the statements made through Det. LaForest.43 Here,
Arciliares did not seek the ability to testify through Det. LaForest;
rather, Arciliares sought to enter into evidence only Det.
LaForest’s statements to Arciliares;44 Harnois does not bar such
evidence from being admitted.45
The State also argued that the testimony of Det. LaForest, as
to the content of the May 17, 2011 meeting with Arciliares, would
be barred because it would create “confusion in the minds of
jurors.”46
The court again disagreed.47
The court further
disagreed with the State’s argument that Det. LaForest’s
testimony would unfairly prejudice the jury48 because the
probative value of the evidence would outweigh any unfair
prejudice to the State.49
The court also addressed the issue of the autopsy photos
entered into evidence over Arciliares’s objection.50 The court
found that weighing the prejudicial value of the photographs was
within the discretion of the trial judge and would only be
overturned if the trial judge went beyond the bounds of that
discretion.51 The court determined that an abuse of discretion did
not occur in the instant case.52 While the photographs may have
40. Id. at 1049.
41. See Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36.
42. Id. at 536.
43. Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1049; see Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36.
44. Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1050.
45. Id.; See Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36.
46. Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1050.
47. Id. at 1050–51.
48. Id. at 1051.
49. Id. at 1050 (providing that “[a]ll evidence supportive of [defendant’s
theory of the case] is prejudicial to a prosecutor’s case, but such evidence will
be excluded only if its prejudicial effect outweighs the degree of its probative
value.”) (quoting State v. Tavarozzi, 446 A.2d 1048, 1051 (R.I. 1982)).
50. Id. at 1051–52.
51. Id. at 1051.
52. Id. at 1052.
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been gruesome, they are relevant for the jury to understand the
Assistant Medical Examiner’s testimony.53
The trial judge,
therefore, did not err in admitting the photos.54
COMMENTARY

Here, the Rhode Island Supreme Court clarified the role of
Harnois when evaluating evidence55 presented at trial and
affirmed the importance of allowing criminal defendants to put
forth a proper defense, which includes the sufficient crossexamination witnesses.56 The evidentiary bar against hearsay
enforced in Harnois prevents defendants from de facto testifying
without being subject to cross-examination.57 That goal is not
effectuated by a rule that prevents statements made to defendants
from entering evidence.58
The court shows concern about the potential for creating
reversible error by limiting the evidence admitted by a criminal
defendant.59 The court’s opinion in this case stands as a warning
sign to the justices of the Superior Court to proceed with caution
when considering excluding evidence that a criminal defendant
seeks to admit at trial.60 The likelihood of reversal is heightened
when probative evidence proffered by the defendant is
suppressed.61
The court did affirm the discretionary function of the trial
justice in determining the probative value of a piece of evidence in
the context of autopsy photos,62 but indicated that that discretion
is not without limit.63 The issue of photographs was secondary to
the discussion of Det. LaForest’s testimony and was reached in an
effort to preempt the possibility of a future appellate claim should
Arciliares be convicted upon re-trial.64

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 1051–52.
Id. at 1052.
See id. at 1049.
See id. at 1052 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36.
See Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1049 (majority opinion).
See id. at 1052 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See id. (majority opinion).
See id.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
Id.
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The trial court’s decision in this case departed from the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence, which closely mirror the Federal Rules
of Evidence with regard to hearsay.65 Det. LaForest should have
been able to testify to the statements he made because the
purpose of the testimony was not to demonstrate the truth of
those statements, but to offer an alternative means by which
Baccaire could have learned the details of the crime.66 Arciliares
intended only to demonstrate that the statements were made,67
and statements proffered for such a reason are not hearsay.68
Regardless of the accuracy of Det. LaForest’s statements to
Arciliares, by demonstrating that Det. LaForest provided
Arciliares with details of Barros’s murder Arciliares could
establish a defense69 and quite possibly reasonable doubt.
Despite the prosecutions assertion to the contrary,70 Harnois
did not establish a new evidentiary bar; it merely enforced the
longstanding bar against hearsay.71 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court simply applied the hearsay rule to the facts of Harnois.72
The Harnois defendant’s argument under Rule 40373 necessitated
a discussion of defendants testifying through another person;
however, it created no additional rule prohibiting the admission of
such statements74 as they were already barred as hearsay.75
65. Compare FED. R. EVID. 801, with R.I. R. EVID. 801.
66. See R.I. R. EVID. 801(c).
67. Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1044.
68. See R.I. R. EVID. 801(c).
69. Arciliares, 108 A.3d at 1051.
70. Id. at 1044 n.8.
71. Harnois, 638 A.2d at 535–36.
72. Id.
73. See R.I. R. EVID. 803(24) (“Other Exceptions. A statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the
general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served
by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not
be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to
the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the
adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his or her
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name
and address of the declarant.”).
74. Id.
75. See R.I. R. EVID. 801.
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Harnois is limited
to statements made by the defendant and does not include
statements made to the defendant thus mirroring longstanding
rules barring hearsay. The court further held that it is reversible
error to deny a criminal defendant the ability to sufficiently crossexamine a material witness when the testimony sought is
probative, not unfairly prejudicial to the prosecution, and not
otherwise barred by the rules of evidence.
Kenneth J. Sylvia
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Family Law. In re Max M., 116 A.3d 185 (R.I. 2015). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court upheld a ruling of termination of parental
rights where the father refused to cooperate with the Department
of Children, Youth and Families and had an overall lack of
interest in the child. DCYF made reasonable efforts of
reunification where it attempted to work with the father, but he
refused to cooperate.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On September 13, 2013, the Department of Children, Youth
and Families (DCYF) filed a petition to terminate the parental
rights of Eric M., the respondent father, regarding his son Max.1
DCYF alleged two grounds for the termination of Eric’s rights.2
First, pursuant to R.I. General Laws Section 15-7-7(a)(3) (1956),
DCYF alleged that Max had been in the legal custody of DCYF for
at least twelve months and there was not a substantial probability
that Max could be returned in a reasonable time.3 Second,
pursuant to R.I. General Laws Section 15-7-7(a)(4) (1956), DCYF
alleged that Eric had abandoned Max.4
In support of its petition, Cheryl Csisar, a caseworker
assigned to Max’s case, testified as a witness for DCYF.5 Ms.
Csisar replaced another caseworker in June of 2013.6 She
testified as to how Max came into the custody of DCYF.7 She
testified that in May of 2012, DCYF was notified that Max’s
mother, Amanda8, was “abusing heroin. . . [and] leaving [Max]
1. In re Max M., 116 A.3d 185, 188 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. A petition to terminate the parental rights of Amada was filed at the
same time as Eric’s. Amanda did not show up to the initial hearing and did
not appeal. Id. at n.2.
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with relatives for extended periods of time and not providing for
his care.”9 Ms. Csisar also testified that Eric could not take care
of Max because he was serving time at the Adult Correctional
Facility (ACI).10 In response, Max was placed in foster care with
his maternal aunt and uncle on May 23, 2012.11
Although Eric was in prison, a previous case worker created
two case plans for Eric with the goal of reunification.12 In July of
2013, a month after Eric was released from prison, Ms. Csisar
created a third case plan for Eric with the same goal.13 As a part
of the third case plan, Eric was expected to develop parenting
skills, find housing, attend substance abuse treatment, address
anger management problems and refrain from any illegal
activities.14 Ms. Csisar was unable to execute the third case plan
because Eric felt that he had already completed anger
management and parenting classes while at ACI.15 Ms. Csisay
testified that these classes were not adequate, although she never
contacted ACI to determine if the classes met DCYF’s standards.16
Ms. Csisar also originally testified that Eric’s home would be
suitable Max, but later stated that it would not because
Amanda17, Max’s mother, lived there. Ms. Csisar also stated that
the home did not have heat or hot water when she visited in
March of 2014.18
Ms. Csisar testified that Eric only saw his son five times
between June 2013 and May 2014, although he was entitled to
visit with his son weekly, and the last visit had taken place in
January 2014.19 Ms. Csisar stated that Eric never requested that
the visits be lengthened and after January 2014, she could no
longer get ahold of Eric to arrange visits.20 Ms. Csisar testified
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
already
n.2.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 188–89.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 189, 190.
Id. Amanda was also Eric’s wife and since her parental rights had
been terminated she would not be an appropriate care giver. Id. at
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
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that Max did not know Eric, and although Eric fed Max when
visiting, Eric got very flustered and did not seem to know what to
do when Max was upset.21 Ms. Csisar also testified that she
talked to Eric about terminating his parental rights and at one
point he agreed to sign a direct consent adoption.22
Ms. Csisar testified that Eric had not met the goals of the case
plan and a new case plan was undertaken for Max with the goal of
adoption.23 Susan Carlson, a DCYF supervisor, also testified that
Eric had not met the goals of his case plan.24
Eric also testified at trial.25 Eric stated that he had done
nothing to obtain custody of his son and he had not provided
financially for his son since Max had been in the custody of
DCYF.26 Eric stated that he did not visit Max when he got out of
jail because he wanted to be stable first and he also stated that he
could not remember the last time that he had seen Max.27 Eric
also testified that when he agreed to sign the direct consent
adoption he had many mixed feelings and nothing had been
official decided.28
The trial justice entered a finding that Eric was an unfit
parent and a final decree terminating Eric’s parental rights was
entered on August 21, 2014.29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On review, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to
determine two issues.30 First, whether the trial justice had erred
in ruling that Eric was unfit to parent Max and second, whether

21. Id. at 190.
22. Id. According to Ms. Csisar, “[Eric] said to me that he decided he
knew he couldn’t parent and that he just wanted to sign the direct consent
[adoption]. He did not want to go forward with the trial. That he knew there
was no point in it. That he felt he would lose and that he couldn’t parent.” Id.
In a direct consent adoption, the biological parent agrees to an adoption for
the child with the child’s current caregivers. See R.I. Code R. 14-1-1100.0025.
23. Id. at 190.
24. Id. at 192.
25. Id. at 190.
26. Id. at 191.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 192.
30. Id. at 193.

FAMILY LAW_FOLEY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/2016 7:10 PM

736 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:733
DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify Eric and Max.31
Eric argued that DCYF had failed to prove either of these points
by clear and convincing evidence32 and as such, his parental
rights should not have been terminated.33 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision.34
First, the court addressed the issue of whether the lower court
had erred by ruling that Eric was an unfit parent.35 The court
acknowledged that several principles are used to determine
whether or not a parent is unfit.36 First, a parent has an
obligation to maintain contact with a child and plan for the child’s
future when the child is in the custody of DCYF.37 Second, the
court has stated that an unwillingness to cooperate with DCYF is
a demonstration of a parent’s lack of interest in a child.38
The court examined the facts relied on by the trial justice to
reach the conclusion that Eric was an unfit parent.39 Eric refused
to cooperate with DCYF.40 He would not participate in case
planning, and he refused to participate in any recommended
programs because he felt that he had done enough while in
prison.41 The trial justice also found support for deeming Eric an
unfit parent based on his “overall lack of interest [in Max].”42 The
court did not find that the trial justice had overlooked or
misconstrued any material evidence when determining Eric was
an unfit parent.43
Second, the court addressed the issue of whether DCYF had
31. Id.
32. Id. “[D]ue process requires that, before the state may terminate a
parent’s rights in his or her own children, the state must support its
allegations by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. (quoting In re Steven D., 23
A.3d at 1154, 1155).
33. Id. at 193.
34. Id. at 196.
35. Id. at 193.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d 199, 205 (R.I. 2006).
38. Id. at 194 (quoting In re Rosalie H., 889 A.2d at 205).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 195. The trial justice noted Eric’s sporadic visits, failure to
support Max and his belief that his family members or wife, whose parental
rights had been terminated, would be primary caretakers as evidence of his
parental unfitness. Id. at 194–95.
43. Id. at 195.
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made reasonable efforts at reunifying Eric and Max.44 DCYF has
to prove that reasonable efforts were made to strengthen the
parent-child relationship.45 Reasonable efforts may vary and the
reasonable efforts standard is subjective.46
In order to
demonstrate reasonable efforts, DCYF must show that “. . . it has
satisfied certain requirements, including case panning with the
parent, arrangements for visitation, and keeping the parent
informed of the child’s well-being.”47 However, the court also
noted that DCYF cannot be to blame when “the treatment
received does not resolve the underlying problem or when a
parent’s recalcitrance to treatment precludes reunification.”48
The court found that the trial justice’s findings were sufficiently
supported to show that DCYF had made efforts at reunification.49
The court found that DCYF had made reasonable efforts at
reunification, supported by clear and convincing evidence.50
COMMENTARY
The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed earlier decisions
that involved the termination of parental rights. The court upheld
a reasonable rule that provides a clear standard for terminating
the rights of parents. The court continues to allow the facts for
each situation to be considered. There is no one single objective
rule that could be used to determine when parental rights should
be terminated and the court continues to recognize this. The
court’s ruling continues to make it difficult for parents to prevent
a termination of the parental rights when they make no
reasonable efforts to allow for reunification. Parents cannot
simply prevent a termination when they refuse to cooperate with
DCYF and when they fail to take opportunities available to them
to reunite with a child. This standard not only protects the best
44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting In re Gabrielle D., 39 A.3d 655, 665 (R.I. 2012)).
46. Id. (quoting In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156).
47. Id. (quoting In re Lyric P., 90 A.3d 132, 141 (R.I. 2014)).
48. Id. (quoting In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d 198, 203 (R.I. 2008)).
49. Id. at 196. The trial justice found that Eric had the opportunity for
weekly visits with Max and DCYF had participated in case planning with
Eric on three separate occasions. Id. The trial justice also found that DCYF
did not need to make specific referrals for Eric because of his repeated and
clear refusal to participate in any further programs. Id.
50. Id.
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interest of a child, it also protects parents. The rule allows parents
to be protected when DCYF does not try and work with them and
it protects parents who are working steadily towards being
reunited with their children.
The court’s ruling also upheld the steps that need to be taken
by DCYF to make reasonable efforts at reunification and
continued to allow a subjective test as to what reasonable efforts
include. DCYF does need to meet certain requirements, regardless
of the chances of success, in order for a finding of reasonable
efforts. This makes sense because regardless of how the parent
reacts, DCYF needs to attempt to case plan with parents and set
up visitation, as well as keeping parents informed about their
children.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld a termination of
parental rights and ruled that the lower Court did not err by
finding a father was an unfit parent and that DCYF had made
reasonable efforts at reunification.
Casandra A. Foley
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Insurance Law. Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v.
ADM Associates, LLC, 116 A.3d 794 (R.I. 2014). The beneficiary of
a life insurance policy must have an insurable interest in the life
of the insured. The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded in
this case, as a matter of first impression, that this insurable
interest requirement should not be extended to annuity policies.
In addition, the court held that an incontestability clause that
takes immediate effect is enforceable, precluding all causes of
action that seek to invalidate the policy.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

“Joseph Caramadre was an attorney who specialized in
finding loopholes in insurance and annuity products that would be
personally lucrative to him.”1
He took advantage of the
application process and structure of annuity policies designed and
sold by Western Reserve Life Assurance Company of Ohio
(“Western Reserve”).2 Western Reserve’s “Freedom Premier III”
annuity policy allows the investor, who is the owner of the policy,
to direct how premiums are to be invested after paying for the
premiums and also to choose to whom annuity payments are to be
made.3 The investor also selects an annuitant, whose life is used
as a measuring tool for the policy.4 The “Double Enhanced Death
Benefit,” an additional option with the policy, guarantees that
when the annuitant’s die, the beneficiary selected by the investor

1. Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. ADM Associates,
LLC, 116 A.3d 794, 796 (R.I. 2014). Annuity is defined by the General
Assembly as “all agreements to make periodic payments for a certain period
or where the making or continuance of all or some of a series of the payments,
or the amount of any payment, depends on the continuance of human life,
except payments made in connection with a life insurance policy.” Id. at 799
(quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-4-0.1(a)).
2. Id. at 796.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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receives whichever is greater: “(1) the highest market value of the
policy at a specified anniversary date or (2) a return of all the
premiums paid into the policy plus five percent per annum
interest.”5
An investor who purchased the “Double Enhanced Death
Benefit,” was essentially making a risk-free investment because it
allowed the investor “to direct that his premiums be invested in
speculative securities, name himself as beneficiary, and thus be
assured that he would receive no less than the total premiums
invested, plus five percent annual interest, upon death of the
annuitant.”6 If the life of the annuitant was shorter, the potential
for profits on the policy increased.7
After discovering this loophole in Western Reserve’s policy,
Caramadre recruited terminally ill individuals as annuitants by
circulating flyers to hospice patients and churches and offered to
pay the individuals cash for their role as the annuitant.8
Charles Buckman served as the annuitant on a policy that
ADM Associates, LLC (“Defendant”) owned and benefited from.9
Buckman was paid a total of $5,000 for his participation as
annuitant.10 Initially, the Defendant invested $250,000 as a
premium to initiate Buckman’s policy, which included the Double
Enhanced Death Benefit, and later invested $750,000 as an
additional premium payment.11 Western Reserve issued the
policy, which included a clause that the made it incontestable
from the date of creation.12 Camaradre repeated this process
many times over several years using plaintiff’s variable annuity
policies and a variety of terminally ill individuals, brokerage
companies, and their agents.”13 A year after its issuance, Wester
Reserve attempted to rescind the Buckman policy after learning
that the policy may have been tainted by Caramdre’s scheme.14
Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id.
Id. at 796–97.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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District of Rhode Island against Caramadre and ADM seeking
“rescission of the annuity policy or a declaratory judgment that
the policy was void because ADM lacked an insurable interest in
Buckman.”15 The Plaintiff also sought damages for fraud, civil
liability for crimes and offenses, and conspiracy.16 The Defendant
made two arguments in opposition to the complaint: “that the
insurable interest requirement for life insurance policies was not
applicable to annuities and that incontestability clauses in the
annuity policies precluded plaintiff from litigating any of its
claims.”17
The District Court dismissed plaintiff’s claims and held that
insurance and annuities are separate, distinct financial
investment vehicles and that the lack of an insurable interest by
ADM in Buckman did not render the Buckman policy void
pursuant to Rhode Island Law.”18
The District Court also
concluded “that the incontestability clause in the policy . . . was
not in contravention of public policy and ‘serve[d] to deflect claims
to rescind the annuities or have them declared void because of
fraud.’”19 The plaintiff appealed to the First Circuit.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island sought to determine
whether the insurable interest requirement should extend to
annuity policies and whether an incontestability clause that takes
immediate effect precluding all causes of action that seek to
invalidate the policy is enforceable.21 The court held that the
insurable interest requirement does not extend to annuity policies
and an incontestability clause that takes immediate effect,
precluding all causes of action that seek to invalidate the policy, is
enforceable.22
The insurable interest requirement for life insurance policies,

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Conreal LLC,
715 F. Supp.2d 270, 279, 280 (D.R.I. 2010)).
20. Id. at 797–98.
21. Id. at 798, 804.
22. Id. at 804, 806.
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which is the requirement that the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy have an insurance interest in the life of the insured, has
long been established in Rhode Island based on public policy
concerns against speculative contracts upon human life because
“to wager on human life is to provide an incentive to shorten the
human life wagered upon.”23 In the court’s opinion, “the plain text
of § 27-4-27(a) clearly indicates that the insurable interest
requirement applies to life insurance only, as the phrase ‘any
insurance contract upon the life or body of another individual’ is
synonymous with ‘life insurance.’”24 The court also pointed out
that looking at the entirety of Chapter 4 of Title 27 “reveals that
the General Assembly contemplated annuities in some sections of
[the] chapter that govern life insurance policies, but not others.”25
Therefore, if the General Assembly intended the insurable interest
requirement to extend to annuities, it would have expressly
indicated that through the language of the section.26 The court
also looked to the express language of the Life Settlements Act
(LSA), which expressly prohibits stranger-oriented life insurance
policies (STOLIs) and is silent on annuities.27
In regard to whether this kind of annuity is a wagering
contract, and therefore void as a matter of public policy, the court
held that the lack of an insurable interest does not convert the
investment into a wagering contract because “the investor’s
payment of the premium does not depend on the occurrence of a
certain event, and the periodic payouts to the beneficiary do not
depend on the occurrence of a contrary event”—they are
23. Id. at 800–01; see Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 154 (1911).
24. Id. at 801.
25. Id. The court explained:
In the other sections within chapter 4 that mention annuities, the
language expressly includes annuities within each of the sections by
the use of phrases such as “life insurance and/or annuities” and “all
life insurance policy forms and annuity contract forms” in § 27-4-24,
“life insurance contract or annuity contract” in § 27-4-26, “[a]ny
policy of life or endowment insurance or any annuity contract” in §
27-4-12, and “[e]very individual life insurance policy delivered . . .
and every individual annuity contract delivered” in § 27-4-6.1.
Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 802 (“A STOLI is defined in § 27-72-2(26) as ‘a practice or plan
to initiate a life insurance policy for the benefit of a third-party investor who,
at the time of policy origination, has no insurable interest in the insured.’”).
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guaranteed by contract.28 The court reasoned that since the
unknown variable (the timing of the annuitant’s death) effects
only whether the investor/beneficiary will either yield a large
profit or simply a return of their baseline investment plus
interest, the annuity is not a “purely speculative contract on the
life of another.”29
In determining whether an incontestability clause that takes
immediate effect and is enforceable, precluding all causes of action
that seek to invalidate the policy, the court pointed to the
arguments in favor of enforceability in a leading treatise on
contract law.30 These arguments reason that “the insurer drafted
the clause and so should be bound by it” and “the insurer has an
unlimited length of time to investigate the policy applicant prior
to issuing the policy” and therefore “could have discovered
whatever errors or misrepresentations might have existed before
it accepts the risk of issuing a policy to the applicant.”31 The court
disregarded the argument against enforcement to discourage
fraud, and determined the clause is “enforceable against all
attempts to escape the ‘deliberately assumed obligation[s]’
contained within these contracts.”32
COMMENTARY

Justice Robinson dissented from the majority and argued that
“if the owner and beneficiary of an annuity with a death benefit
like the one at issue in this case is a stranger to the annuitant, the
annuity is indeed infirm for want of an insurable interest.”33
While annuities are not the equivalent of life insurance contracts,
are in fact “separate and distinct,” he points out that the focus
should not be on whether or not the annuity is distinct in
definition from a life insurance policy, but instead “whether or not
the ‘Double Enhanced Death Benefit’ makes this annuity a
wagering contract which this Court should refuse to enforce as a
28. Id. at 803.
29. Id. (quoting Cronin v. Vt. Life Ins. Co., 40 A. 497, 497 (R.I. 1898)).
30. Id. at 805.
31. Id. (citing 16 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 49.97 at 845–46 (4th ed.
2014)).
32. Id. at 806 (quoting Murray v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 A. 800, 801
(R. I. 1901)).
33. Id. at 807.
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matter of venerable and sound public policy.”34 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court, as well as the United States Supreme Court, has
consistently held that wagering contracts are detrimental to
society and against public policy.35 While the majority opinion
does consider whether the contract at hand is a wagering contract,
it fails to consider that “[i]f one turns to the reason that certain
wagering contracts were determined to be void without an
insurable interest—namely, the concern that the individual who
would profit from the death of the other individual involved has a
motive to potentially harm that individual—it becomes clear that
the annuity in this case is an impermissible wagering contract.”36
As Justice Robinson points out, “[d]ue to the ‘Double Enhanced
Death Benefit,’ if the market is performing well, the owner of the
annuity would have an incentive to end the life of the annuitant in
order to reap a larger gain” since profits from the investment
depend on the time of the death of the annuitant.37
The majority admits that the structure of annuities has
become “increasingly complex” and has “evolved to offer a variety
of elective features, including a smorgasbord of investment and
payout opinions, as well as death benefits” but fails to fully
address how the feature of death benefits changes an annuity in
regard to public policy concerns.38 With an investor standing to
possibly gain large profits from their financial investment,
depending on the time of death of the annuitant, it seems that
death benefits may transform annuities into a “speculative
contract on the life of another.”39
CONCLUSION

“[A]n annuity is not infirm for want of an insurable interest
when the owner and beneficiary of an annuity with a death benefit
is a stranger to the annuitant.”40
Furthermore, “an
incontestability clause that takes immediate effect is enforceable,

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id. at 807–08.
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 800–01.
Id. at 804.
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precluding all causes of action that seek to invalidate the policy.”41
Christina Volpe

41.

Id. at 806.
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Insurance Law. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe, 188 A.3d 500 (R.I.
2015). A child of divorced parents can have multiple residences
for the purpose of determining insurance coverage under a
homeowner’s policy. In determining whether a child is a resident
of a given home, a court must resolve, using a totality of the
circumstances approach, whether that child has the requisite
intent to fulfill the definition of resident as set forth in Aetna Life
and Casualty Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980 (R.I. 1990). If the child
maintains a personal presence in a home with the intent to
continue that presence for more than a temporary period, he or
she is a resident of that home.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Maya is the minor child of divorced parents living in Rhode
Island. Maya’s parents, Denise Luppe (“Luppe”) and Christopher
Henderson (“Henderson”), terminated their marriage pursuant to
a judgment of absolute divorce entered in the Family Court in
May 2010.1 The judgment awarded Maya’s parents joint legal
custody, with Luppe gaining physical custody of Maya, and giving
Henderson “all reasonable rights of visitation.”2
Maya
infrequently stayed overnight at Henderson’s small studio
apartment, which he obtained shortly after the couple separated
in January 2009.3
Sometime after June 2010, Henderson
purchased a two bedroom home with enough space to allow for “a
regular schedule of overnight visitation with [Maya].”4 Per this
schedule, Maya would stay overnight at Henderson’s house on
1. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Luppe, 118 A.3d 500, 502 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id. The property settlement agreement defined joint custody as
“shared responsibility for all major decisions concerning the upbringing,
education, medical care, dental care, spiritual care, and all matters
concerning the general welfare of the child.” Id.
3. Id. Henderson testified that Maya spent the night at his studio
apartment “no more than a couple” of times between January 2009 and June
2010. Id.
4. Id. (alteration in original).

746
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Wednesdays and Sundays.5 Luppe or her parents would pick up
Maya from school after Henderson dropped her off on Thursday
and Monday mornings.6 Maya generally slept in her father’s
bedroom when visiting, however, she sporadically slept in the
spare bedroom that contained some of her toys and extra
clothing.7 Occasionally, Maya would use a bag to bring her
belongings between houses.8
Maya also had toiletries at
Henderson’s, including a toothbrush, hairbrush, and a hair dryer.9
On Sunday, August 22, 2010, Maya was at Henderson’s house
when his dog attacked Maya in an unknown part of the house
while Henderson was in the kitchen.10 The dog severely injured
Maya, who required “significant medical attention.”11
In 2011, Luppe filed a personal injury lawsuit on behalf of
Maya against Henderson.12 The complaint alleged that Maya
“was disfigured, suffered personal injuries,” “may continue to
suffer great pain of mind and body, and incurred medical expenses
in connection” with the dog attack.13 Henderson sought a defense
from Peerless Insurance Company (“Peerless”), which held
Henderson’s homeowner’s liability policy at the time the dog
injured Maya.14 Peerless denied coverage to Henderson, asserting
that Maya was a resident of Henderson’s home at the time of the
attack and so her injuries, as an insured of the policy, were not
covered.15 The policy defined “insured” as the homeowner and
“residents of [the homeowner’s] household who are: a. [the
homeowner’s] relatives; or b. [o]ther persons under the age of

5. Id. at 503.
6. Id.
7. Id. Spare clothing and “backup items” included a “[s]weatshirt . . .
shorts, a pair of jeans, sandals, [and] sneakers.” Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Luppe also filed her own complaint, not addressed by the Court’s
opinion, alleging she “suffered a loss of consortium with [Maya] because of
Maya’s injuries.” Id. at n.4 (alteration in original).
14. Id.
15. Id. Peerless point to “Section II—Exclusions” of the homeowner’s
policy in denying coverage, which excluded coverage for “‘[b]odily injury’ to
you or an ‘insured’ within the meaning [of this policy].” Id.
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[twenty-one] and in the care o[f] any person named above.”16
On January 10, 2012, Peerless filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment with the Washington County Superior
Court, seeking a determination on Maya’s status as a resident of
Henderson’s home.17 During discovery, Luppe testified that Maya
was listed as a resident of Luppe’s home on all of her school forms,
Maya’s mail was addressed to Luppe’s home, and Luppe claimed
Maya as an exemption on her tax return.18 Henderson testified
that, despite the presence of Maya’s belongings at Henderson’s
home, neither he nor Maya considered his house to be Maya’s
home.19 Peerless filed a motion for summary judgment on August
16, 2013, claiming that there were “no issues of fact in dispute”
and arguing that “the undisputed facts supported a finding that
Maya was a resident of [Henderson’s] household when she was
injured.”20 Both Henderson and Luppe objected to the motion,
and Luppe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.21
On November 18, 2013, arguments were heard on the
summary judgment motions filed by Peerless and Luppe by a
justice of the Superior Court.22 The parties agreed that there were
no genuine issues of material fact and that application of the test
recited in Aetna Life and Casualty Co. v. Carrera, a prior Rhode
Island Supreme Court decision, was proper for determining
residency in the context of insurance policies.23
During
arguments, Luppe tried to introduce an affidavit offering a
conclusion on the status of Maya’s residency, but the affidavit did
not persuade the hearing justice that “custody could have been
16. Id. (alteration in original).
17. Id. at 504. Henderson filed a counterclaim in response to Peerless’s
pursuit of declaratory judgment, alleging breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, and bad faith, which was stayed pending the outcome of
Peerless’s action. Id. at 504 & n.6.
18. Id. at 504.
19. Id. at 503. “[Maya] knows it as daddy’s house. You know, she knows
[her mother’s] home as, let’s say, home, and she knows my home as daddy’s
house.” Id.
20. Id. at 504 (alteration in original).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. In determining residency for insurance purposes, courts look at
“(1) the amount of time [one] spends in the locality (2) the nature of [one’s]
place of abode (3) [one’s] activities in the locality and (4) [one’s] intentions
with regard to the length and nature of [one’s] stay.” Id. at 508. (citing Aetna
Life and Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980, 984 (R.I. 1990)).
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crafted differently.”24
After hearing the arguments on the
motions, the hearing justice held that “Maya was a resident of Mr.
Henderson’s home and therefore concluded that there was no
coverage for her injuries under the Peerless policy.”25 The justice,
observing the issue before her as a question of law, issued a bench
decision granting summary judgment for Peerless.26 Henderson
and Luppe both filed timely notices of appeal.27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Conducting a de novo review of the summary judgment
ruling, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to determine
whether the hearing justice disregarded the “unpersuasive”
affidavit in error, whether the term “resident” as used in the
insurance policy was ambiguous, and whether the hearing justice
erred in her application of the Carrera test.28 Though Luppe
argued that the affidavit submitted during the summary
judgment hearing should be conclusive on the question of Maya’s
residency, the court viewed the affidavit merely as the affiant’s
legal conclusion and as raising “no material issue of fact.”29 The
purpose of an expert, the court observed, is to formulate an
opinion of fact to “assist the fact-finder,” and not to draw legal
conclusions.30 The court further noted that because the parties
agreed that no facts were in dispute and that the Carrera test
governed, consideration of the affiant’s expert opinion was

24. Id. at 504–05. The affidavit was prepared by an experienced family
law attorney who concluded that, “because during their divorce proceedings
the parties had agreed that Maya’s physical placement would be with her
mother, the young girl’s residence was with her mother only.” Id. at 505.
25. Id. at 504.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 505–09. “Summary judgment is appropriate when the hearing
justice, after considering the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’
finds ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as [a] matter of law.” Id. at 505 (quoting Miller v.
Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins, Co., 111 A.3d 332, 339 (R.I. 2015)).
29. Id. at 505–06. “[I]t is well settled that such an opinion is permissible
only ‘when the subject matter is wholly scientific or so far removed from the
usual and ordinary experience of the average lay person . . . .’” Id. at 506
(quoting Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830, 851 (R.I. 1997)).
30. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 699 (10th ed. 2014)).
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unnecessary.31 Accordingly, the court found that, although it
believed the hearing justice could have been clearer in her finding
as to the affidavit, she committed no legal error.32
The court then evaluated the ambiguity of the term “resident”
as it applied to the insurance policy, with the resolve of construing
any ambiguity against Peerless.33 The court interpreted the
policy de novo, giving the words their plain meaning.34 Prior
cases had already defined the term resident in the context of
insurance policies, and the court recognized the “common
existence of multiple residences.”35 Being a resident of a home
implies more than “being a mere transient guest,” explained the
court; that a home to a resident is a “place . . . where he or she
lives, sleeps, and carries on life with regularity.”36 The court
determined that the plain meaning of the phrase “residents of
your household,” when read in conjunction with a phrase in the
same definition, “who are [ ] your relatives,” communicated an
unambiguous understanding of the meaning of resident within the
context of the Peerless policy.37
Finally, the court addressed the hearing justice’s application
of the Carrera test to the uncontested facts of the case to
determine whether or not Maya was a resident of Henderson’s
31. Id. The Carrera test “does not contemplate matters that are outside
the usual and ordinary experience of a layperson.” Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. “An ambiguity in an insurance policy is strictly construed
against the insurer.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Koziol v. Peerless
Ins. Co., 41 A.3d 647, 651 (R.I. 2012)).
34. Id. “[W]e refrain from ‘engaging in mental gymnastics or from
stretching the imagination to read ambiguity into a policy where none is
present.’” Id. (quoting Mallane v. Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. in Salem, 658 A.2d
18, 20 (R.I. 1995)).
35. Id. at 507 (citing Barricelli v. American Universal Ins. Co., 583 A.2d
1270, 1271 (R.I.1990)). “Shared-custody arrangements are increasingly
frequent . . . and we recognize that a child may call multiple dwellings his or
her home.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). See also, Canfield v.
Peerless Ins. Co., 692 N.Y.S. 562, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (child bitten by
dog during a scheduled visit in the home of her father) (“[T]he child of
divorced parents can be a resident of both her mother’s and her father’s home
for the purpose of being insured under the homeowner’s policy of each
parent.”).
36. Luppe, 118 A.3d at 507.
37. Id. at 506. The court traditionally gathers the meaning of seemingly
ambiguous terms by reviewing the term in context. See Aetna Life and Cas.
Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980, 983 (R.I. 1990).
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home for the purposes of the Peerless policy.38 Determining
residency in the context of a homeowner’s policy was a matter of
first impression for the court.39 Drawing on past experience with
uninsured and underinsured motorist insurance policies, the court
reasoned that “the term resident should not have vastly different
meanings across multiple types of insurance contracts.”40 To
determine residency in the context of a homeowner’s policy, the
court adopted its reasoning in Flather v. Norberg, which addressed
the definition of residency for state income tax purposes, and
handed down several factors to be considered in determining
residency: “(1) the amount of time [one] spends in the locality (2)
the nature of [one’s] place of abode (3) [one’s] activities in the
locality and (4) [one’s] intentions with regard to the length and
nature of [one’s] stay.”41
In Carrera, the court focused on the fourth factor—intent—
and found that, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances,
“one who maintains a personal presence in a home with the intent
to continue that presence for more than a temporary period is
considered a resident of that home under [Rhode Island] law.”42
Shortly after the court pronounced the definition of residency in
Carrera, it addressed the question in the context of divorce.43 In
Barricelli v. American Universal Insurance Co., the daughter of
divorced parents maintained “structured, albeit intermittent”
contact with her mother’s household, including weekly visits to
the mother’s home as well as overnight visits on alternate
weekends, during which she would sleep on a pullout sofa.44 The
daughter kept “one or two changes of clothing” at her mother’s
house, but would use a suitcase when staying overnight.45 The
38. Luppe, 118 A.3d at 507-509.
39. Id. at 507.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 508 (citing Carrera, 577 A.2d at 984).
42. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Carrera, 557 A.2d at 985). In
Carrera, the Court ruled that the decedent was not a resident of his mother’s
home, and that the decedent’s estate was unable to maintain a claim under
his mother’s insurance policy because the decedent lacked the intent to
return to his mother’s home, or to the state of Rhode Island in general at the
time of his fatal accident. See Carrera, 557 A.2d at 985.
43. Luppe, 118 A.3d at 508 (citing Barricelli v. American Universal Ins.
Co., 583 A.2d 1270, 1271 (R.I.1990)).
44. Id. at 508-09 (quoting Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1271).
45. Id. at 509 (quoting Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1271).
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court held that the daughter’s presence in her mother’s home was
“mere[ly] transitory” in nature, and that the girl’s infrequent
stays, lack of a regular bed to sleep in, and her need for a suitcase
in transporting her belongings militated against her being a
resident of her mother’s home.46
Applying the Carrera test to the case at bar, the court
distinguished the facts of Barricelli from the facts of Luppe and,
after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, was “convinced
by an analysis of the agreed facts that Maya was a resident of [ ]
Henderson’s household” on the day she was injured because it was
a place at which she had a “recent history of physical presence
together with circumstances that manifest[ed] an intent to return
to the residence within a reasonably foreseeable period.”47
Specifically, the court pointed to Maya’s regular schedule of
weekly overnight visits at Henderson’s house per an amicable
custody agreement, which was maintained even after the date of
the injury which brought rise to the lawsuit; Maya’s many
belongings which stayed at Henderson’s house, including clothes,
toys, and toiletries, and Maya receiving visitors at Henderson’s
house.48 While the court acknowledged the argument that Maya’s
residency was with her mother due to Maya being listed on
Luppe’s tax returns, Maya’s mail being sent to Luppe’s house, and
Maya being listed as residing at Luppe’s house, the court said that
those facts did not disprove that Maya also resided with her
father.49 Accordingly, the court held that the hearing justice
committed no error in granting summary judgment, because of the
uniform definition of resident across “all types of insurance,”
regardless of the policy considered.50
COMMENTARY

This case culminates the efforts of the Rhode Island Supreme
Court to coalesce the understanding of residency as it relates to
46. Id. (quoting Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1271-72).
47. Id. (quoting Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d 980, 985
(R.I. 1990)). “[Maya’s] presence in her father’s home establishes that Maya
was there for more than ‘a mere transitory period’ . . . when Maya was at Mr.
Henderson’s house, it was functionally her home.” Id. (alteration in original)
(citing Barricelli, 583 A.2d at 1272).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 507.
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insurance policies under Rhode Island law, as well as reflects its
desire to comport with the sentiments of other jurisdictions on the
issue of a child’s residency in the home of a divorced noncustodial
parent with whom the child visits under circumstances similar to
those in the Luppe case.51 Favoring a “general principle . . . [of]
broad coverage” in interpreting homeowner’s insurance policies,
the court believed that it pronounced a holding consistent with the
“purpose of homeowner’s insurance policies, which is to protect
against claims from outsiders, and not for intrafamily injuries.”52
The court also took its analysis a much needed step further when
reinforcing its approach in Carrera and, by focusing heavily on the
factor of intent in the residency consideration test, ostensibly
foreshadowing the substantial role intent will play in the
determination of future cases.53 In fact, without a determination
of intent, the distinguishability of the facts the court relied on in
ruling on the residency issue in the Barricelli and Luppe cases
becomes far more debatable.54
In this case, Maya kept a select few belongings, as well as a
few spare articles of clothing at Henderson’s, transported some
clothing and supplies in a bag for overnight visits and, though a
spare bedroom existed, Maya rarely slept in it, instead sleeping in
Henderson’s room.55 Similarly, the daughter in Barricelli kept a
few changes of clothing and select personal belongings at her
mother’s house, routinely transported further articles in a suitcase
for overnight visits and, though there was no spare bedroom for
the decedent, she was routinely accorded sole use of a pullout sofa,
51. Id. at 509–10; see, e.g., Canfield v. Peerless Insurance Co., 692
N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (holding that a regular schedule of
visitation coupled with the child’s keeping personal items at her father’s
home was a “sufficient degree of permanency to establish that she was a
resident of that household as a matter of law.”); see also Estate of Adams v.
Great American Ins. Cos., 942 P.2d 1087, 1091 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding child a resident of her father’s home because “the child regularly
spen[t] time in the household in question, such that there exist[ed] a
continuing expectation of the child’s periodic return on intervals regular
enough that the household [wa]s the child’s home during the time the child
[wa]s there, as opposed to a place of infrequent and irregular visits.”).
52. Luppe, 118 A.3d at 510 (quoting Carrera, 577 A.2d at 983) (citing
Steven Plitt et. al., COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 128:2 at 128-7).
53. Id. at 508.
54. See id. at 503, 509.
55. Id. at 503.
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which for the purposes of sleeping when visiting is essentially a
bed, during her stays.56 On these facts, it is not at all apparent
that Maya’s activities at Henderson’s home warrant an outcome
different than that reached in Barricelli.
Whereas the decedent in Barricelli had designated use of the
pullout sofa during her visits, which is a bed for all intents and
purposes, Maya slept almost exclusively in Henderson’s bedroom,
sharing it with Henderson, and used the spare room primarily to
store belongings, using it for herself only when relatives visited.57
In a way, because the first three elements of the Carrera test focus
on the activities and time spent in the home, and not the
intentions of the stay in the home, without the element of intent,
Maya, because she shared a bedroom with Henderson, had a less
stable arrangement than that of the decedent in Barricelli, who
was provided a bed of her own, albeit convertible.58 Absent the
element of intent, the court would have a much harder time
reconciling the two outcomes, as the cited lack of a “regular” bed to
sleep in and the necessity to bring a suitcase in Barricelli also can
apply to Maya’s circumstances. However, when one takes into
account the element of intent, the court’s reasoning becomes much
clearer.
While the decedent in Barricelli stayed at her mother’s on
alternate weekends, her stay at her mother’s home was only
“structured” insofar as she expressed a desire to visit.59 In fact,
she generally stayed with her father, despite her mother obtaining
physical placement in the divorce.60 Unlike that pattern of
visitation, Maya’s personal presence in Henderson’s home was
ongoing even after the dog bite and was more frequent, being a
weekly occurrence, and was part of an amicable and adhered to
plan of visitation, which delineated a clear intent for Maya to
continue a routine presence at Henderson’s home.61 The Supreme
Court, in granting summary judgment for Peerless and affirming
the ruling of the Superior Court, delineated and reinforced the
56. Id. at 509 (citing Barricelli v. American Universal Ins. Co., 583 A.2d
1270, 1271 (R.I.1990)).
57. Id. at 503, 509.
58. Id. at 503, 509 (citing Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Carrera, 577 A.2d
980, 984 (R.I. 1990)).
59. Id. at 509 (citing Barricelli, 583 A.2d. at 1271).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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intent element in the Carrera test as the hook upon which the
issue of residency will turn, and provided a concrete, uniform, and
very workable method of determining residency in the insurance
context.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that in the context of
homeowner’s policies, a person is a resident of a home when that
person maintains a personal presence in a home with the intent to
continue that presence for more than a temporary period.
Daniel F. Miller
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Labor Law. Town of N. Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters,
Local 1651 AFL-CIO, 107 A.3d 304 (R.I. 2015). A firefighters’
union has the right to negotiate with a town for the
implementation of a unilateral change to the firefighters’
schedule, even if that implementation is considered a
management decision. The union waives its right to negotiate if it
has been formally notified of the proposal and fails to timely notify
the town under R.I. General Laws Section 28-9.1-13 of the
Firefighters Arbitration Act.1 Additionally, a party waives its
right to request interest arbitration if it has been formally notified
of the proposal and fails to timely file such a request under
Section 28-9.1-7 of the Firefighters Arbitration Act.2
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On June 30, 2010, a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)
between the Town of North Kingstown (“Town”) and the North
Kingstown Firefighters, Local 1651, International Association of
Firefighters (“Union”) expired.3 Negotiations were ongoing, but
both parties had vastly different views regarding the structure of
the fire departments’ schedules.4 The Town proposed a threeplatoon structure which increased the average workweek from
forty-two hours to fifty-six hours and made the firefighters work
twenty-four consecutive hours followed by a forty-eight hour
recess.5 The Union, on the other hand, wished to keep the current
four-platoon structure which contained a forty-two hour
workweek.6
When these negotiations failed, an interest
arbitration panel was assembled to create a new CBA that would

1. See Town of N. Kingstown v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651
AFL-CIO, 107 A.3d 304, 316 (R.I. 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.
2. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 317; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.
3. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 307.
4. Id.
5. Id. at n. 2.
6. Id. at 307.
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last from July 1, 2010, to June 30, 2011.7 Disagreeing with the
Town’s position on its proposal, the panel awarded the same work
schedule as the prior CBA.8
Nearing the end of the arbitration CBA, on February 23,
2011, the Union contacted the Town to negotiate for a new CBA.9
The parties met together on October 28, 2011, and five more times
after that, but negotiations again failed because the Town
continued to press the three-platoon structure that the Union did
not want.10 Most notably, an interest arbitration panel was never
requested to resolve any disputes at this time.11 On December 19,
2011, the Town informed the Union that it was going to enact an
ordinance that would establish the three-platoon structure
reorganization of the fire departments’ schedules.12 After two
more failed negotiation attempts, the ordinance went into effect on
January 30, 2012.13
The Union then sued the Town on February 28, 2012, seeking
relief in three forms: “(1) a declaratory judgment that the
ordinance was invalid because it was passed in violation of the
Town charter; (2) a declaratory judgment that the Town violated
the Firefighters Arbitration Act (FFAA or ‘the Act’) and the State
Labor Relations Act (SLRA); and (3) injunctive relief.”14 Nearly
three months later, on May 23, 2012, the Superior Court
concluded that the ordinance was invalid because it violated the
Town’s charter and, even if the ordinance were properly passed, it
still violated the Union’s rights under the FFAA.15 Although the
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 308.
13. Id. The Union and the Town assembled for another negotiation
meeting to reach a settlement after the ordinance was enacted, but again it
was to no avail. Id.
14. Id. The parties were ordered by the Superior Court to enter into
mediation before a decision was rendered, but no settlement was reached,
and on March 11, 2012, the ordinance went into effect. Id.
15. Id.; see also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO v. Town
of N. Kingstown, No. C.A. WC 12-0127, 2012 WL 1948338, at *1 (R.I. Super.
May 23, 2012) (hereinafter “North Kingstown I”).
The Firefighters
Arbitration Act (“FFAA”) gave the Union its rights to negotiate changes to
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, as well as a right to
an arbitration process. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 308. Because of this
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Superior Court did admit that implementing a three-platoon
structure was within the Town’s control if the parties’ could not
come to an agreement, it nevertheless stressed that ‘“ . . .
unilateral implementation of changes to wages, hours and terms
and conditions of employment’ was improper.”16
Prior to this ruling, on February 23, 2012, the Union
contacted the Town to negotiate a new CBA for the contract period
beginning July 1, 2012 through June 30, 2013.17 On March 14,
2012, the Union requested an interest arbitration panel for the
July 1, 2011-June 30, 2012 contract year and that request was
granted (hereinafter “2011-2012 Arbitration Panel”).18 However,
negotiations for the 2012-2013 contract year again fell through
between the parties, and another arbitration panel was requested
and granted for that contract year (hereinafter “2012-2013
Arbitration Panel”).19 In response to the Town standing firm on
its new proposal, the Union then filed an unfair labor practice
charge (ULP-6088) against the Town to the State Labor Relations
Board (SLRB) on June 14, 2012.20 The SLRB, in response to
receiving the complaint, then sued the Town on August 2, 2012,
arguing that the Town’s implementation of the three-platoon
structure violated state law.21 On September 5, 2012, the Town
filed a complaint of its own, seeking various forms of relief.22 The
ordinance, the Superior Court determined that these rights were stripped
from the Union. Id.
16. Id. (quoting North Kingstown I, 2012 WL 1948338, at *1).
17. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 308.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. On July 9, 2012, the Town had also requested and was granted
arbitration to determine the effects of the three-platoon structure
reorganization (hereinafter “Effects Arbitration Panel”), but had withdrawn
this demand for arbitration on November 5, 2012. Id. at 308–09; n. 3.
21. Id. at 309.
22. Id. The Town, in its original complaint, plead:
(1) [T]he SLRB was without jurisdiction to enforce ULP-6088; (2) the
Town’s actions in implementing the three-platoon structure were
lawful; (3) jurisdiction to determine the effects of the Town’s decision
to implement the three-platoon structure rests exclusively with the
Effects Arbitration Panel; (4) the Union waived its right to submit to
interest arbitration the unresolved issues arising out of the parties’
negotiations for a CBA for the July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012
period; and (5) the 2011–2012 Arbitration Panel was without
jurisdiction to decide any unresolved issues between the parties for
the July 1, 2011 through June 30, 2012 period.
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Town’s central argument was that it had the inherent right to
reorganize into the three-platoon structure because the Union
failed to meet the statutory deadline to request interest
arbitration when the CBA had expired.23 It also argued that the
Union waived its right to collectively bargain altogether for it
failed to properly notify the Town within the statutory
requirement under Section 28-9.1-13.24
After listening to
arguments on both sides, the Superior Court, on February 4, 2013,
held that (1) the Town’s actions in implementing unilateral
changes to a three-platoon structure were unlawful; (2) the SLRB,
and not the Superior Court, had jurisdiction over the claim arising
out of the ULP-6088 charge ‘“insofar as it is necessary to
determine which terms and conditions have existed between the
parties since the expiration of the previous CBA’”; (3) the
arbitration panel does not have jurisdiction over the unilateral
changes because these changes are invalid; (4) the Union and the
Town both waived their rights to an arbitration panel; and (5) the
arbitration panel had no jurisdiction over the above-mentioned
claims because both parties waived its rights to arbitration for the
2011–2012 contract year.25 The Superior Court also reinstated
the original four-platoon structure.26 In response to the decision,
the Town timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.27
Id. Additionally, the Town sought a motion to stay both the 2011–2012
Arbitration Panel and the 2012–2013 Arbitration Panel, as well as a
declaration that the SLRB was without jurisdiction to enforce ULP-6088. Id.
The Town amended its complaint on September 24, 2012, additionally
seeking that the Union failed to meet requirements under Rhode Island
statutory law for both the 2011–2012 and 2012–2013 contract years, thus
forfeiting its right to collectively bargain “firefighters’ wages, rates of pay, or
any other matter requiring appropriation of money by the Town.” Id.; see
also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13. The Town also pleaded that the Union
waived its right to request interest arbitration for the 2012-2013 contract
year, and that the 2012-2013 Arbitration Panel was without jurisdiction to
decide any disputes for that period. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 309.
23. Id.; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.
24. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 309; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.113.
25. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 310 (quoting Town of N. Kingstown v.
Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1651 AFL-CIO, 2012 WL 6638703 at *13 (R.I.
Super. Dec. 14, 2012) (hereinafter “North Kingstown II”)).
26. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 310.
27. Id. Additionally, the SLRB held for the ULP-6088 charge that the
Town had committed unfair labor practices by “failing to bargain in good
faith and unilaterally implementing its reorganization in violation of the
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the North Kingstown II28 holding, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court first discussed whether the Town could
unilaterally implement the three-platoon structure.29 Under the
FFAA, the Union obtains the ‘“right to bargain collectively * * * as
to wages, rates of pay, hours, working conditions, and all other
terms and conditions of employment.’”30 Additionally, a Town will
be obligated to bargain in good faith with the Union on these
matters so long as the Union complies with the applicable notice
provisions provided for in the FFAA.31 While there are numerous
matters and rights that are nonnegotiable on the Town’s part,32
one in particular that is related to this case is the Town’s
managerial decisions.33 Such decisions may still be nonnegotiable
and not subject to review even when they may have profound
effects on the terms and conditions of employment.34 However, if
FFAA.” Id. at 311; see also In re Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board &
Town of N. Kingstown, 2013 WL 5755149 (R.I. Lab. Rel. Bd. September 27,
2013). The SLRB found numerous remedies for the Union, including
reverting back to the four-platoon structure, back pay and interest on back
pay, and all contractually bargained-for benefits lost by the Union since the
three-platoon structure had been implemented. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d
at 311; see also In re Labor Relations Board, 2013 WL 5755149. The Superior
Court, upon appeal by the Town, had affirmed the SLRB’s decision, but
granted the Town’s stay until the Rhode Island Supreme Court rendered this
decision. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 311; see also Town of N. Kingstown v.
Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 2014 WL 185327 (R.I. Super. Jan.
6, 2014) (hereinafter “North Kingstown III”). Thus, North Kingstown III is
not reviewed in this case. North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 311.
28. See supra note 26.
29. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 312.
30. Id. at 313 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-4.
31. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 313.
32. Such nonnegotiable rights belonging to the Town are its statutory
duties and “powers and responsibilities . . . [in] the essence of [its] mission.”
Vose v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 587 A.2d 913, 915
(R.I. 1991); North Providence School Committee v. North Providence
Federation of Teachers, Local 920, American Federation of Teachers, 945
A.2d 339, 347 (R.I. 2008). These same rights also cannot be delegated to an
interest arbitration panel. See North Providence School Committee, 945 A.2d
at 347; State, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals v.
Rhode Island Council 94, A.F.S.C.M.E., AFL-CIO, 692 A.2d 318, 324 (R.I.
1997).
33. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 313.
34. See id. at 314 (quoting Providence Hospital v. National Labor
Relations Board, 93 F.3d 1012, 1018 (1st Cir. 1996)).
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the problem involved concerns both a question of management and
a term of condition of employment, the employer has the duty to
negotiate with the individuals involved, so long as the individuals
do not waive their right to bargain.35 Upon reviewing other
jurisdictions’ rulings, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the Town’s unilateral change into a three-platoon structure was
indeed a management decision.36
Even though the Town’s implementation of the three-platoon
structure was a management decision, the court noted that the
Union originally retains a right to bargain.37 The court next
determined whether or not the Union waived its right to negotiate
the implementation of the three-platoon structure.38 Under
Section 28-9.1-13 of the FFAA, for matters related to “wages, rates
of pay, or any other matter requiring appropriation of money [by
the town],” the Union has the obligation to request collective
bargaining at least 120 days before the day of final approval of the
Town’s budget.39 The Rhode Island Supreme Court previously
held that failing to abide by this statute is fatal, for its terms are
mandatory, not merely directive.40 Here, the day the Town’s
budget was considered final for 2011 was May 4, 2011; thus the
latest the Union could have requested bargaining the threeplatoon structure was 120 days before that date, which was

35. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 314; see also Providence Hospital,
93 F.3d at 1018.
36. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 314; see also State ex rel. Quiring
v. Board of Educ. of Indep. School District No. 173, Mountain Lake,
Minnesota, 623 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (reorganization of
organizational structure is a management decision); Appeal of Int’l Ass’n of
Firefighters, AFL-CIO Local 1088, 462 A.2d 98, 100 (N.H. 1983) (alteration of
fire department’s platoon size was a management decision); Borough of
Atlantic Highlands v. Atlantic Highlands PBA Local 242, 469 A.2d 80, 85
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983) (a shift change in structure is a managerial
decision). Additionally, although the 2007–2010 CBA by no means adds
terms to later CBAs between the parties, the court nonetheless noted how the
2007–2010 CBA Agreement between the Town and the Union contained a
management rights clause which retained all other rights and
responsibilities to the Town. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at n. 7.
37. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 315.
38. See id. at 316.
39. Id. (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.
40. See Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 23, 372
A.2d 1273, 1275 (R.I. 1977).
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January 4, 2011.41
The Union, however, did not request
bargaining the three-platoon structure until February 23, 2011.42
Therefore, the Union failed to meet the notice requirement of
Section 28-9.1-13 of the FFAA, leaving the Town no obligation to
bargain any matter requiring the appropriation of money.43
Even though matters involving appropriation of money did
not require bargaining, there were still other matters in dispute
between the Town and Union.44 Section 28-9.1-7 of the FFAA
states that if the Town and Union are unable to come to an
agreement on any issues within thirty days from and including
the date of their first meeting, the parties may submit a request
for interest arbitration to resolve the matters.45 Here, the Town
and Union first met to negotiate on October 28, 2011; therefore,
thirty days from that date was the deadline to request interest
arbitration.46 However, the Union did not demand interest
arbitration until March 14, 2012, clearly beyond the thirty-day
time frame.47 In response, the Union argued that there was an
agreement to extend the notification deadline for interest
arbitration; however, because there was no evidence indicating an
express agreement between the parties, the court affirmed the
Superior Court’s decision to reject that argument and keep the
original deadline.48 Therefore, the Union failed to timely file for
interest arbitration and thus waived its right to pursue that
remedy.49 As a result, the 2011-2012 Arbitration Panel had no
jurisdiction over any unresolved issues between the parties or to
determine the effects of the three-platoon structure.50

41. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at n. 9.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 316; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.
44. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316.
45. See id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.
46. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 316–17.
49. See id. at 317; see also Lime Rock Fire District v. Rhode Island State
Labor Relations Board, 673 A.2d 51 (R.I. 1996) (holding that even though
firefighters’ union complied with § 28-9.1-13 and timely requested bargaining
on matters dealing with appropriation of money, and that both union and
town had different views regarding town’s decision to lay off an entire class of
employees, decision was nonetheless lawful because union failed to timely
submit any issues to arbitration).
50. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 320.
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Furthermore, the Union knew that the Town had intentions
to implement the three-platoon structure as early as 2010, at the
hearings before the 2010–2011 Arbitration Panel.51 Formal notice
of the three-platoon structure proposal for the 2011-2012 contract
year was also given on October 28, 2011.52 In Town of Burrillville
v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that “a union with sufficient notice of a
contemplated change waives its bargaining rights if it fails to
request bargaining prior to the implementation of that change.”53
The Town of Burrillville implemented a change of procedure to
police officers’ receipt of injured-on-duty benefits, and notified the
union one week before the change went into effect.54 The court
noted that this notification by the town, though it was given only a
week before the change was implemented, was nonetheless
adequate notice to the union, and the union’s failure to timely
notify Burrillville to negotiate thus waived this right.55 Here,
then, because (1) the Union had knowledge of the three-platoon
structure; (2) the Union failed to timely comply with Section 289.1-13 of the FFAA; (3) the Town formally proposed to the Union
the three-platoon structure on October 28, 2011; and (4) the Union
failed to timely comply with Section 28-9.1-7 of the FFAA in
requesting arbitration, “ the Town’s implementation of its decision
to reorganize into a three-platoon structure was lawful.”56
In addition to these findings, the court found that because the
Town’s action in implementing the three-platoon structure was
justified, there was nothing for the SLRB to review and therefore
the Board had no jurisdiction over any matters from the 20112012 contract year.57 The court also noted that this decision
rendered the Union’s injunction against the Town from
implementing the three-platoon structure meaningless and
therefore vacated the order.58 Lastly, the court shifted its
attention to North Kingstown III and assured the Superior Court

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See id. at 317.
See id.
921 A.2d 113, 120 (R.I. 2007).
Id. at 116.
See id. at 120.
See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 318.
See id. at 320.
See id.
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that if the issues surrounding the 2012-2013 Arbitration Panel in
that case parallel the issues surrounding this decision, then there
is no need to re-litigate a matter that has already been decided.59
COMMENTARY

Although some may believe this holding seems harsh because
the firefighters will be forced to adhere to the new three-platoon
structure, in actuality it was the Union who made the mistake
here by not filing bargaining or arbitration requests on time.60
Even though the court determined that implementing the threeplatoon structure was within the Town’s powers of management,
the Union still had the power to bargain because it was a matter
dealing with “ wages, rates of pay, or any other matter requiring
appropriation of money [by the Town].”61
This power of
bargaining, however, was subject to the Union timely notifying the
Town that they wished to negotiate the Town’s decision before
implementation.62 If the Town does not hear from the Union by
that deadline, the Town assumes the Union abides by its decision
and thus has every right to implement its management power
without having to negotiate.63 This same notion applies to
requesting arbitration.64 If the parties cannot come to an
agreement on a key issue thirty days after their first meeting, one
party, if they so wish to be heard by an interest arbitration panel,
must file a request for arbitration within that time frame.65
Again, the Union failed to meet this deadline, leaving the Town
with the impression that silence means acceptance.66
The court had also stressed that these statutory deadlines
were mandatory, not merely directive, and pointed to numerous
Rhode Island Supreme Court cases supporting that viewpoint.67
59. See id. at 320–21.
60. See id. at 316.
61. Id. at 315 (quoting Town of Tiverton v. Fraternal Order of Police,
Lodge # 23, 372 A.2d 1273, 1275 (R.I. 1977)).
62. See id. at 316; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.
63. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-13.
64. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316.
65. See id.; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.1-7.
66. See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 316.
67. See Town of Burrillville v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations
Board, 921 A.2d 113, 120 (R.I. 2007); Lime Rock Fire District v. Rhode Island
State Labor Relations Board, 673 A.2d 51, 54 (R.I. 1996); Town of Tiverton v.
Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge # 23, 372 A.2d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 1977).
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What’s more, the Union had every reason to file these requests on
time if they were displeased with the proposal, for they knew the
Town’s intentions to implement the three-platoon structure at
every negotiation meeting since the moment the parties began
negotiating before the 2010-2011 Arbitration Panel.68
As easy as it seems to say the Union missed deadlines and
thus lost this case, it nonetheless is difficult to ignore the Union’s
position on this matter. Firefighters indulge in one of the most
courageous and hardworking everyday tasks that we, as citizens,
take for granted. It is fair to say, then, that their voices should be
heard when a town uses its management power to take away their
hard-earned pay and wages. Also important is that their voices be
heard when their schedules are modified that take away much
needed time with their families. Maybe in another setting or in
another profession can a decision this crucial be handed down
because an employee missed a deadline. But when we are dealing
with a profession that promotes safety and wellness to our society,
we must also pay attention to public policy considerations. Some
current or prospective firefighters may pursue another career
because they may believe that meeting a deadline to file an action
is now more important than the right to negotiate. Regardless,
the public may nonetheless fear that a town’s “managerial
decisions” over a union has now officially exceeded its limits.
Still, as much as these arguments may be convincing, the
court has precedent to point out that these statutory deadlines
were mandatory, and thus the Union had every reason to know
how important meeting these deadlines were. Perhaps if the
Union was blindsided with the three-platoon structure, instead of
having knowledge of the Town’s intentions for four years, the
court might come to a different conclusion. But regardless, a life
lesson was certainly garnered from this decision: always meet
your deadlines.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that (1) North
Kingstown’s decision to implement a three-platoon structure was
within the Town’s management powers; (2) the Union had
knowledge of the three-platoon structure; (3) the Union failed to
68.

See North Kingstown, 107 A.3d at 317.
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timely comply with Section 28-9.1-13 of the FFAA; (4) the Town
formally proposed to the Union the three-platoon structure on
October 28, 2011; and (5) the Union failed to timely comply with
Section 28-9.1-7 of the FFAA in requesting arbitration. Because of
these rulings, the Town’s unilateral implementation of the threeplatoon structure was lawful.
Joseph Galindo
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Labor Law. State of Rhode Island Department of Corrections v.
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 115 A.3d 924
(R.I. 2015). In disciplinary-action cases taken against a state
employee, which are arbitrated, an arbitrator’s job is two fold:
first, to determine if the State has “just cause” for that particular
form of disciplinary action, and second, if the State does not have
“just cause” for that particular penalty, he or she must fashion an
appropriate punishment. In determining whether the State has
just cause to take disciplinary action against an employee, the
arbitrator is required to resolve a dispute based on a portion of the
applicable collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”).
The
arbitrator is not to look outside the four corners of the CBA in
crafting his or her decision if an applicable section therein can
solve the dispute. If the arbitrator ignores an applicable section of
the CBA then he or she has abused his or her power and the
award is subject to reversal.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On March 2, 2009, Department of Corrections (“DOC”) Chief
Inspector Aaron Aldrich (“Inspector Aldrich”) received notice that
Gene Davenport (“Officer Davenport”) and James Maddalena
(“Officer Maddalena”) were smoking marijuana while on duty.1
Inspector Aldrich confronted Officer Davenport—armed and on
perimeter duty—and smelled a strong odor of marijuana
emanating from Officer Davenport’s vehicle.2 Inspector Aldrich
also noted that Officer Davenport’s eyes were blood shot.3 Officer
Davenport then confessed to smoking marijuana and claimed that
although Officer Maddalena was in the car with him while he

1. R.I. Dept. of Corrs. v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 115 A.3d 924, 926
(R.I. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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smoked marijuana, Officer Maddalena did not participate.4 The
Rhode Island State Police investigated the matter and questioned
Officer Maddalena regarding the marijuana incident and
ultimately discovered that Officer Maddalena had not been
truthful during his interview.5
As punishment, Officer
Maddalena was placed on administrative leave with pay and a
pre-disciplinary hearing was scheduled for April 8, 2009.6
Director Ashbel T. Wall, II (“Director Wall”) subsequently notified
Officer Maddalena that he was being terminated for his conduct,
and the Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers
(“RIBCO”) filed a grievance on Officer Maddalena’s behalf,
arguing that Officer Maddalena’s termination was without just
cause.7
On July 26, 2010, the matter proceeded to arbitration where
the arbitrator was to determine whether Officer Maddalena was
terminated with just cause; if it was determined that Officer
Maddalena’s termination was not with just cause, then the
arbitrator would dictate the appropriate remedy.8
RIBCO
submitted documents as evidence, detailing the DOC’s past
disciplinary action vis-à-vis dishonesty, which did not result in
termination.9
Inspector Aldrich and State Police Sargent
Benjamin Barney (“Sargent Barney”) testified on behalf of the
DOC, outlining the imperativeness of safety and security in
perimeter posts and the need for confidence in DOC officers.10
4. Id.
5. Id. Officer Maddalena initially told police that he was present with
Officer Davenport inside the vehicle, but denied seeing him smoke
marijuana. It was not until Inspector Aldrich informed Officer Maddalena
that a witness reported seeing the two officers together while Officer
Davenport smoked marijuana that Officer Maddalena confessed to
witnessing Officer Davenport smoking marijuana while on duty. Id.
6. Id. Officer Maddalena was charged with failure to report a fellow
correctional officer smoking marijuana on duty, dishonesty during an
interview with State Police, and dishonesty during an interview with the
DOC’s Office of Inspections. Id.
7. Id. at 926–27.
8. Id. at 927.
9. Id.
10. Id. Additionally, Inspector Aldrich and Sargent Barney focused on
the fact that officers receive training on reporting threats to institutional
security and on site criminal activity and the need for trust and reliability in
its employed officers to avoid any lapse in security, which could yield deadly
consequences. Id.

LABOR LAW_BERNARD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

SURVEY SECTION

5/16/2016 7:14 PM

769

Despite noting that the DOC’s evidence and testimony were
“compelling and convincing,” the arbitrator found that
terminating Officer Maddalena would not be consistent with past
disciplinary measures for the DOC in dishonesty cases and found
there was no just cause for Officer Maddalena’s termination.11
The arbitrator instead held that a sixty-day suspension without
pay, making Officer Maddalena whole for lost wages and benefits
less the sixty-day suspension, was more appropriate.12
On November 19, 2010, the DOC filed a petition in Superior
Court, seeking to vacate the arbitration award on the grounds
that the arbitrator exceeded his power, while RIBCO contended
that the dispute was arbitrable based upon the evidence presented
as well as relevant law.13 The Superior Court justice determined
that the dispute was indeed arbitrable pursuant to R.I. Gen. Law
Section 42-56-10(24) and found that the arbitrator reached an
irrational result as he disregarded the CBA.14 RIBCO filed a
timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, seeking to have
the Superior Court justice’s holding overturned and the
arbitration award reinstated.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

At the very outset of the case, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court sought to reiterate the standard of review for arbitration
awards.16 In doing so, the court was swift and precise in
reminding the parties that there is a strong public policy in favor
of an arbitration award’s finality,17 which will only be disturbed
for “disregard [to] a contractual provision, a completely irrational
result, a decision that is contrary to public policy, or any award
11. Id. The arbitrator relied on one instance submitted by RIBCO,
which purported an instance where an officer lied twice concerning
knowledge he had of a fellow officer’s participation in criminal activity, which
did not result in termination. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. The DOC believed that R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-10, which
enumerates the Director of the DOC’s power, including the ability to
discharge employees, meant that the issue of Officer Maddalena’s
termination was not arbitrable. Id. at 927–28.
14. Id. at 928.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Berkshire Wilton Partners, LLC v. Bilray Demolition Co.
91 A.3d 830, 834 (R.I. 2014)).
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that determined a matter that was not arbitrable in the first
place.”18
Before immediately jumping into the merits of the case, the
court addressed the issue of arbitrability, determining that the
issue was properly before them,19 and—on de novo review—that
the issue of Officer Maddalena’s termination was substantively
arbitrable because of the language contained in Article XVI,
Section 16.4 of the CBA.20
The court then delved into the arbitration award itself and
properly recognized the two issues that the arbitrator was to
determine: whether just cause existed to terminate Officer
Maddalena, and if not, what the appropriate remedy would be.21
The court ultimately concluded that the Superior Court justice
overturning the arbitration award was valid for two reasons: first,
the arbitrator impermissibly substituted his own remedy for that
of the DOC’s, and second, the arbitrator failed to base his decision
on any relevant provision of the CBA.22 In reaching its holding,
the court noted that the arbitrator, by finding RIBCO’s evidence of
past DOC disciplinary action limited in terms of usefulness and by
finding Director Wall’s testimony “compelling,” regarding the need
to take action to ensure safety and security, substituted his own
remedy for the DOC’s.23 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
arbitrator blatantly ignored his duty to base his decision on any
relevant portion of the CBA, specifically noting that the arbitrator
did not turn to Section 4.1 (“Management Rights”), which gives
the DOC power to “suspend, demote, [and] discharge . . . such
employees.”24 Lastly, to support its finding, the court cited to R.I.
Gen. Law Section 28-9-18(a)(2), which states that an arbitrator’s
award can be overturned where the arbitrator exceeded his power
18. Id.
19. Id. at 928-29.
Here, the DOC properly raised the issue of
arbitrability in its memorandum to the Superior Court and argued the issue
before the Supreme Court at oral arguments. Id. at 929.
20. Id. at 930. Article XVI, Section 16.4 allowed for arbitration if RIBCO
or the employee notified the DOC of the request for arbitration. Id. The
court also declined to find the DOC’s argument that R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-5610(2), which states the DOC is responsible for maintaining safety and
security of all correctional facilities, overrode the CBA provision. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 931.
23. Id. at 930–31.
24. Id. at 931.
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if “[a] definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.”25
As an ancillary argument, both RIBCO and the DOC
contended that R.I. Gen. Law Section 42-56-10(24)26 was
unconstitutional; RIBCO contended that the director’s authority
vis-à-vis security is reviewable by an arbitrator, and the DOC
countered that RIBCO essentially purported to classify all
arbitration awards as unreviewable by the judiciary, thus making
the amendment in violation of the separation of powers.27
However, the court was able to avoid answering the
constitutionality question28 and affirmed the Superior Court’s
decision to vacate the arbitration award.29
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court definitively reiterated the
statutory grounds for vacating an arbitration award—where the
arbitrator fails to base his decision on a relevant portion of a
CBA—and the duties of the arbitrator in this labor dispute—
whether the DOC had just cause to terminate Officer Maddalena
and, if not, what an appropriate remedy would be.30 Although the
court laid the proper foundation for determining this case, it
nevertheless appears to have departed from that very
foundational basis. In this instance, it would seem that the court
substituted its own authority for that of the arbitrator’s,
admonishing the arbitrator for looking outside of the CBA. This,

25. R.I. GEN. LAWS §28-9-18 (1956); id.
26. RIBCO, 115 A.3d at 932. The court explained:
Notwithstanding the enumeration of the powers of the director as set
forth in this section and notwithstanding any other provisions of the
general laws, the validity and enforceability of the provisions of a
collective bargaining agreement shall not be contested, affected, or
diminished, nor shall any arbitration be vacated, remanded or set
aside on the basis of an alleged conflict with this section or with any
other provision of the general laws.
Id. at 932-33.
27. Id. at 933.
28. The Supreme Court held that because it ruled the arbitration award
was irrational, it need not venture into the constitutionality of §42-56-10(24).
Id.
29. Id. at 934.
30. Id. at 930–31.
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however, is exactly what an arbitrator is supposed to do.31
Indeed, the majority seems to contradict itself; it argues that the
arbitrator substituted his own judgment for that of the DOC’s by
ignoring the DOC’s “compelling” evidence; shortly thereafter, the
majority reasons the entire award is irrational because the
arbitrator’s decision was not based on a relevant portion of the
CBA.32 There is both substantive and logical error with this
finding. As the dissent points out, the arbitrator’s finding that the
DOC offered “compelling” evidence was in regards to the need for
disciplinary action to be taken, not the fact that the DOC had just
cause to terminate Officer Maddalena, as that was the exact issue
to be determined.33 If, however, the majority’s interpretation in
applying “compelling” evidence to the issue of whether there was
just cause for Officer Maddalena’s termination is correct, it would
seem that the court is vacating the arbitrator’s award simply for
his classification on a piece of evidence’s strength.
Additionally, the majority overlooks the fact that the
arbitrator did indeed look through the CBA in searching for a
relevant provision that spelled out offenses and corresponding
penalties.34 Not finding one, the arbitrator proceeded to look
outside the four corners of the CBA, weighing the relevant
evidence presented to him and ruling that just cause did not exist
to terminate Officer Maddalena, but rather that a sixty-day
suspension was more appropriate.35 The majority improperly and
narrowly construed the Management Rights Section of the CBA;
the exclusivity given to the DOC within that section implies that
no other entity is responsible to enforce the rights enumerated
within Section 4.1A, not that the DOC is granted the power to
make unreviewable determinations. If we follow the majority’s
rationale, we are left with the scenario where almost no employee
termination will be without just cause because Section 4.1A of the
CBA grants the DOC exclusivity in terminating employees. Put in
other words, the majority believes that Section 4.1A automatically
31. Id. at 934–35 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (citing United Steel Workers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960)
(explaining that arbitrators may indeed look outside the CBA for guidance in
determining an award)).
32. Id. at 930-31 (majority opinion).
33. Id. at 935 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 934.
35. Id. at 927 (majority opinion).
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grants just cause, eliminating the need for the arbitrator to look
elsewhere within or even outside the CBA and completely
removing the ability for him to formulate another appropriate
remedy.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held, vis-a-vis union
members, that an arbitrator exceeds his or her authority when he
or she does not base an award on a relevant provision within the
CBA and looks outside the CBA’s four corners. Furthermore, the
Court held that when an arbitrator does find just cause for the
State to take disciplinary action, he or she has no authority to
craft an alternative remedy; the finding of just cause is
inextricably tied to the proposed disciplinary action taken by the
State.
Trevor T. Bernard
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Professional Responsibility. In re Keven A. McKenna, 110
A.3d 1126 (R.I. 2015). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over attorney conduct that occurs outside Supreme
Court proceedings, including attorney conduct in federal courts.
Additionally, the procedures utilized by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court—promulgating and enforcing Rules of Professional
Conduct, appointing persons to a disciplinary board, and
ultimately determining how to sanction attorneys—do not result
in a merger of investigatory and prosecutorial functions so as to
deny an attorney due process.

FACTS AND TRAVEL
In May 2009, attorney Keven McKenna was practicing law
under the duly licensed entity “Keven A. McKenna, P.C.” (“the
PC”) when an employee of the PC, Sumner Stone, filed a claim for
worker’s compensation alleging work-related injuries.1 The PC
was unable to provide proof that it carried workers’ compensation
insurance as required by statute and a pretrial order was entered
ordering McKenna to make weekly compensation payments to
Stone.2 McKenna did not pay Stone and repeatedly reiterated the
same arguments to the court, as to why he should not have to
make payment, despite the court’s denial of all of McKenna’s
motions.3 The Chief Judge observed that McKenna was “simply
using the procedures of this court to delay and harass.”4 Thus, the
court dismissed McKenna’s claim for a trial and the pretrial order
to pay Stone became the court’s final order.5 The Workers’

1. In re Keven A. McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126, 1131 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id.
3. McKenna refused to make payment on the ground that the order
violated his due process rights. Id. He further argued that the Chief Judge
of the Workers’ Compensation Court should recuse himself. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Compensation Court records contain numerous examples of
McKenna showing contempt for the court proceedings, including a
statement that McKenna would “drag this on forever”6 and, after
being asked a question from the judge, McKenna responded “I’m
not going to answer that question. You’re not the prosecutor, Your
Honor.”7 In December 2009, the Worker’s Compensation Court
entered an order finding McKenna in contempt for his refusal to
make payments to Stone as required by the pretrial order.8
McKenna appealed this decision and his appeal was
repeatedly denied.9 McKenna ultimately filed a motion with the
Worker’s Compensation Court claiming an inability to meet the
payment obligations “due to circumstances beyond his control,
including but limited [sic] to a priority U.S. I.R.S. [sic] [levy] of
[$]171,000 upon his bank account.”10 On January 25, 2010, one
day before a hearing on this motion, McKenna filed a Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition on behalf of the PC.11 He argued that this
automatically stayed the worker’s compensation action against
him.12
The Workers’ Compensation Court then asked for
arguments that same afternoon regarding whether the
bankruptcy applied to McKenna personally. During a break in the
proceedings, McKenna filed for bankruptcy personally.13
Subsequent to the appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee for
the PC, McKenna applied to the Rhode Island Supreme Court for
a license to practice law as a limited liability company as “The
Law Offices of Keven A. McKenna, LLC.”14 The court denied
McKenna’s request until he could satisfy the court that the PC
would no longer engage in the practice of law.15 Despite the
court’s order, McKenna continued to use a bank account in the
name “Law Offices of Keven A. McKenna, LLC,” to cash checks for
6. Id. at 1132.
7. Other examples include McKenna’s statement to the judge that
“[Stone is] making a mockery of this court, Your Honor, because of your
dislike for me,” and “[t]his is a rump court proceeding.” Id.
8. Id. at 1132–33.
9. Id. at 1133.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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expenses related to the practice of law.16 These actions formed
the basis for count one, alleging McKenna’s violation of Rules 3.3,
7.1, 7.5, and 8.4(c)17 by engaging in the unauthorized practice of
law in violation of the court’s order.18
The second count—alleging violations of Rules 3.3 and 8.4(c)
for failure to disclose his income to the Bankruptcy Court,
misrepresenting his interest in a receivable to that court, and
engaging in conduct that amounted to dishonesty to the
bankruptcy trustee—was based on McKenna’s failure to disclose
the existence of a receivable for legal fees, totaling $63,000, on his
initial corporate bankruptcy filing.19 On June 7, 2011, McKenna
appeared in Probate Court in Bristol and asserted a lien for
attorney’s fees in the amount of $93,000 against real property
owned by his client’s estate.20 Although McKenna informed the
bankruptcy court that the receivable was largely uncollectable, he
did not disclose that there was real property that could potentially
be used to satisfy the debt.21
On August 4, 2011, the bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint
objecting to discharge.22
In his answer, McKenna neither
admitted nor denied many of the allegations, including those that
were clearly within his knowledge.23 McKenna’s actions in
Bankruptcy Court and his actions during the Workers’
Compensation Court proceedings formed the basis of count four,
alleging violations of Rules 3.3 and 3.5(d) by demonstrating a lack
of candor and an attempt to disrupt the proceedings.24
Finally, on September 12, 2011, the Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel, who was charged with bringing charges against
McKenna for violations of the rules of professional conduct, issued
a subpoena to McKenna directing him to produce certain records
and to testify about them.25 While McKenna appeared at the
16. Id.
17. See Article V, Rules 3.3, 7.1, 7.5, 8.4(c) of the Supreme Court Rules of
Professional Conduct.
18. McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1133–34.
19. Id. at 1134.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1134–35.
25. Id. at 1135.
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deposition, he failed to produce the records and challenged the
authority of the Assistant Disciplinary Counsel to issue the
subpoena.26 McKenna’s failure to comply with the subpoena was
the basis for count three, alleging a violation of Rule 1.19, which
requires that attorneys keep financial records pertaining to the
practice of law.27
The Disciplinary Board, consisting of a three-member panel,
conducted a series of eight hearings.28 During these hearings,
both the Assistant Disciplinary Counsel and McKenna examined
witnesses and entered exhibits into evidence.29 With regard to
the first count, McKenna argued that he changed the name of his
LLC to “McKenna Support Services LLC” and that the use of the
account and checks bearing the name of the former LLC did not
constitute the practice of law.30 Further, with respect to count
two, McKenna argued that he had made no false statements on
his bankruptcy filings and that he valued the Wells receivable at
$63,000 because “[n]ot all of the estate[‘s] billing had been posted”
and the unbilled time increased to $93,000.31 Next, McKenna
denied the charges under count three by arguing that he had
brought the records to the deposition but he only made them
available for inspection, not for copying.32 Finally, as to count
four, McKenna argued that his actions in Workers’ Compensation
Court and Bankruptcy Court are outside the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction.33 He further represented that there was no evidence
that he had engaged in conduct intended to disrupt any tribunal.34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Under Article III, Rule 6(d) of the Supreme Court Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure for Attorneys35, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court reviewed the record submitted by the disciplinary board to
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1135–36.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Rhode Island Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary Procedure for
Attorneys, Article III, Rule 6(d).
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determine whether McKenna should be disciplined for his
conduct.36 While McKenna alleged many constitutional claims in
his correspondence with the court, the claims were essentially two
issues: first, he challenged the authority of the Supreme Court to
regulate attorneys; and second, he argued that the proceedings
before the board and the court had violated his procedural due
process rights.37
The court first addressed McKenna’s claim that the court’s
authority was limited to appellate jurisdiction over statutory
courts and/or that the judiciary’s inherent power was limited to
adjudicating cases and controversies.38
The court rejected
McKenna’s argument saying that the General Assembly had
affirmed the court’s power to license attorneys and admit them to
practice under section 2, chapter 322, G.L.1923, which said that
“[t]he [S]upreme [C]ourt . . . shall by general or special rules
regulate the admission of attorneys to practice in all the courts of
the state.”39 Additionally, in In the Matter of Almeida, the court
held that it had “the authority to exercise necessary means to
regulate and control the practice of law by promulgating and
enforcing rules to discipline attorneys.”40
McKenna further argued that the court did not have
jurisdiction over attorney conduct outside of the Supreme Court’s
proceedings. Specifically, McKenna claimed that the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution41 prevented the Rhode
Island Supreme Court from exercising authority over attorney
conduct in federal courts.42 The court found no merit in either of
these claims stating that these assertions would not only render
much of the professional rules of conduct useless, but it also flew
in the fact of the well-established notion that the “power inherent
in this [C]ourt to control and supervise the practice of law
generally, [applied] whether in or out of the Court.”43 The court
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1137.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1137–38. This statute is now codified at R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956
§ 8-1-2.
40. Id. at 1138 (quoting In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1381 (R.I 1992)).
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
42.
McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1140–41.
43. Id. at 1140 (quoting Rhode Island Bar Ass’n. v. Automobile Service
Ass’n, 179 A. 139, 142 (R.I. 1935)).
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also cited how rarely, if ever, attorneys come before the Supreme
Court explaining that this would “utterly prevent this Court from
protecting the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible
representation.”44
Finally, the court dismissed McKenna’s
supremacy clause argument by stating that the supremacy clause
was only relevant when “there [was] impermissible state
interference with federal law.”45 The court explained that there is
no such implication here because “state and federal courts have
consistently been in harmony as to the proper ethical conduct of
attorneys practicing in their respective courts.”46 As an example,
the court pointed to the United States District Court for the
District of Rhode Island, which had adopted the Supreme Court
Rules of Professional Conduct.47
The court next considered McKenna’s claim that his
procedural due process right to “present evidence and argue law”
and to be heard by the full board were violated.48 McKenna
argued that because the court promulgates and enforces the Rules
of Professional Conduct, appoints persons to the board, hires
disciplinary counsel, and ultimately determines whether and how
to discipline an attorney for misconduct, this amounted to a
merger of investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions
so as to deny him procedural due process.49 The court used the
Mathews test’s three factors to determine whether a procedure
violated due process.50 The three factors were: “the private
interest that will be affected by the official action”; “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”; and “the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
44.
McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1140.
45. Id. at 1141 (quoting In re Petition of Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1090
(R.I. 1992)).
46. Id. at 1141.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1142.
49. Id. at 1142.
50. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (holding that an
evidentiary hearing was not required prior to termination of disability
benefits, and that administrative procedures in place during the case fully
comported with due process).
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entail.”51
The court considered each of the Mathews factors and found
that under the first factor, it was undisputed that McKenna’s
license to practice law was “a property interest sufficient to invoke
due process protections.”52 The third factor, which was conceded
by McKenna, is met because the state clearly had an interest in
regulating attorneys.53
With respect to the second factor,
McKenna argued that he was not able to present evidence and
argue law and was denied a full hearing by the board.54 The court
disagreed, explaining that “it [was] indisputable that [McKenna]
was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.”55 The court
went on to state “the mere existence of a combination of
‘investigatory, inquisitorial, and adjudicative roles in a single
administrative body’ d[id] not amount to a denial of due process or
signify that the agency’s structure or operations is subject to
constitutional attack.”56
The court then addressed McKenna’s motion to have members
of the Rhode Island Supreme Court recuse themselves on
allegations of bias against him.57 McKenna asserted three bases
for this allegation: first, he claimed that Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel was appointed by the court; second, that the chair of the
board that heard McKenna’s case applied to the Chief Justice to
be appointed a magistrate during the disciplinary proceeding; and
third, that the members of the court were friendly with a retired
Chief Justice who McKenna claims is biased against him.58 The
court rejected McKenna’s argument stating that McKenna “ha[d]
failed to provide any facts that would demonstrate either bias or
the appearance of bias.”59 The court noted that a party that raises
this claim must overcome a “presumption of honesty and integrity
in those serving as adjudicators”60 and that while judges are
51. McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1142 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
52. McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1143.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1143 (quoting In re Commission on Judicial Tenure and
Discipline, 916 A.2d 746, 750 (R.I. 2007)).
57. Id. at 1145.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1146.
60. Id. at 1145 (quoting La Petite Auberge, Inc., 419 A.2d at 284).
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required to recuse themselves under certain circumstances, they
“have an equally great obligation not to disqualify themselves
when there is no sounds reason to do so.”61
Lastly, the court dismissed McKenna’s motion to stay the
proceedings pursuant to G.L.1956 § 9-33-2, known as the antiSLAPP statute, as there were no merits for this claim.62
McKenna argued that the purpose of the disciplinary proceedings
against him was to “chill the free speech rights of Keven A.
McKenna as an attorney by having his [sic] suspended from the
practice of law.”63 The court noted that the “purpose and
application of the anti-SLAPP statute are wholly inapplicable to
attorney disciplinary proceedings.”64
The court then turned to the disciplinary board’s findings and
McKenna’s sanction, and pointed out a unique characteristic to
this particular litigation: that a client never brought these
allegations forward and there was no allegation that McKenna
improperly accessed any client funds.65 However, the court
explained that “[t]he duty of candor. . .is the foundation of a
lawyer’s profession.”66 This duty is not limited to Rule 3.3, rather
there is a general duty of candor to the court that is broader than
the rule.67 Here, the integrity of the judicial system was not
served when an attorney who had been sworn to tell the truth,
refused to answer simple questions or when an attorney
disregarded orders of the Supreme Court or deliberately
misrepresented his assets to a bankruptcy trustee.68 As such, the
court found that the board’s findings were appropriate that
McKenna violated Rules 1.19, 3.3, 7.1, 7.5, and 8.4(c).69 Finally,
the court stated that it was satisfied with the board’s
recommendation that McKenna receive a one-year suspension
from the practice of law.70 The court noted that “the purposes of
61.
McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1145 (quoting State v. Mlyniec, 15 A.3d 983,
999 (R.I. 2011)).
62.
McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1147.
63. Id. at 1146.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1147.
66. Id. at 1148.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1148.
69. Id. at 1149.
70. Id. at 1150.
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discipline are not punishment of the attorney but protecting the
public and maintaining the integrity of the profession” and that
this sanction appropriately served the dual purpose of professional
discipline.71
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court detailed the reasoning
behind its authority to regulate attorney conduct regardless of
whether the conduct occurs within its courtroom or not, ultimately
concluding that “it is undeniable that this Court may investigate
and discipline attorney conduct regardless of where that conduct
takes place.”72 The court explained that confining its authority to
discipline attorney conduct to instances where attorneys appear
before the court would effectively “prevent this Court from
protecting the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible
representation”73 due to the infrequency in which attorneys
actually appear before the court, if at all. Additionally, the court
traced the history of its authority to discipline attorneys
concluding that the regulation of attorneys is an “inherent judicial
function.”74
Moreover, the court explained that while no client brought
this action and there was no allegation that McKenna improperly
accessed any client funds, it was the responsibility of the court to
“give full force and effect to all of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”75 The court noted the importance of demanding a high
level of ethics and professionalism from members of the bar
because “[w]e cannot maintain the integrity of the profession if we
ignore persistent, intentional, and repeated violations of the Rules
of Professional Conduct.”76 The court sought to balance this duty
to uphold the integrity of the profession and the protection of the
public with Chief Justice Marshall’s observation that, “the
profession of an attorney is of great importance to an individual,
and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its exercise.
The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1140.
Id.
Id. at 1147.
Id.
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taken from him.”77
However, as Justice Goldberg explains in her dissent “the
sanction adopted by the majority is inadequate and fails to
respond to the egregious nature and sheer number of material
misrepresentations made by the respondent and, importantly, also
ignores the respondent’s conduct before the board.”78 While the
court detailed the numerous violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, it adopted the board’s recommendation that McKenna be
suspended for one-year, despite the Assistant Disciplinary
Counsel’s recommendation that McKenna be disbarred.79 The
majority offers little explanation for rejecting the Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel’s recommendation other than that they
“customarily give great weight to the recommendation of the
board.”80 But as Justice Goldberg notes the court has not always
chosen to adopt the recommendation of the board.81 Further,
Justice Goldberg points out that the sanction adopted by the
majority appears inadequate especially when compared to
discipline imposed on other attorneys for a single violation of the
rules.82 Thus, while the majority details the importance of
judicial regulation of attorneys, it undercuts this by imposing a
sanction that seems inadequate, at least when compared with
similar sanctions imposed for far less.83
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the court has
jurisdiction over attorney conduct that occurs outside the Supreme
Court’s proceedings. Further, the court determined that the
promulgation and enforcement of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the appointment of persons to a disciplinary board, and
the determination on how to sanction attorneys did not result in a
merger of investigatory and prosecutorial functions so as to deny
77. Id. at 1149.
78. Id. at 1151.
79. Id. at 1157.
80. Id. at 1150 (quoting In re Cozzolino, 811 A.2d 638, 641 (R.I. 2002)).
81. See In re Schiff, 677 A.2d 422, 424-25 (R.I. 1996); Lisi v. Resmini,
603 A.2d 321, 324 (R.I. 1992).
82. McKenna, 110 A.3d at 1157.
83. See, e.g., Schiff, 677 A.2d at 425; Lisi, 603 A.2d at 324.
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an attorney due process.
Christopher M. Moran
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Professional Responsibility.
FIA Card Services, N.A. v.
Pichette, 116 A. 3d. 770 (R.I. 2015).1 Any attorney who prepares
pleadings, motions, or other written submissions on behalf of a pro
se client appearing in court2 is not in violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, so long as she signs the prepared documents and
discloses to the court her identity as well as the nature and extent
of the assistance provided.3 The attorney must obtain informed
consent, in writing, setting out the nature and extent of the legal
representation she is undertaking and may note on the prepared
documents that the signature does not constitute an entry of
appearance.4
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In three separate, unrelated cases, the Superior Court,
Providence County, sanctioned two attorneys for drafting
pleadings, motions, and legal memoranda without signing their
names or entering their appearances to the Court, on behalf of
three separate and unrelated pro se litigants who were in court
regarding debt collection actions. The sanctions were imposed
under Rule 11 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure5 and under Article V, Rule 1.2(c) of the Rhode Island
1. This case addresses the facts from three separate cases: FIA Card
Servs., N.A. v. Pichette, 116 A.3d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 12-272A); HSBC Bank
Nevada, N.A., v. Cournoyer, 116 A.3d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2013–156A);
Discover Bank v. O’Brien-Auty, 116 A. 3d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2013-157A).
2. This practice is colloquially referred to as “ghostwriting.” Pichette,
116 A.3d at 771.
3. Id. at 784.
4. Id.
5. R.I. SUPER. R. CIV. P. 11. Rule 11 states in relevant part:
[E]very pleading, written motion, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be personally signed by at least one
attorney of record . . . The signature of an attorney . . . or party
constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper . . . and that the pleading, motion,

785
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Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct.6
In the titular action, FIA Card Services initiated a credit card
debt collection action against James D. Pichette in May 2011.7 In
response to the action, Mr. Pichette consulted with the debt
consolidation company, Morgan Drexen, which referred him to
attorney Charles M. Vacca, Jr.8 In the first hearing, FIA’s counsel
informed the hearing justice that Mr. Pichette’s pleadings had
been drafted, but not signed, by an attorney licensed in Rhode
Island.9 Mr. Pichette acknowledged that his documents were
prepared by an attorney and admitted that he had not understood
the affirmative defenses pled in his answer, the basis or substance
of the counterclaims alleged, or the content of the objection to the
motion to dismiss.10 Mr. Pichette further stated that he had
declined Mr. Vacca’s full representation when he entered into a
limited-scope representation agreement.11
The hearing justice issued a notice to Mr. Vacca to appear
before the court in order to determine three things: (1) the extent
of Mr. Vacca’s representation of Mr. Pichette, (2) whether Mr.
Vacca’s actions in drafting these documents violated either Rhode
Island law or the Rules of Professional Conduct, and (3) whether
Mr. Vacca’s actions warranted sanctions pursuant to any
violations.12 At his hearing, Mr. Vacca reiterated that Mr.
Pichette had declined full representation and had opted for a

or other paper is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation. . . . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court . . . may impose upon the person who
signed the pleading, motion, or other paper, a represented party, or
both, any appropriate sanction.
6. R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(C). This rule provides, in
relevant part: “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the
limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives
informed consent.”
7. FIA Card Services, N.A. v. Pichette, 116 A.3d 770, 772 (R.I. 2015).
8. Id.
9. Id. Among the documents Mr. Vacca prepared for Mr. Pichette were:
an answer, including affirmative defenses; a two-count counterclaim to FIA’s
complaint; an objection to FIA’s motion to dismiss; and a memorandum in
support of the objection to the motion to dismiss. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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limited-representation agreement.13 Mr. Vacca argued that his
representation was reasonably limited in scope and thus
permissible pursuant to Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.14 Ultimately, the hearing justice found that Mr. Vacca
had provided partial and inadequate representation in violation of
Rule 1.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct and was therefore
subject to sanctions.15
The facts of the second and third actions are parallel and
concurrent, but with different parties and attorneys.16 In each
case, a bank initiated a debt collection action against a pro se
litigant and moved for summary judgment. The pro se defendants
in these actions contracted with the debt-consolidation firm,
Morgan Drexen, which provided each defendant with an attorney
to draft, but not sign, the necessary court documents.17 Both
defendants represented to the court that they did not fully
understand the documents they had filed and that they believed
the attorneys who drafted the documents were, in fact,
representing them in their respective actions before the court.18
The hearing justice telephoned each attorneys during the initial
hearing and ordered the attorneys to appear at a hearing on June
13. Id.
14. R.I. SUP. CT. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(C); Pichette, 116 A.3d at 773.
15. Pichette, 116 A.3d at 772–73 (reasoning that Mr. Vacca had “clearly
provided only partial and inadequate representation”).
16. The two actions are referred to in the opinion as “the HSBC Action”
and “the Discover Bank Action.” In the HSBC action, the pro se defendant
was Robert L. Cournoyer and the attorney drafting his documents was
Wendy Taylor Humphrey. Id. at 773. In the Discover Bank Action, the pro se
defendant was Diana L. O’Brien-Auty and the attorney drafting her
documents was Michael Swain. Id. at 775. One notable distinction between
the two cases is that, in the Discover Bank Action, the filings included a
written disclosure stating: “[t]his document was prepared by, or with the
assistance of, an attorney licensed in RI and employed by Consumer Law
Associates, LLC.” Id. at 774–75. The hearing justice did not find the written
disclosure to be a distinguishing factor. Id. at 775.
17. Id. at 773, 775. Each defendant filed an answer, an objection to the
motion for summary judgment, and a memorandum in support of that
objection. Id.
18. In the HSBC action, “Cournoyer also testified that he had not yet
met [his attorney] Taylor Humphrey and thought she was going to be in court
for the hearing that day to represent him.” Id. at 773. In the Discover Bank
action, “O’Brien–Auty testified that she had been paying a monthly fee . . .
and that she had never met Swain in person—had only spoken to him on the
telephone—but believed that he was her attorney.” Id. at 775.
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6, 2011.19
At the June 6 hearing, both attorneys testified that they had
prepared, but not signed, the court filings pursuant to limitedscope representation agreements, which were offered as
“unbundled legal services.”20 The hearing justice issued a showcause order demanding each attorney show why their conduct
should not result in Rule 11 sanctions for misrepresentation to the
tribunal.21
Ultimately, the hearing justice found that both
attorneys had ghostwritten pleadings and that this conduct was
unethical and in violation of Rule 11.22
The hearing justice issued a written decision on January 17,
2013.23 In that decision, the hearing justice found the following:
an attorney-client relationship existed as a matter of fact and law
between each of the three pro se defendants and their respective
attorney. Furthermore, each attorney’s conduct violated Rule 8.4
of the Rules of Professional Conduct, and the attorneys’ failures to
disclose their identities to the court was a violation of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, the hearing justice found
that Rule 1.2(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct did not
preclude a finding of a Rule 11 violation.24
Upon de novo review of the three cases, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court reversed the hearing justice’s sanctions as a
matter of law, finding that Rule 11 did not apply to the drafting
assistance provided by these three non-signatory counsel and,
therefore, there was no Rule 11 violation on which to base the
sanctions.25

19. Id. at 773, 775. Both HSBC’s motion for summary judgment and
Discover Bank’s motion for summary judgment were heard on the same day
by the same hearing justice. Id. at 775.
20. Id. at 775, 781.
21. Id. at 775.
22. Id. The hearing justice also imposed a $750 sanction on each
attorney. Id. at 773–75. With respect to Mr. Swain and the Discover Bank
Action, the Supreme Court quashed the initial imposition of the sanction on
the grounds that Mr. Swain had not been provided with an adequate notice
and opportunity to be heard prior to the imposition of the sanction at the
June 6 hearing. Id. at 775.
23. Pichette, 116 A.3d at 774.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 781.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Despite that trial justices typically receive wide latitude to
formulate what they consider to be appropriate sanctions, the
Supreme Court engaged in de novo review of these cases because
it found that the sanctions at issue were “imposed based on an
erroneous view of the law.”26 The court’s ultimate holding – that
ghostwriting was not a Rule 11 violation – reversed the hearing
justice’s conclusion that the attorneys violated the “clear intent of
Rule 11” and breached their ethical duties of candor and honesty
toward the tribunal when they failed to sign documents they
drafted for pro se clients.27 The Supreme Court found this was a
flawed application of Rule 11.28
In answering the “threshold question”29 of whether an
attorney who drafts court documents for a pro se litigant without
disclosing his identity to the court has violated Rule 11, the court
considered three factors:30 (1) the plain language of Rule 11; (2)
the proper interpretation of Ellis v. State of Maine31, one of the
grounds upon which the hearing justice imposed sanctions; and (3)
the spirit or intent behind Rule 11.32
The court found that the plain language of Rule 11 did not
address the ‘author’ or ‘drafter’ of documents and only held the
“attorney of record” accountable.33 Since all of the cases were
brought by pro se defendants, none of the cases had an “attorney
of record.”34 Thus, the plain language of Rule 11 could not apply
to these attorneys, regardless of their influence on the defendants’

26. Id. at 776, 781.
27. Id. at 779.
28. Id. at 781.
29. Id. at 778.
30. Id. at 778–781.
31. In Ellis, the First Circuit addressed the practical concerns
underlying ghostwriting and found that an attorney who failed to sign a
document could “escape the [Rule 11] obligation imposed on members of the
bar.” Id. at 779. The fact that an attorney could shirk her Rule 11
obligations and consequences simply by withholding her signature from a
court document suggests that the attorney’s signature was vital to the
application of Rule 11 and, consequently, to the imposition of Rule 11
sanctions. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 781.
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pleadings.35
Contrary to the hearing justice’s interpretation, the court
found that Ellis explicitly excepted non-signatory attorneys from
Rule 11 sanctions.36 Additionally, the court noted that the First
Circuit had never imposed Rule 11 sanctions on an attorney who
had failed to sign documents, and so there was no precedent for
the sanctions.37 As such, it was consistent with the circuit’s
jurisprudence to reverse the hearing justice’s imposition of
sanctions.38
The court declined to apply Rule 11 as the enforcement arm of
the rules of ethics, finding that Rule 11 was written in light of a
binary system in which there was either full representation or no
representation and that this system was at odds with “the reality
of today’s legal practice.”39 The court suggested that it was selfdefeating to read Rule 11 in such a way that it punished conduct
permitted by Rule 1.2(c).40 Instead, it distinguished between
conduct that violated Rule 11 and conduct that offended the Rules
of Professional Conduct, concluding that ghostwriting did not
necessarily violate either.41

35. Id. at 779.
36. Id. at 779.
The court noted, “[w]e view the First Circuit’s
acknowledgement that ghostwriting attorneys evade Rule 11 as support for
our ultimate opinion that Rule 11 is not applicable to attorneys for the
assistance they provided in drafting papers subsequently filed by pro se
litigants.” Id. Nevertheless, the hearing justice determined that “the clear
intent of Rule 11 *** is to enforce an attorney’s ethical obligations of candor
and honesty in interactions with the tribunal,” and thus the imposition of
sanctions on attorneys who failed to sign documents they prepared was both
proper and in-keeping with the ‘spirit’ of Rule 11. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 779–80. The court did note, in footnote 12, that it
distinguished between Rule 11 sanctions and sanctions imposed based on the
inherent authority of the trial courts. The implication is that the First
Circuit may have previously imposed other sanctions upon attorneys who
drafted, but did not sign certain court documents. However, whatever the
bases for these potential, hypothetical sanctions, none of them were based on
a Rule 11 violation. Id. at 780.
39. Id. at 780-81 (“[W]e draw a distinction between conduct that offends
Rule 11 and that which may violate one of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”).
40. Id. at 781 (“We decline to interpret Rule 11 as applying to the
drafting assistance provided by these three nonsignatory counsel and,
consequently, perceive no violations thereof.”) Id.
41. Id. at 781–82.
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To determine the terms on which Rhode Island courts should
permit ghostwriting, the court solicited amicus briefs addressing
the benefits and detriments of the practice as a form of limitedscope representation.42 Based on these submissions and its own
opinion, the court concluded that an attorney who prepares
written submissions on behalf of a pro se client appearing in court
is not in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or the
Rules of Civil Procedure, so long as she signs the prepared
documents and discloses to the court her identity as well as the
nature and extent of the assistance she provided.43
COMMENTARY

In allowing limited scope representation, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court relied on several amicus briefs, which outlined
three primary benefits of ghostwriting and other forms of limited
scope representation.44 First, limited scope representation can
help the legal profession to ward off obsolescence by
complementing, rather than combating, the “‘do-it-yourself’
mentality” that has emerged in response both to new legal
technologies and to the wealth of free information available on the
42. Id. at 781.
43. Id. at 784.
44. The Rhode Island Supreme Court also took note of potential pitfalls
inherent to limited scope representation, most of which were proffered by the
Attorney General’s office in its amicus brief. See Amicus Brief of the Attorney
General of the State of Rhode Island, FIA Card Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d
770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-272A) [hereinafter AG Amicus]. The brief makes
two arguments opposing limited scope representation in Rhode Island: (1)
that ghostwriting gives a pro se litigant an “unfair advantage” in court
proceedings, and (2) that opposing counsel may walk into an “ethical
minefield” if it communicates directly with the supposedly pro se litigant
about “matters for which the party is represented.” AG Amicus at 45. The
latter critique arguably has merit, but the former criticism presents two
serious issues. First, it reveals that the Attorney General lacks faith in the
judiciary’s ability to distinguish the work of a layperson from the work of a
practicing attorney. Second, and more problematically, the suggestion that
pro se plaintiffs will be at an “unfair advantage” because they have received
limited support during their ordeal with the court systems clearly discounts
the incredible disadvantages facing pro se litigants in the first place. See AG
Amicus at 44 (emphasis added). Such a suggestion is akin to the suggestion
that children with dyslexia are at an unfair advantage when they receive
extra time on spelling tests.
Indeed, the most common form of
accommodation offered to pro se litigants comes in the form of additional time
to file documents.
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Internet.45 Second, limited scope representation can increase the
efficiency of the court by mitigating the “tedious delay[s]” that
self-represented clients unintentionally create as a result of their
unfamiliarity with our complex and nuanced court systems.46
Third, limited scope representation bridges the “justice gap” that
exists “between those who need legal services and those who
cannot afford them” by removing some of the barriers that have
historically prevented attorneys from choosing to take on pro bono
projects.47
The question now “is not whether Rhode Island will or should
have limited scope representation, but how best to implement
limited scope representation across the state[?]”48 To answer that
45. Amicus Brief for the Rhode Island Bar Association for the Appellants
at 11-12, FIA Card Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012272A) [hereinafter “RIBA Amicus”]. According to the Rhode Island Bar
Association (RIBA), “attorneys attempting to make ends meet are likely to
find that offering limited legal services will provide a new client base among
litigants who are ‘do-it-yourself’ motivated.” Id. at 13; see also, Dee Crocker,
Highlights from the 2012 ABA Techshow Technology Matters, OR. ST. B.
BULL., June 2012, at 37 (“The growing number of [. . .] automat[ed] [. . .] legal
services cannot be ignored by lawyers[. . .] However, lawyers can use some of
those same systems, tools and techniques to boost their own law practices to
attract clients”).
46. Amicus Brief for the Rhode Island Bar Association for the Appellants
at 11-12, FIA Card Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012272A). In the same section, RIBA points out that limited scope representation
“benefits all actors in pro se litigation” – from the clerks of court who attempt
to give direction without giving legal advice, to the attorneys who work
opposite of a pro se litigant, to the court which has to balance the interests of
justice in the face of a litigant who has failed to meet procedural
requirements. Id. at 13.
47. See Amicus Brief of the Pro Bono Collaborative at 5-7, FIA Card
Servs. v. Pichette, 116 A.2d 770 (R.I. 2015) (No. 2012-272A) [hereinafter PBC
Amicus]. One of the most pervasive barriers is what the Pro Bono
Collaborative (PBC) has termed “mission creep”: when an attorney takes a
case for a discrete purpose and ends up tied to that case “far beyond the point
that [she] initially envisioned.” Id. at 7. A common example that arises in
the context of prisoner re-entry in Rhode Island is when a child visitation
dispute becomes entangled with a child custody case. Id. at 8. Relying on the
various amici briefs and its own sound judgment, the Court ultimately
concluded that “allowing attorneys to provide limited drafting assistance to
pro se litigants will serve to encourage pro bono participation by more
attorneys, will remove barriers and disincentives to such participation and
will promote greater access to justice.” Pichette, 116 A.3d at 783.
48. Judah Rome, Comment, Give Up the Ghost Hunt: A Defense of
Limited Scope Representation and Ghostwriting in Rhode Island, 20 ROGER
WILLIAMS L. REV. 461, 462 (2015).
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question, the Rhode Island Supreme Court must address three
key elements of limited scope representation: how an attorney
begins the representation, how the attorney and client define the
precise scope of that representation, and how an attorney
withdraws once he has fulfilled his limited purpose. The court
will also need to determine how much out-of-court oversight it will
impose upon attorneys providing limited scope representation.
Lastly, because the rules governing the procedure of limited scope
representation will be used by lawyer and layperson alike, it is
essential that the procedures are simultaneously comprehensive
and user-friendly. To achieve this, I recommend the court adopt a
procedure that is a hybrid of those currently employed in
Colorado,49 Illinois,50 and New Hampshire.51 In all three states,
attorneys must fully disclose their name, address, and registration
number on the documents they prepare for pro se clients, although
the signature does not constitute an appearance.52
Colorado courts inserted the procedure governing limited
representation directly into their existing Rule 11, “Signing of
Pleadings,” which requires that attorneys identify themselves and
sign all filings in order to hold the attorneys accountable for the
veracity of the document’s content.53 Subsection (b) specifically
establishes that ‘limited representation’ does not amount to an
‘appearance’ and does not hold the attorney accountable for full
representation of the client.54 However, Colorado courts also state
that any in-person appearance before a judge, magistrate, or other
judicial officer on behalf of the pro se client will constitute an
entry of appearance, thereby committing the attorney to full
representation.55
In Illinois, the procedure governing limited representation
functions as a sub-category of “appearances,” inserted into Rule 13

49. C.R.C.P. 11(B).
50. IL. R. S. CT. RULE 13.
51. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 14.
52. C.R.C.P. 11(B); IL R S CT RULE 13; N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 14.
53. C.R.C.P. 11.
54. C.R.C.P. 11. “Limited representation of a pro se party under this
Rule 11(b) shall not constitute an entry of appearance by the attorney for
purposes of C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-1 or C.R.C.P. 5(b), and does not authorize
or require the service of papers upon the attorney.” Id.
55. Id.
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of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Procedure.56 Taking a
much more thorough and comprehensive approach than Colorado,
Illinois requires attorneys to file a Notice of Limited Scope
Appearance with the court, stating the precise nature of the
representation.57 Additionally, a lawyer may only withdraw his
appearance by motion or notice to the parties; if the attorney has
completed the tasks enumerated in the Limited Scope Appearance
form, the court must grant the motion for withdrawal of
appearance.58 Likewise, a party may only object to an attorney’s
motion to withdraw his appearance if the objecting party believes
the attorney has not yet fulfilled the duties required under scope
of his limited appearance.59
In a similar vein, New Hampshire has inserted these new
procedural rules into their existing Rule 14 of the New Hampshire
Superior Court Rules, which addresses “Appearances - General,
Special, and Limited.”60 There, courts permit limited scope
representation only in non-criminal cases, and, like Illinois, they
characterize limited-representation as a form of appearance before
the court.61 New Hampshire attorneys must file an appearance
explaining the precise scope of representation offered.62 The
courts presume that any action the attorney takes that is outside
the scope of the limited representation is simply an extension of
the limited representation, and does not commit the attorney to
full representation.63
In Pichette, the Rhode Island Supreme Court voiced its
preference for full identification of the attorneys and an upfront
articulation of the scope of the representation.64 As a practical
matter, attorney identification is essential to ensure candor
towards the courts and accountability in counsel. The court

56. IL. R. S. CT. RULE 13.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id
60. N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 14
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See Pichette, 116 A.3d at 784 (holding that an attorney must “sign[]
the document and disclose[] thereon his or her identity and the nature and
extent of the assistance that he or she is providing to the tribunal and to all
parties to the litigation”).
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should further establish that limited scope representation
constitutes a “limited appearance,” as the New Hampshire and
Illinois courts have because this allows attorneys to appear inperson at proceedings without committing them to full
representation of the client.
Additionally, the court should
strongly consider extending the options for limited scope
representation to criminal defendants, to increase access to
necessary legal services for those defendants who do not meet the
low threshold required to obtain publicly funded legal counsel.
Finally, the court should not adopt New Hampshire’s
“presumption of extension” as this has a strong likelihood of
blurring the lines between full representation and limited
representation and risks misleading clients as to the role their
lawyer plays. Rather, Rhode Island should follow the example set
by Colorado and Illinois and require that any additional tasks the
client and lawyer wish to add to the scope of the limited
representation must be specifically outlined and filed with the
court. For the sake of uniformity and simplicity, Rhode Island
should adopt a standard form for extending the scope of
representation, rather than requiring attorneys to request an
extension of the scope of representation by motion. This will allow
the court filings to clearly and succinctly reflect the development
of the lawyer-client relationship throughout a particular dispute
and will limit the frequency with which the court must play
“referee.”
To maximize the impact of the court’s opinion and ensure that
Pichette serves as the springboard for formally establishing a new
category of accessible legal services in Rhode Island, these
procedures and protocols must be imminently forthcoming. In
shaping these procedures, the court must address: “when it is
appropriate to limit the scope of representation; how to apply the
ethical standard of competence to limited scope representation;
how the court and opposing parties should communicate with a
party who is engaged in limited scope representation how an
attorney can enter a limited appearance and then withdraw; and
whether the rules surrounding conflicts of interest should be
relaxed for limited scope representation.”65

65.

See Rome, supra note 48 at 483.
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CONCLUSION

A Rhode Island attorney who prepares written submissions on
behalf of a pro se client appearing in court is not in violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct or the Rules of Civil Procedure, so
long as she signs the prepared documents and discloses to the
court her identity as well as the nature and extent of the
assistance she provided. Although the Court’s decision is not
novel on its face,66 it still signals a new direction for the legal
profession in Rhode Island that has the potential to increase
access to quality legal services in while simultaneously
encouraging attorneys to take on more pro bono work. However,
the long-term benefits of this decision will depend entirely on the
quality and breadth of the procedural rules the Court implements.
Katherine Berling

66. See Rome, supra note 48 at 473, 475, 477 (discussing the procedures
for addressing limited scope representation as they have been enacted in
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, respectively).
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Property Law. Renewable Resources, Inc. v. Town of Westerly,
110 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2015). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the lower hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in
granting the town’s emergency motion for relief. The advanced
deterioration of the mill’s building in the wake of Hurricane
Sandy, as well as the plaintiff’s continued noncompliance with the
signed memorandum of agreement, satisfied the requisite change
in circumstances required to modify a preliminary injunction.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Potter Hill Mill ceased operation in the 1950s.1 In 1980
the town of Westerly sought to have the mill demolished because
of its worsening condition and eventually issued an order to that
effect.2 In 1984, the order was affirmed by a Rhode Island District
Judge, however the demolition never took place.3 In 1992, the
plaintiff, Renewable Resources Inc., purchased the mill for
$50,000.4 In 2006, the plaintiff and the town signed a memorandum of agreement (MOA) “in which plaintiff recognized the validity of the condemnation order and pledged to meet a series of conditions in order to stave off demolition.”5
The town requested proposals for the mill to be demolished in
a newspaper advertisement in August of 2009, because the plaintiff had failed to “expeditiously pursue its development plan” and
because of the ongoing deterioration of the mill.6 The plaintiff re-

1. Renewable Res., Inc. v. Town of Westerly, 110 A.3d 1166, 1168 (R.I.
2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. “The MOA required that plaintiff fence off the property, clean up
debris, and expeditiously pursue its development plan. Furthermore, the
MOA explicitly granted the town the power to determine whether plaintiff
was in breach of the MOA’s conditions.” Id.
6. Id.

797
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sponded in September “seeking a temporary restraining order, a
preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction against the
town” preventing the demolition of the mill.7 The town answered,
alleging that the plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the MOA’s requirements of due diligence granted “the Town the right to condemn. . .and demolish the building.”8 A Superior Court justice
granted the plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order.9
In April of 2011, the Superior Court justice dismissed part of
the plaintiff’s complaint that requested the court issue a mandatory injunction against the town.10 The justice then ordered an
agreement between the plaintiff and the town.11
In June of 2012 an order was entered allowing the town’s
building official to inspect the mill every quarter.12 The order also
allowed for the issuance of permits for the demolition and reconstruction of the property, as well as a viewing of the mill by the
court.13 The parties and the hearing justice viewed the property
on October 16, 2012.14 On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy
made landfall and “wreak[ed] havoc on what was left of the
mill.”15 The town filed an emergency motion for relief from the
preliminary injunction describing “the advanced rate of deteriora7. Id.
8. Id. at 1169. The town also objected to the temporary restraining order as well as the request for the court to view the mill. Id.
9. Id. Id. The parties litigated the preliminary injunction for more
than a year while the temporary restraining order was in effect. Id.
10. Id. The plaintiff sought the authority of a court order in forcing the
town to conform to the zonings classifications of the mill proposed in the
plaintiff’s comprehensive plan. Id.
11. Id. “The order provided plaintiff with a timetable for both submission of development plans and actual repair work for the mill, and it also
provided that a preliminary injunction against demolition of the mill would
remain in effect until further notice.” Id. In June of 2011, the town filed a
motion to hold the plaintiff in contempt of this agreement. Id. at 1169 & n.2.
The town alleged that the plaintiff had failed to submit a reconstruction plan
and failed to repair a gravel road. Id. The court did not hold the plaintiff in
contempt, but did order to begin reconstruction and repair of the mill and a
court-appointed architect was assigned to oversee the project. Id. The plaintiff filed its development plan, but did not follow up when additional information was requested by the town. Id. The town filed again to hold the
plaintiff in contempt and again the motion was not granted. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1169 n.2 (alteration in original).
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tion and collapse of the buildings since the summer and requested
that it be allowed to demolish the buildings so that it might prevent immediate harm to children.”16
In December of 2012, the town’s building official, David Murphy, testified that the mill’s buildings were “unsafe” and “beyond
repair.”17 Mr. Murphy concluded that the buildings should be
demolished because “they posed a threat to persons on the property and in the adjacent waterway.”18 Mr. Murphy also acknowledged the potential risk and problems posed by trespassers and
children on the mill property.19 The town planner, Marilyn
Shellman, testified at the same hearing that she visited the mill
property twice over the past year, and that during her second visit
“ [t]he integrity of the buildings seem[ed] to be worse than [on her]
first viewing.”20
On December 18, 2012, the hearing justice relieved the town
from the restraining order and permitted the town to issue a demolition order for the mill property.21 On January 22, 2013, the
hearing justice, in a written decision, found that the plaintiff
breached the MOA and, on February 6, 2013, vacated the preliminary injunction.22

16. Id. The town made its motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The operative language of that rule
is “[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party
or a party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: . . . the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application [.]” Id. at 1169 & n.4.
17. Id. at 1169-70.
18. Id. at 1170. “Mr. Murphy issued a notice of unsafe condition and order to demolish, citing eight of the unsafe conditions listed in G.L.1956 § 2327.3-124.1” Id. at 1170 & n.5. Westerly’s Building Code Board of Appeals denied the plaintiff’s appeal of the demolition order. Id. The plaintiff again appealed, unsuccessfully, to the Rhode Island Building Code Standards Committee. Id. Finally, the plaintiff appealed on administrative grounds to the
Sixth Division District Court. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. Ms. Shellman specifically referred to the deterioration of the roof
and sidewalls. Id. Two neighbors of the property, Bonnie Bennet and Allison
Goodsell, testified to the presence of children and trespassers on the property
before and after Hurricane Sandy. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1170.
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ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The dispute on appeal centered on whether the trial justice
abused his discretion in vacating the preliminary injunction.23
The plaintiff argued that the trial judge erred in “failing to find a
‘substantial’ change in circumstances warranting the vacating of
the preliminary injunction.”24 The plaintiff specifically pointed to
the trial justice’s “absence of any findings of significant deterioration” between the date that the preliminary injunction was granted and the date of the filing of motion for relief.25 The town argued that the plaintiff’s failure to adhere to the terms of the MOA,
as well as the increased deterioration of the mill in the aftermath
of Hurricane Sandy, “were sufficient evidence of a change in circumstances.”26
Upon review, the court initially sought to determine whether
there had been a sufficient change in circumstances that would
enable the preliminary injunction to be modified.27 The court recounted the town’s series of witnesses at the December 11, 2012
hearing.28 All of these witness “testified to the escalation of the
dangerous condition” of the mill property.29 Specifically, the court
cited to the fact that Mr. Murphy, the building official, testified
that the buildings were “unsafe and on the verge of collapsing.”30
The justice also relied on Mr. Murphy’s testimony that he was led
to believe that the plaintiff had violated the MOA’s diligence requirement.31 Furthermore, the court relied on the testimony of
Ms. Shellman, the town planner, who spoke to the “worsening of
the buildings’ condition,” the plaintiff’s “inaction with respect to
23. Id. at 1171. Before addressing the merits of the case, the Supreme
Court explained their standard of review and clarified that even though the
town’s emergency motion for relief was improperly brought under Rule
60(b)(5), “a trial justice still retains the inherent power to modify any interlocutory judgment or order prior to final judgment.” Id. at 1170–71 (quoting
Murphy v. Bocchio, 338 A.2d 519, 522 (R.I. 1975)).
24. Id.
25. Id. The plaintiff obtained the preliminary injunction on April 26,
2011 and the town filed a motion for relief on November 16, 2012. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 328 (R.I. 1995).
28. Renewable Resources, 110 A.3d at 1172.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. The plaintiff filed an incomplete demolition permit application.
Id.
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the MOA,” and failure to submit a master plan.32
The court held that the hearing justice acted within his discretion in vacating the preliminary injunction even though he did
not “specifically explain what constituted a change in circumstance.”33 The court determined that the hearing justice was in
compliance with Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure because the justice “detailed the witness testimony he
found credible.”34 The court also noted that the hearing justice
“stressed that plaintiff’s noncompliance with the MOA was the
impetus for vacating the preliminary injunction.”35 The plaintiff
failed to persuade the court that the hearing justice’s references to
the MOA were improper.36 In fact, the court found that the plaintiff had waived that argument when it failed to object when the
town itself invoked the terms of the MOA as “a basis for vacating
the preliminary injunction.”37
Additionally, the court noted that the hearing justice’s determination that the plaintiff’s breach of the MOA was “sufficient to
constitute the requisite change in circumstances.”38 The court
reasoned that the preliminary injunction had certain requirements, most notably the repair and reconstruction of the mill’s
buildings, and that the plaintiff failed to be faithful to these requirements.39 Further, the court noted two prior unsuccessful
motions to hold the plaintiff in contempt.40 The court emphasized
that the plaintiff had been shown leniency on both occasions and
that this “continued noncompliance” was sufficient to be classified
as a change in circumstances.41 Finally, the court held that the
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. “[I]n granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court
shall [ ] set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute
the grounds of its action . . . It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court . . . .” R.I. SUPER.
R. CIV. P. 52(a).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.; see also Town of Smithfield v. Fanning, 602 A.2d 939, 942 (R.I.
1992) (“[T]his court will not consider an issue raised on appeal that has not
been raised in reasonably clear and distinct form before the trial justice.”).
38. Renewable Resources, 110 A.3d at 1173.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. The court elaborated and said that “[a]lthough plaintiff’s
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hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in granting the town’s
emergency motion because the town effectively demonstrated,
with sufficient evidence, that a change in circumstances occurred
with regard to the condition of the buildings on the mill property.42
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court made a reasonable ruling in
finding that there was adequate evidence presented to the hearing
judge so as not be found as an abuse of discretion.43 The hearing
judge was presented with evidence from city officials and neighbors that documented how the mill had continued to deteriorate
before and after Hurricane Sandy.44 Discretion to lower courts is
essential to an efficient and just legal system, especially in cases
that are so heavily fact-based. Here, there was incontrovertible
evidence that the property had subsequently been damaged by the
hurricane and that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the
MOA between the parties.45
The court’s decision demonstrates the outer-bounds of a
hands-off approach to dealing with parties that attempt to find
their own agreement and parameters through a MOA. The court
also observed that the lower court was lenient on the plaintiff during the towns prior motions requesting the court hold the plaintiff
in contempt for failure to comply with the MOA requirements.46
Society wants to encourage parties to find settlements that work
for the parties involved in any given dispute while, at the same
time, encouraging them to honor those agreements. Parties that
can amicably settle their dispute will save their own resources, as
well as those of the courts. However, the court’s emphasis on the
plaintiff’s continued noncompliance demonstrates that the legal
system can sometimes run out of patience with those parties that
do not follow what they say they will do.47 This mill had been out

profered ‘substantial’ change in circumstances standard was not proper, we
note in any case that the hearing justice heard and recited enough testimony
to satisfy even that standard.” Id. at 1173 & n.9.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1172.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1173.
47. Id.
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of service since the 1950s, the plaintiff had purchased the property
in 1992, and the MOA was agreed to in 2006.48 There comes a
time when parties need to move forward. The result from this
case may shorten the leash on the noncompliance of MOAs and
encourage parties to act with more speed and alacrity in the face
of potential legal consequences to their inaction.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the testimony of
advanced deterioration of the mill’s building in the wake of Hurricane Sandy, as well as the plaintiff’s continued noncompliance
with the signed memorandum of agreement, satisfied the requisite
change in circumstances required to modify a preliminary injunction. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision and held that
the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in granting the
town’s emergency motion for relief.
Peter M. MacArthur

48.

Id. at 1168.
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Public Contracts. Kayak Centre of Rhode Island v. Town of
Narragansett, 116 A.3d 250 (R.I. 2015). The Rhode Island
competitive bidding statute, R.I. General Laws 1956 Section 4555-5, clearly and unambiguously does not apply to public
concession contracts.
Nevertheless, the competitive bidding
process is still subject to the Gilbane1 standard of good faith in
order to protect against public corruption.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In August of 2012, the Town of Narragansett (“the Town”)
acquired a 9.5-acre parcel of land that included a property on
which a Rhode Island company operated a paddle sports
business.2 Subsequent to the Town’s acquisition of the property,
the paddle sports business continued to operate on the land until
August of 2013 when the Town invited competitive bidding for a
five-year concession contract to operate a paddle sports business
on the property.3 In preparation for the competitive bidding
process, the Town’s purchasing agent and the Director of the
Town’s Parks and Recreation Department jointly prepared a
package and an invitation to bid on the concession award.4
Ultimately, two companies submitted bids to the town: The
first was Narrow River, also a Rhode Island limited liability
company that operated a paddle sports business currently
operating on the land in question.5 The second bidder was Kayak

1. Gilbane Bldg. Co. v. Bd. of Trs. of State Colls., 267 A.2d 396, 399
(R.I. 1970).
2. Kayak Centre of R.I. v. Town of Narragansett, 116 A.3d 250, 252
(R.I. 2015). The property at issue is located at 94 Middlebridge Road in
Narragansett, Rhode Island. Id.
3. Robert O’Neill, the Chairman of the town’s Land Conservancy Trust,
explained the rationale behind the invitation. Mr. O’Neill explained that it
made “good business sense” for the Town to review interest in other proposals
for the paddle sport’s concession at the property. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 251.

804
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Centre of Rhode Island, a Rhode Island limited liability company
that operates paddle sports businesses at two locations. The Town
asked each of the bidders to state the “annual payment” they
would be willing to make to the Town for comparison.6 Kayak
Centre submitted a five-year combined annual payment total of
$180,505, whereas Narrow River submitted a five-year combined
annual payment total of $100,500.7
Once all the bids had been received, the Town’s Parks and
Recreation Department examined the submitted bids and
prepared a report that was subsequently submitted to the town
council.8 The report established that Kayak Centre was “the best
and most qualified bidder and recommended that the [t]own
[c]ouncil award the municipal contract to [] Kayak Centre.”9
According to the report, the Town recommended the award be
given to Kayak Centre based on the totality of its 18-year
experience in the paddle sports business, positive references, and
bid offering.10
The Department presented the report at the October 7, 2013
town council meeting and a motion was made to award the
contract to Kayak Centre.11 However, after comments from the
public and discussion amongst the members of the town council,
the council voted three to one to reject the motion seeking to
award the concession contract to Kayak Centre.12 Following the
town council’s decision to reject Kayak Centre’s motion, the town
solicitor suggested that, under the review of the town council, a
new bid package with additional criteria and qualifications be
developed before the bid package would go back out to bid.13 At
the advice of the town solicitor, the town council voted three to one
to reject all submitted bids and begin the bidding process anew.14
On December 3, 2013, Kayak Centre filed a complaint in
Rhode Island Superior Court consisting of three counts: (1) a
request for declaratory judgment that the Town violated Rhode
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 252.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Parties Stipulated Facts).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

PUBLIC CONTRACTS_SEMONELLI.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/2016 7:19 PM

806 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:804
Island’s competitive bidding statute, R.I. Gen. Laws 1956 Section
45-55-5; (2) an allegation that the Town committed a criminal
misdemeanor in its violation of Section 45-55-5; and (3) a prayer
for injunctive relief alleging that it would be irreparably harmed if
the Town was allowed to reject the bid and rebid the concession.15
A Superior Court justice heard the case on February 10, 2014 and
issued a written decision in which the court found that the
provisions of Section 45-55-5 were inapplicable to the bidding
process at issue and that the standard for fairness in competitive
bidding did not apply.16 The justice ultimately denied Kayak
Centre’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief and found for
the Town on all counts.17
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
On appeal, Kayak Centre argued that the trial justice erred in
ruling that the requirements of Section 45-55-5 were inapplicable
to the case and thereby erred in denying declaratory relief.18
While Kayak Centre urged the court to rule that Section 45-55-5
did apply, the court held that the statute did not apply to
concession contracts.19 Conducting a de novo review of the
statutory interpretation, the court concluded that the language of
the statute was clear and unambiguous where Section 45-55-9
required competitive bidding for contracts that exceeded “ten
thousand dollars ($10,000) for construction and five thousand
dollars ($5,000) for all other purchases.”20 The court focused on
the language in Section 45-55-5 requiring that the contract be
awarded to the “responsive and responsible bidder whose bid is
either the lowest bid price, or lowest evaluated or responsive bid
price.”21
The court noted that a contract for expenditures did not
include all of the same considerations as a concession contract.22

15.
(2013)).
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 252–53 (citing in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-5
Id. at 253 (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-5 (2013)).
Id. at 254 (citing in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-9 (2013)).
Id. (quoting in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-5(e)).
Id.
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The court found that Section 45-55-9 required competitive bidding
for contracts that included “procurements” and “purchases,” thus
Section 45-55-5 does not apply to competitive bidding processes
involving concession contracts, which produce revenue rather than
spend it.23 Absent an explicit mention of concession contracts, the
court held that Section 45-55-5 makes clear that the statute is
inapplicable to the concession contract at issue.24 The court
considered the intent of the Legislature in enacting Section 45-555 and noted that, in the court’s opinion, the Legislature “sought to
regulate contracts that require the expenditure of public funds.”25
The court further noted that the Legislature was free to include
concession contracts within Section 45-55-5, but chose not to do
so.26 Accordingly, the court held that the justice did not err in
refusing to apply the statute to the Town’s action and, therefore
affirmed the court’s denial of Kayak Centre request for
declaratory relief.27
Kayak Centre additionally argued that the trial justice erred
in denying injunctive relief because the Town’s actions were
governed by the standard of fairness established in Gilbane
Building Co. v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges.28 Conducting
a de novo review, the court considered the standards for conduct
in concession bidding and noted that before the Legislature
enacted the competitive bidding statute, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court used the Gilbane standard when it reviewed bid
disputes.29 The court explained that the Gilbane standard
provides that “[i]n the absence of any legislative requirement
pertaining to competitive bidding, it is the duty of the appropriate
public officials to act honestly and in good faith as they determine
which bidder would best serve the public interest.”30 The court
held that although Section 45-55-5 does not apply to concession
contracts, the Gilbane standard does.31
23. Id. (quoting in relevant part R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-9).
24. Id. at 255.
25. Id. at 254.
26. Id. at 254–55 (citing Narragansett Food Servs., Inc. v. R.I. Dep’t of
Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 808 (R.I. 1980)).
27. Id. at 255.
28. Id. at 253 (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399).
29. Id. at 255 (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399).
30. Id. (quoting Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399).
31. Id. (citing Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399).
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The Town asserted that the issue was not reviewable because
the Town had not yet completed the bidding process, and so there
was no award for the court to review.32 The court, however, relied
on National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Fazzano where the Rhode
Island Supreme Court reviewed an action brought in a competitive
bidding case before the commencement of the bidding process.33
Accordingly, the Kayak Centre court rejected the Town’s argument
that its conduct was not reviewable.34 Furthermore, the court
disagreed with the trial justice’s determination that the Gilbane
standard did not apply and, therefore, mandated that the case be
remanded for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issue
of whether the Town acted “corruptly or in bad faith, or so
unreasonably or arbitrarily as to be guilty of a palpable abuse of
discretion.”35
COMMENTARY
Although the Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the plain
language of Section 45-55-5 rendered it inapplicable to the
concession contract at issue, Justice Goldberg disagreed. Justice
Goldberg describes an alternative and, in her opinion, equally
plausible, reading of the statute, which renders it ambiguous.36
Justice Goldberg advises that rather than being read narrowly,
the statute should be read in accordance with the entirety of the
regulatory scheme, which requires the incorporation of all sections
in the statute.37
Historically, when the Rhode Island Supreme Court
interprets “clear and unambiguous statutory provision[s], it is
entirely proper [] to look to the sense and meaning fairly deducible
from the context.”38 Typically, the court “‘consider[s] the entire
statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the
context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were

32. Id.
33. Kayak Centre, 116 A.3d at 255 (citing National, 307 A.2d at 771).
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d at 485 (quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147,
150 (R.I. 2006).
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independent of all other sections.’”39 In the past, when the
Supreme Court has faced with statutory provisions that are in
pari materia, it has “construe[d] [the statutory provisions] in a
manner that attempts to harmonize them and that is consistent
with their general objective scope.”40 Yet, here the court has
failed to follow its own precedent.
The court’s narrow
interpretation undermined the legislative intent of the statute; the
statute was enacted in order to develop a uniform system for the
award of contracts by municipalities utilizing open cooperative
bids.41 The court erred in holding otherwise where the concession
contract before the court undoubtedly fits cleanly within the
Legislative intent of the statute.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court’s decision presents
obstacles to Kayak Centre beyond those typically associated with
an unfavorable ruling. By finding that the statute was not
ambiguous and hence ruling that the statute did not apply to the
Town’s actions, the Supreme Court invites public corruption.
Justice Goldberg hints at the risk of public corruption in her
concurrence/dissent, pointing to the “dangerous waters” to which
the Majority embarks.42 The risk of public corruption that Justice
Goldberg noted is further illustrated by the strict Gilbane
standard that Kayak Centre faces on remand.43 Kayak Centre
must be able to exemplify that the Town committed a
demonstrable abuse of discretion, a feat likely to prove difficult for
the small-town business as the Town has demonstrable proof to
the contrary.44 The record that was before the court demonstrates
that the Town faced backlash from the public regarding the
impending bid award to Kayak Centre, providing the Town with a
justifiable reason to reconsider the award.
Only if Kayak Centre is able to show that despite this noted
public outcry, the Town itself demonstrated corruption and bad
faith so as to warrant a holding that the Gilbane standard was

39. Raiche, 101 A.3d at 1248 (quoting Mendes v. Factor, 41 A.3d 994,
1002).
40. Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 295 (R.I. 2007).
41. Kayak Centre, 116 A.3d at 257 (Goldberg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 45-55-1).
42. Id.
43. 267 A.2d at 399.
44. Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399.
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breached will its claim survive.45 Considering the uphill battle
that Kayak Centre faces, Kayak Centre’s claim will likely be
extinguished on remand because, even beyond the general
undetectable nature of corruption, the proof of the townspeople’s
concern will further protect the Town from any allegation of
corruption or bad faith.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island competitive bidding statute, R.I. General
Laws 1956 Section 45-55-5, does not apply to the bidding for
public concession contracts because the statute explicitly applies
only to contracts that produce purchases. In the absence of an
applicable statute, the Gilbane46 standard of good faith must
nevertheless be applied to consider whether a party “acted
corruptly or in bad faith, or so unreasonably or so arbitrarily as to
be guilty of a palpable abuse of discretion” during the competitive
bidding process.47
Breegan Semonelli

45.
46.
47.

267 A.2d at 399.
Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 399.
Kayak Centre, 116 A.3d at 255 (quoting Gilbane, 267 A.2d at 400).
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Real Property. Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc. et al, 112
A.3d 703 (R.I. 2015). The Rhode Island Supreme Court found no
abuse of discretion when the Superior Court granted the Plaintiff
landowner’s preliminary injunction to prevent the Defendant
landowner from trespassing onto, interfering with, obstructing, or
blocking the Plaintiff’s business. The court further held that the
lower court properly ruled on the merits of exclusive ownership
and easement by prescription as the justice advised the parties he
would not consider those claims.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Plaintiff, Mario Gianfrancesco, owned the Geneva Diner
at 1162 Douglas Avenue, North Providence, since 1992.1 The
Defendant, A.R. Bilodeau Inc., owned a neighboring factory,
located at 1164 Douglas Avenue, which began operating in 1998,
which he leased to the co-defendant, Service Tech. Inc.2 The
Plaintiff’s parking lot and the Defendant’s driveway abutted each
other; divided by an unmarked boundary line.3 To conduct its
business, Service Tech used independently owned and operated
tractor-trailers (“trucks”), that ranged from thirty to fifty feet in
length.4 During business, the trucks routinely drove through the
Plaintiff’s property to access the Defendant’s property.5 The
Plaintiff never gave the Defendant permission to do so.6
A few incidents occurred between 1998 and 2001, whereby the
trucks caused damage to the Plaintiff’s property.7 After those
incidents, the Plaintiff “aggressively policed” his property to

1.
2015).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Gianfrancesco v. A.R. Bilodeau, Inc. et al, 112 A.3d 703, 705 (R.I.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prevent further damage.8
Despite his policing, the trucks
continued to pass through the Plaintiff’s parking lot.9 Conversely,
diner customers would park in the lot directly to the right of the
diner, encroaching on the Defendant’s property, and preventing
trucks from entering the driveway.10 There was no mention of
any specific incidents between 2001 and 2010.11
On March 28, 2013, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in the
Providence County Superior Court,12 seeking declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief.13
On April 12, 2014, the
Defendant filed his answer, which included counterclaims for: (1)
easement by prescription; (2) possession by acquiescence; (3) and
trespass.14 On May 13, 2013 the Defendant sought a temporary
restraining order seeking to enjoin the Plaintiff from blocking
access to the diagonal path to the parking lot.15
The hearing on the motions was held on May 23, 2013. The
Plaintiff testified that a Service Tech employee asked him to move
a car that was parked on the Defendant’s property.16 The
Plaintiff called the police, who arrived and instructed him to put
up a sign and traffic cones to prevent his patrons from parking in
the driveway.17 The Plaintiff also told the officer he wanted to
install a fence along the boundary line.18 Afterward, the Plaintiff
installed a plywood sign and cones; however, on June 5, 2013, the
Defendant testified that Service Tech employees moved the cones
to make way for a truck.19
The Plaintiff also introduced
photographs showing large trucks parking in front of the diner,
obscuring the building from the street.20 A witness further
testified the trucks would pass through the parking lot “every few
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 706.
11. Id. at 705–06.
12. Id. at 706. The complaint demanded the Defendant cease and desist,
requested quiet title, and claimed tortious interference with business
relations and quantum meruit. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 707.
20. Id.
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days.”21
The Defendant stated that he allowed the trucks to use the
parking lot because “[it] was the only way to get the product into
[the] facility.”22 The Defendant also testified that he had never
given permission for any trucks to park in the parking lot.23 He
further stated that if the Plaintiff erected a fence, Service Tech
“would be shut down for the most part” because it “wouldn’t be
able to get deliveries.”24 However, a video, recorded on May 31,
2013, showed a large truck using the driveway without using the
parking lot.25 The Defendant also conceded that skilled drivers
could enter his property without using the parking lot, but they
would have to make a “hard enough swing” to do so.26
After the hearings, the hearing justice issued a bench decision
granting the Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief
and denying the Defendant’s request.27 The Defendant then filed
an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court.28
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In reviewing the preliminary injunction,29 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court limited its review to “whether the hearing justice
erred in granting the Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive
relief.”30 To determine whether the trial justice erred, the
Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case warranting preliminary
injunctive relief.31 The trial justice must consider four factors to
21. Id.
22. Id. at 705.
23. Id. at 706.
24. Id. at 707. A witness for the Defendant further testified that the
driveway could not be used alone because “there is just not enough room.
They wouldn’t be able to make it to the facility otherwise.” Id. at 705.
25. Id. at 707.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Defendant also moved to stay and/or modify the order, which
was denied. Id.
28. Id. at 708.
29. Id. at 708 n.6. (“General Laws 1956 §9-24-7 provides in pertinent
part: Whenever, upon a hearing in the superior court, an injunction shall be
granted or continued, . . . an appeal may be taken from such order or
judgment to the supreme court in like manner as from a final judgment, and
the appeal shall take precedence in the supreme court”) (quoting R.I. GEN
LAWS §9-24-7 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 709.
31. Id. at 708.
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make his or her determination, including: whether the Plaintiff:
(1) has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, (2) will
suffer irreparable harm without the injunctive relief, (3) has the
balance of equities tip in his or her favor; and, (4) has shown the
issuance of a preliminary injunction will preserve the status
quo.32
In analyzing the first prong, the court did not dispute the
Superior Court’s finding that the Plaintiff owed the diner and
parking lot for thirty years and had the right to use and control
the property.33 The court then focused on the Defendant’s
easement by prescription defense.34 According to the Defendant,
he had gained title to the parking lot because the trucks
continually crossed Geneva Diner’s parking lot for over ten years
in an actual, open, notorious, and hostile manner to the
Plaintiff.35 The court dismissed the defense, finding no error
when the trial justice found that the Defendant lacked a
reasonable likelihood of success on that claim,36 because of the
undisputed fact that the Plaintiff continually objected to the
trucks using his parking lot, thus preventing the ten years from
accruing.37 Concluding that the trial justice did not abuse his
discretion, the court found the first prong satisfied.38
The court then briefly addressed the remaining prongs,
finding no abuse of discretion.39 For the second prong, the trial
justice properly found the size of the trucks posed an incredible
disruption, and an economic and safety hazard to the Plaintiff,
thus causing irreparable harm.40 For the third prong, the trial
32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 709. The trial justice found that “there has been no evidence
that the [P]laintiff do[es] not own . . . the entire parcel including the area
travel over from time to time by the [D]efendants.” Id.
34. Id. at 710.
35. Id. (citing Butterfly Realty v. James Romanella & Sons, Inc., 93 A.3d
1022, 1030 (R.I. 2014)).
36. Id. at 710.
37. Id. (quoting Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d
826, 832 (R.I. 2001). The true owner can “stop the statutory prescriptive
period from running” by “affirmatively communicat[ing]” objection to the
use”).
38. Id.
39. Id. The court noted that the trial justice’s analysis was “somewhat
scant” but “adequately addressed the issues.” Id. at 711.
40. Id.at 710. The justice relied on the Plaintiff’s video showing a large
truck enter the Defendant’s property in supporting that the Plaintiff would

REAL PROPERTY_HENNINGER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

SURVEY SECTION

5/16/2016 7:20 PM

815

justice properly balanced the equities by finding that the Plaintiff
suffered greater hardships than the Defendant.41 Finally, the
trial justice found that the status quo of the clear separation of
properties would allow the Plaintiff full use of his parking lot.42
According to the Supreme Court, none of these conclusions were
abuses of discretion.43
Finally, the Supreme Court struck down the Defendant’s
argument that the trial justice abused his discretion by ruling on
the merits.44 The court found no evidence of abuse of discretion as
the trial justice consistently stated he would withhold deciding the
case on the merits until the injunction issue was decided.45
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court gave wide discretion to the
trial justice for preliminary injunctions by finding no abuse of
discretion. Such discretion is necessary for trial justices to carry
out their role as the primary deciders of justice. The court refused
to become a helicopter parent of the lower courts, noting its
limited review.46 However, the court noted the “somewhat scant”
analysis of the trial justice’s rationale in granting the preliminary
injunction,47 suggesting that lower court justices may need to
further engage in the case at bar and begin more in-depth
analyses of the law and facts of the case. The court did not set the
minimum standard justices must meet in applying the law, but
agreed that the trial justice’s emphasis on the first prong was
adequate when compared to the thin analyses of the remaining
prongs.48
suffer irreparable harm without the injunction. Id. at 710-711.
41. Id. at 711.
42. Id. (quoting Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc., 792 A.2d at 705). “Prospective
damage to a business’s good will and reputation ‘is precisely the type of
irreparable injury for which an injunction is appropriate.’” Id. (quoting The
Fund for Community Progress v. United Way of Southeastern New England,
695 A.2d 517, 523 (R.I. 1997)).
43. Id. at 710.
44. Id. at 711.
45. Id. During the hearings, the trial justice consistently stated he was
not considering the merits of the claims and the injunction would remain in
effect until the complaint was heard on its merits. Id.
46. Id. (citing Vasquez, 57 A.3d at 318).
47. Gianfrancesco, 112 A.3d at 711.
48. Id.
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The weighing of the various prongs suggests that preliminary
injunctions are not merely a check-list, but a balancing scale,
where one very strong prong may supplement the weaker prongs.
Indeed, the court agreed that the trial justice did not err in
emphasizing the first prong.49 However, an emphasis on one
prong does not mean the other prongs can be ignored. The court’s
review of the remaining prongs shows that all four factors must be
considered by a trial justice when deciding a preliminary
injunction.50 Yet, even one fact in favor of each factor is sufficient
to satisfy them. For example, the court found the third factor, the
balancing of equities, was satisfied simply by finding no error in
the finding that the Plaintiff’s hardships were much greater than
the Defendant’s.51 One fact can satisfy one factor.
Regarding the first factor, trial justices must carefully tread
the fine line between finding a reasonable likelihood of success
without ruling on the merits of the complaint. The close
similarities between ruling on the merits and reasonable
likelihood of success could lead a justice to cross the fine line.
Indeed, the Defendant argued the trial justice ruled on the merits
of the case.52 Yet, the court took the trial justice’s refusal to rule
on the merits of the claims at face value. It did not probe into the
justice’s actions, other than his statements during the hearings,53
nor his visitation of the disputed property at the outset of the
hearings.54 Such discretion by the court allows justices room to
rule on injunctions without ruling on the merits of claims or
constraining the formalistic rules and procedures.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Superior
Court did not abuse its discretion when it granted the Plaintiff’s
preliminary injunction and denied the Defendant’s request for an
49. Id.
50. Id. at 708 (citing Iggy’s Doughboys, Inc., 729 A.2d at 705).
51. Id. at 711. The forth prong of preserving the status quo was
similarly satisfied by one fact: the preliminary injunction favoring the
Plaintiff would allow him the full use of his property. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The trial justice specifically stated the injunction “will stay in
effect until the complaint, underlying complaints are heard on their merits.”
Id.
54. Id. at 706 n.4.
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injunction despite a minimal decision from the trial court. The
court further found the trial justice did not rule on the merits of
the complaint by his explicit refusal to do so, leaving the matter
for the Superior Court.
Gregory Henninger
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Tort Law. Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of
Rhode Island v. Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., L.P., 115 A.3d 998 (R.I.
2015). The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that the
claim of negligence alleged against Charlesgate Nursing Center
did not constitute an intentional act. The court found that
allegations against Charlesgate were in fact an “occurrence” or
“accident” to which commercial general liability (CGL) applies. A
duty to defend an insured exists unless and until the tortious
actions of the insured amount to an intentional act.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association of Rhode
Island (JUA) insured the Charlesgate Nursing Center under a
policy that provided coverage for both hospital professional
liability (HPL) as well as commercial general liability (CGL) from
December 2008 until December 2009.1 In June of 2009, a resident
at Charlesgate Nursing Center claimed that Josiah Ajibade
Olowoporoku, a certified nursing assistant (CNA) and employee at
Charlesgate, sexually assaulted her.2 The resident passed away
in October 2011 and her son, acting as the administrator to her
estate, “filed suit in the [Rhode Island] Superior Court against
Charlesgate” as well as various partners and employees of
Charlesgate for negligence and sexual assault.3
The complaint asserted that Olowoporoku physically and
sexually assaulted the resident on June 16, 2009.4 Furthermore,
the complaint alleged that at the time of the assault, another
CNA, Sandra James, “was at the nurse’s station where she heard
the resident’s cries for help, but she did not respond.”5 The
1. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass’n of Rhode Island v.
Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., L.P., 115 A.3d 998, 1000 (R.I. 2015).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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complaint alleged that James reported the assault to a fellow
employee, Lynda Gaboriault, who similarly failed to report the
assault.6 On June 16, the resident reported the assault to a
medical technician, Sharon Scott, and to James.7 On June 18, the
family of the resident was informed of the assault and the family
immediately insisted that Charlesgate file a report regarding the
assault with the police department.8 That day a rape kit was
administered to the resident and revealed “bruising, a laceration,
excoriation, and trauma or penetration to the vaginal area.”9
The estate’s complaint contained six counts altogether, five of
which were claiming negligence against Charlesgate and its
employees.10 The complaint alleged that Charlesgate and its
employees failed to “properly supervise, train or screen its
employees; to provide proper security measures; to report that a
resident had been abused or mistreated within twenty-four hours
in accordance with [General Laws] 1956 § 23-17.8-2; and to
discipline its employees following the alleged sexual assault.”11
The complaint also alleged that as a “direct and proximate result
of [Charlesgate’s] alleged negligence” the resident suffered “severe
personal injuries, shock and injury to her nervous system, extreme
pain and suffering, mental anguish, loss of capacity for the
6. Id.
7. Id. When notified of the assault, Scott reported the incident to
Gaboriault on June 16 and 17. The opinion is unclear as to whether
Gaboriault ever reported the incident. It is also noted that following the
assault Charlesgate continued to employ Olowoporoku. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The complaint also noted that the resident had been given at
least three bed baths and one shower at Charlesgate in between the time of
the assault and the time the rape kit was administered. Id.
10. Id. at 1001. One count of the complaint made a claim of assault and
battery against Olowoporoku. Id.
11. Id. The court stated:
General Laws 1956 § 23-17.8-2 provides, in pertinent part, that: “(a)
Any physician, medical intern, registered nurse, licensed practical
nurse, nurse’s aide, orderly, certified nursing assistant . . . or any
person, within the scope of their employment at a facility or in their
professional capacity, who has knowledge of or reasonable cause to
believe that a patient or resident in a facility has been abused,
mistreated, or neglected shall make, within twenty-four (24) hours or
by the end of the next business day, a telephone report to the
director of the department of health or his or her designee for those
incidents involving health care facilities.”
Id. at n.4.
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enjoyment of life, humiliation, embarrassment, [and] severe
emotional distress.”12
Once notified of the complaint against Charlesgate, the JUA
conducted an investigation to determine whether it had a duty to
defend Charlesgate in the pending matter.13 Upon investigation,
the JUA concluded that no duty existed to defend Charlesgate
against this particular suit, and that according to their policy,
Charlesgate was not entitled to either HPL or CGL insurance
coverage.14 The JUA decided that “the alleged sexual assault did
not constitute a ‘medical incident’ within the ambit of HPL
coverage, and . . . the alleged sexual assault ‘cannot be construed
as an accident under any definition’ and therefore is not an
‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the CGL insurance coverage.”15
Upon this decision, the JUA filed an action in Superior Court
seeking a declaration stating that it had no obligation to defend
Charlesgate against the pending allegations.16
Charlesgate
responded with a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment
that the JUA had “a duty to defend each of the Charlesgate
defendants” and also sought damages for the JUA’s alleged breach
of contract.17 To follow up the JUA filed a motion for summary
judgment in January 2013 and Charlesgate responded in
February 2013 with an objection as well as its own cross-motion
for summary judgment requesting the declaratory judgment from
the court.18 In May 2013 the Superior Court denied the JUA’s
motion for summary judgment and subsequently granted
Charlesgate’s cross-motion for summary judgment.19 The court
held that the JUA did owe a duty to defend Charlesgate and its
defendants against the allegations.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the Superior Court order, the Supreme Court
determined that it was most appropriate to interpret the terms of
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1001, 1002.
Id at 1002.
Id.
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the disputed insurance policy according the general rules that
govern the construction of contracts.21 Essentially, the court
would only consider the literal language of the policy unless they
found any ambiguous language, in which case they would only
apply the ordinary meaning to the ambiguous term.22
Furthermore, the court decided that when it found an ambiguous
term in the policy, it would interpret that term in favor of the
insured and against the insurer.23 Once the court interpreted the
literal meaning of the policy, it applied the “pleadings test” to
determine whether the JUA owed Charlesgate a duty to defend it
in the contested suit.24 Under the “pleadings test,” an insurer has
“an unequivocal duty to defend” an insured party when “a
complaint contains a statement of facts which bring the case
within or potentially within the risk coverage of the policy.”25
The literal language of JUA’s insurance policy is the central
question in this suit.26 On appeal, the JUA argued that
Charlesgate was not entitled to the CGL coverage included in the
policy because the sexual assault complained of by the estate did
“not constitute an ‘occurrence,’ which is defined in the policy as an
‘accident.’”27 On the other hand, Charlesgate argued that the
negligence claims against them in the suit did in fact constitute an
“occurrence” under the policy’s guidelines, and they are therefore
entitled to coverage by the JUA’s policy.28 It is then up to the
court to determine if the language purported in the policy does in
fact apply to the negligence allegations set forth in the complaint
against Charlesgate.
The court found that because the complaint only contained
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1003.
24. Id. at 1004.
25. Id. (quoting The Employers’ Fire Insurance Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I.
623, 632, 240 A.2d 397, 403 (1968)). In Rhode Island, “a liability insurer’s
duty to defend is predicated not upon information in its possession which
indicates or even proves non-coverage, but instead upon the allegations in the
complaint filed against the insured.” The Employers’ Fire Insurance Co. v.
Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 632, 240 A.2d 397, 403 (1968). Essentially, the insurer
has a duty to defend the insured when the facts alleged in the complaint are
within the scope of the insurance policy. See id.
26. See Charlesgate Nursing Ctr., 115 A.3d at 1003.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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allegations of negligence against Charlesgate, the court would not
consider any allegations of intentional or sexual assault in the
matter.29 In order to determine whether the JUA owed a duty to
defend Charlesgate, the court endeavored to evaluate the precise
and literal definitions of the terms essential to the JUA’s
insurance policy.30 The court concentrated on the clause in the
policy that offers coverage to Charlesgate “only for the risks of
‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ that are caused by an
‘occurrence.’”31 The court was thus tasked with determining if
“the facts alleged in the estate’s complaint constitute[d] an
‘occurrence’ to which CGL coverage potentially applies.”32 The
JUA’s policy defined “occurrence” to mean an “accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions,” but failed to define exactly what the policy
meant by “accident.”33 The court acknowledged that it had to
define the ambiguous term “accident” in order to determine if the
JUA had a duty to defend Charlesgate under the policy.
The court first referred to Black’s Law Dictionary to
determine the ordinary definition of “accident” and found the term
to mean an “unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence;
something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that
could not be reasonably anticipated.”34 The court further found
that this definition of “accident” should be interpreted from the
viewpoint of the insured, rather than from the viewpoint of the
insurer.35 Therefore, the court held that the events alleged in the
complaint qualified as unexpected and unforeseen to Charlesgate,
because the alleged sexual assault was not within the usual
course of events that generally took place between residents and
employees at the nursing center.36 Upon the determination of this
definition, the JUA attempted to argue that because the sexual
assault itself was an intentional act, the facts alleged in the
complaint did not amount to an accident that would be covered by

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 1004.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 2014)).
Id.
Id.
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the policy.37 The court, however, found that allegations against
Charlesgate qualified as an accident because the complaint
alleged the count of sexual assault (the intentional act) against
the individual defendant Olowoporoku, and not against
Charlesgate.38 Ultimately, the court opined that the particular
language expressed in the policy should be interpreted according
to “the intent expressed by the language of the contract,” rather
than by the intent of the insurer and, therefore, should be read
more broadly than the JUA initially suggested.39 The court held
that under a broader reading of the policy, the JUA did have a
duty to defend Charlesgate against the claims made in the estate’s
complaint.
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted this particular
insurance policy in light of the fact that Charlesgate was not
defending against claims of intentional sexual assault, but rather,
was only facing charges of negligence.40 The JUA favored a very
narrow interpretation of their policy, insisting that the facts
alleged in the complaint did not constitute an accident, but only
an intentional act that should not be covered by their policy.41
The JUA relied on a number of Rhode Island cases attempting
to argue that, in the past, insurance agencies were not obligated to
insure against claims of intentional sexual assault.42 The JUA,
however, failed to recognize that in both cases prior, the insured
party had personally and directly committed the intentional
sexual assault against the complainant,43 whereas Charlesgate
did not directly commit the sexual assault, but is only defending
against allegations of negligence.44
The court in this case interpreted the intentions of the policy
more broadly than the JUA would have liked.45 The court

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
See id. at 1006.
Id. at 1007
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005.
Id.
Id. at 1006.
Id. at1004.
See id. at 1007.
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determined the most basic and ordinary meaning for the terms in
question and applied that meaning to the facts alleged in the
complaint.46 Charlesgate was not directly responsible for the
assault, but rather the sexual assault can easily be interpreted as
an event or occurrence that was “neither expected nor intended”
by the nursing center and is not something that happens in the
“usual course of events.”47 Therefore, because Charlesgate’s
alleged negligence was not intentional, but purely circumstantial,
the claims of negligence appropriately fit within the coverage of
JUA’s insurance policy.
This entire opinion hinged on the fact that the JUA was not
specific enough with the terms and conditions in their policy. Had
the JUA simply defined what an “accident” was and constructed
its policy in accordance with that definition, it very well could
have avoided litigation altogether. Furthermore, a more specific
policy could have resulted in a different outcome since the court
would have had to do more than just apply plain legal language.
If the JUA had defined the terms “accident” and “occurrence”
according to their objectives, the court would have been left to
interpret the policy in a way the JUA had preferred for it to be
read. A specific contract ultimately gives a court less interpretive
discretion regarding the terms in question.
This case may be a warning to insurance companies going
forward. The court’s broad reading of the JUA’s policy should
alert other insurance companies that courts are more inclined to
interpret contracts in a light more favorable to the insured
parties.48 The court’s decision here should warn insurance
companies, in some sense, to be more careful and more specific
when constructing and enforcing coverage policies in order to
avoid liability in cases where accidents are concerned. This
decision shows that Rhode Island courts are more inclined to
interpret insurance policies against the insurer and going forward,
insurance companies should be very wary of the terms and
definitions they do or do not include in their policies.49 A
contract’s specificity could ultimately relieve an insurer of their
duty to defend certain clients in certain instances.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 1005.
See id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1248 (10th ed. 2014)).
See id. at 1003.
See id.
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This decision may also put a heavier burden on companies
and individuals who choose to be insured. If insurance companies
have been put on notice and begin to clean up their policies, it will
be the insured party’s obligation to inspect their policies more
closely than they may have prior. Of course, insured parties today
do not sign policies without some kind of reasonable inspection.
However, this case should put any insured party on notice that, in
the event that a dispute arises, insurance companies may be more
prepared to defend their policies with more directed language and
specific conditions. As a result, this case may, as a whole, make
both insured parties and insurers more accountable.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the JUA had a
duty to defend Charlesgate Nursing Center against the negligence
allegations lodged against them in the estate’s complaint. The
court concluded that the terms “occurrence” and “accident”
specified in the insurance policy applied to the negligence claims
against Charlesgate, and therefore, under the “pleadings test” the
JUA had an explicit duty to defend the Charlesgate Nursing
Center against the estate’s complaint.
Olivia Phetteplace
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2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 44, 46. An Act Relating to Criminal
Offenses – Threats and Extortion. This Act adds magistrates to
the list of public officials against whom it is felonious to threaten
with bodily harm or death.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 98, 110. An Act Relating to
Uniform Controlled Substances – Offenses and Penalties. This
Act requires that a civil fine for possession of one ounce or less of
marijuana be paid 30 days after the disposition of the case, a
change from previous language that said “the offense.” The act
further specifies that no record by a state agency or tribunal that
includes personally identifiable information of possession of one
ounce or less of marijuana, by adults or juveniles, be open to
public inspection.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 119, 153. An Act Relating to
Courts and Civil Procedure – Post Conviction Remedy. This Act
allows for someone convicted of a crime to file a petition
requesting forensic DNA testing of evidence. The Act eliminated
any requirement that the petitioner be incarcerated or imprisoned
in order to file such a petition.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 129, 151. An Act Relating to Labor
and Labor Relations – Fair Employment Practices. This Act
prohibits employers from refusing to make reasonable
accommodations for employees or prospective employees if they
have conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions, unless the employer can show that the
accommodation would create an undue hardship to the employer’s
business. An employer may not require their employees to take
leave if the employer can make another reasonable
accommodation related to the employee’s condition. An employer
cannot prevent an employee or prospective employee from
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opportunities if they are preventing it because of the pregnancy,
childbirth, or a related medical condition. Employers must provide
written notice to all of their employees regarding employees right
to freedom from discrimination due to pregnancy, childbirth and
related conditions. New, perspective and current employees
should also be notified of their right to reasonable
accommodations for conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth or
related conditions. Any person violating the terms of this act or
coercing others to do so would engage in an unlawful employment
practice. This act does not compel employers to create new
positions that they would not have created, unless they do so for
other employees. Further, this Act does not compel employers to
terminate or transfer any employee with more seniority or
promote an unqualified person, unless they do so for other
employees.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 138, 148. An Act Relating to
Criminal Offenses – Identity Theft Protection Act. This Act seeks
to protect Rhode Island citizens from identity theft. Any state or
municipal agency that stores or uses Rhode Island residents
personal information must implement a risk-based information
security program, containing reasonable security procedures and
practices in line with other organizations of the same nature,
purpose, size and scope. The agencies must protect Rhode
Islander’s personal information from any unauthorized access or
disclosure, so that the information is confidential.
Any
information that is collected is required to be destroyed in an
appropriate manner, once the information has been used for its
intended purpose. If there is a disclosure of any Rhode Island
resident’s personal information to a nonaffiliated third party there
must be a written contract with the party that requires the third
party maintain the information with reasonable security in line
with other organizations of the same nature, purpose, size and
scope. The third party must also destroy the information after it
has been used for the purpose for which the organization acquired
the information. If there is a breach of information collected by
the agency or the information security system, which would
threaten that information, the agency must provide notice, within
forty five (45) calendar days, to any Rhode Islander who may have
been affected. If there are more than five hundred (500) Rhode
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Island residents affected than the agency shall notify both the
Rhode Island Attorney General and the major credit reporting
agency of the timing, content and distribution of notices and the
approximate number of those effected. Notification may be
delayed if a law enforcement agency notifies the breaching agency
without unreasonable delay that they believe that the notification
will slow or negatively affect a criminal investigation. If there is a
law enforcement agency delay, then law enforcement will notify
the breaching agency when there is no more threat to an
investigation, and the agency will make notification to Rhode
Island residents as soon as practicable. The breaching agency will
cooperate with any law enforcement agency. Any notification to
Rhode Island residents who could or are victims of a breach must
include a brief description of the breach and the number of those
affected, the information that was involved in the breach, the date
of the breach and its discovery, and a description of remedial
measures that the agency will take, including contact information
for credit reporting agencies, remediation service providers, and
the Attorney General. The agency will also provide information
on how to seek a security freeze, file a police report or the fees
required for consumer reporting agencies. Any reckless violation
of the chapter is a violation, each instance will have a penalty of
not more than one hundred dollars ($100) per record. Any
knowing and willful violation of the chapter is a civil violation
with a penalty of two hundred dollars ($200) per record. The
Attorney General, if there is suspicion of a violation, may bring an
action against a person or business who has violated this section.
Any agency, person or business will be in compliance with this
section if the organization complies with this law or 15 U.S.C. §
6809(2). Any financial institution in compliance with the Federal
Interagency Guidelines on Response Programs for Unauthorized
Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice will be in
compliance. Any health care industry organization or covered
entity governed by HIPAA will be deemed in compliance.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 160, 183. An Act Relating to
Animal and Animal Husbandry – Regulation of Vicious Dogs.
This Act requires that any dog seized by law enforcement be
placed in the care of the Rhode Island Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals (“RISPCA”). The RISPCA is required to use a
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process that is timely to determine where to place the dog,
whether with a rescue organization or adoptive home. The Act
also requires that there be humane euthanization if the dog’s
medical or behavioral condition requires it or after reasonable
time and effort, there is no appropriate placement for the dog. The
Act further requires that the determination of whether a dog
trained for fight is deemed vicious can be made only after the
RISPCA assess the dog.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 162, 178. An Act Relating to State
Affairs and Government – Department of Children, Youth, and
Families. This Act adds to the Children’s Bill of Rights a
nondiscrimination clause for any child under the supervision of
the Rhode Island Department of Children Youth & Families.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 174, 184. An Act Relating to
Property – Condominium Ownership. This Act prohibits any
landlord, owner or association from preventing or enforcing a
restrictive covenant that prevents a tenant or unit owner
displaying or posting on the entry to their dwelling any religious
items displayed with sincere religious belief. The Act is not meant
to prohibit items that threaten public health or safety,
discriminate in housing according to the Rhode island Fair
Housing Practices Act, or federal or state law. The Act does not
apply to religious items located in any other part of the property
not considered the entry way or displays that combined or
individually total a size of twenty-five square inches. The Act
does not authorize material changes to the unit entry, changing
material, color or other alteration to the entry door or door frame
unauthorized by the covenant. The property owner’s association is
permitted to remove items that violate a restrictive covenant that
the act permits.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 204, 224. An Act Relating to
Education – Health and Safety of Pupils. This Act requires that
all public schools providing sixth through twelfth grade educations
provide on-site an opioid antagonist, a drug that binds to opioid
receptors that prevent opioids effects, like Narcan or naloxone.
Any trained “nurse-teacher” may administer to opioid antagonist
in an emergency to a student or staff, whom the “nurse-teacher”
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suspects of being under the effects of an opioid overdose, whether
there is a history or not. A “nurse-teacher” may receive training
in the administration of an opioid antagonist by the department of
health. School physicians shall make standing orders that create
procedures to follow in the case of a suspected opioid overdose at
the school. Those orders shall not require a specific “nurseteacher” to administer the drug. The drugs will be kept in a
quantity required by the department of elementary and secondary
education and the department of health and shall be kept in an
obvious place that is readily available, but secure.
Those
departments will create regulations and procedures for the health
and safety of students. No “nurse-teacher” or school will be liable
for civil damages for negligence or liable for criminal prosecution
resulting from good faith administration of the opioid antagonist,
but this does not apply to gross negligence or willful or wanton
conduct. Further, no “nurse-teacher” will be subject to penalty or
discipline for refusing training for opioid antagonist
administration.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 208, 232. An Act Relataing to
Education – Curriculum. The Act “strongly encourage[s]” all
secondary public schools to offer music courses to their students.
The Act further specifies that the curriculum should make an
emphasis of and attempt to develop appreciation for creative
expression.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 210, 241. An Act Relating to
Probate Practice and Procedure – Uniform Adult Guardianship
and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act. This Act adopted the
“Uniform Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings
Jurisdiction Act” that is now in use in forty-four states. Rhode
Island courts may communicate with other state courts regarding
the proceedings of guardianship and protective orders, including
scheduling, calendars, court records and other administrative
matters without a record. The courts must allow all parties to
participate in the communication and make a record of the
communication, including the fact that the communication
occurred and the identification of the participants, if it is not for
administrative purposes. Courts may cooperate with one another
in a guardianship or protective proceeding by holding evidentiary
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hearings, evidentiary or witness orders, evaluation or other
investigatory orders. The courts holding these hearings or making
these orders must forward to the other court an official transcript
of the proceedings. Outside courts may also issue orders to appear
and may, after a hearing, issue an order for the production of
medical, financial or other relevant information in compliance
with federal and state law. Rhode Island courts may allow for
testimony in a guardianship or protective proceeding to be taken
in deposition or through video or audio of those in other states.
Evidence taken by another state court and transmitted through
electronic means, so that it is not an original writing, may be
objected to because of the transmission. The Act enumerates
factors to consider when determining if a respondent has
significant connections to the state. The act allows for special
circumstances to claim jurisdiction, and for specific reasons for
jurisdiction. A court may decline jurisdiction, however, if there is
a more appropriate forum or because of unjustifiable conduct.
Notice of any proceeding is requires by the act and must be
granted to parents who would have been given notice in another
state. If there are two or more concurrent proceedings, then if
Rhode Island has jurisdiction under this act, the court may
continue. If the Rhode Island court does not have jurisdiction,
they are to stay the proceedings and communicate with the other
court. Any party may petition to transfer proceedings to another
state or to have their proceedings transferred to Rhode Island.
Registration may be filed for recognition in Rhode Island from
other states with regards to both guardianship and protective
orders. After registration, those orders are to be respected in full
by Rhode Island.
2015 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 214, 235. An Act Relating to Motor
and Other Vehicles – Comprehensive Community-Police
Relationship Act of 2015. This Act amends pieces of the racial
profile act. The Act allows law enforcement to ask for consent to
search a pedestrian without reasonable suspicion or probable
cause that the person is included in criminal activity. The Act
also requires reasonable suspicion or probable cause for any
search of juveniles and that police may not ask for consent to a
search. The Act also required to document any search, even the
search did not result in arrest, in a computer-aided dispatch
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(“CAD”) or another police-generated report. The Act requires data
collection be police departments to show any disparities in traffic
stops regarding race, and that they report this information to the
department of transportation or its designee. The information is
to be used to address any inconsistences that show disparities or
impermissible profiling.

